His current book The Jihadists: Unholy Warriors will be published by Harcourt Press and available in summer 2005.

His book America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?(1999) is available at the Cambridge University Press Web site. The Islamists and the West: Ideology vs Pragmatism (Cambridge University Press) was published in 2002.

His articles and essays have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The Christian Science Monitor, The International Herald Tribune, The Nation, Survival, Harvard Journal of World Affairs, The Oxford International Review, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, The Middle East Journal, The Beirut Review, Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi, Al Hayat, Al-Safir, Al-Nahar, Al-Mustaqbal and in other journals and anthologies. 

Analysis: Can Lebanon Region Be Calmed? Will Hariri Assassination Cause Further Destabilization? There May Be Ways to Avoid Disaster
By FAWAZ A. GERGES
ABCNews.com, February 18, 2005
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=511984&page=1

Employing a massive explosive device, assassins killed the former prime minister of Lebanon in the streets of Beirut last week. The brazen attack immediately heightened tensions in the country, threatening a fragile peace that has endured since 1990, when Lebanon's bloody civil war came to a close.

The slain leader, Rafik Hariri, was a critic of the powerful role played in Lebanon by neighboring Syria, which maintains some 14,000 troops on Lebanese soil. Syrian leaders condemned Hariri's killing, but the United States moved quickly to increase international pressure on Damascus to withdraw its troops.

What does Hariri's assassination mean for Lebanon and its potential to further destabilize an already volatile region? Although many Lebanese pointed fingers at Syria, why would the Damascus regime embark on such a shockingly bold and risky move? Why would Damascus take such a risk? How can regional actors and the international community avoid another disaster in the Middle East?

At the outset, there is no smoking gun, no concrete evidence of who committed this heinous crime. Even so, the opposition in Lebanon and Hariri's family clearly hold the Syrian and Lebanese governments responsible for the blast. The international community also appears to be leaning toward the theory that rogue elements of Syrian intelligence or pro-Syrian elements in Lebanon had a hand in the attack.

Lebanese Opposition Suspects Syria The opposition in Lebanon claims that killing Hariri was designed to intimidate and silence them. In the last few weeks, pro-Syrian elements in Lebanon accused Hariri of funding the opposition and running the show from behind the scenes. The logic of the opposition goes like this: By going to the top, Syria was sending a powerful signal that anyone who dares to defy Syria will be targeted.

If that was the case, it was very risky. In fact, it defies common sense, because Syria has been under considerable international scrutiny. The United Nations demanded recently that Syria pull its forces out of Lebanon. The United States has been exerting pressure on Syria. The noose has been tightening around the neck of Syria's leaders, trying to force them to sever links to Lebanon. Syria must have known that such a risky venture would bring the full weight of international opinion down on its head.

I doubt Syrian President Bashar Assad has blood on his hands or would give an order to assassinate Hariri. But that does not mean that some rogue Syrian agents or pro-Syrian elements in Lebanon were not involved. We just do not know. We have no evidence. We are speculating.

Syria Dilemmas The critical question facing the international community, along with the league of the Arab States, is how can they persuade Syria to withdraw its security forces from Lebanon.

Unilateral American action will not do. The international community as a whole -- led by the United Nations along with the Arab League -- must exert pressure on Syria, as well as engage the Syrian leadership politically, in order to assure them that Lebanon will not become a hostile theater against Syrian interests.

Syria needs to be persuaded that pulling out does not mean it will be targeted as a next step by American forces. Syria's leaders believe the invasion of Iraq and the recent pressure on them are designed to topple the nation's Baath regime. Syria, Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon believe they are being targeted by the United States.

As to Lebanon, there exists no real fear that if Syria does withdraw, it could mean a return to the same factionalism that led to the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990. If there is one thing the assassination has shown, it's that the Lebanese are deeply committed to regaining their sovereignty and independence. Although the Lebanese remain divided, a consensus has emerged that they are not willing to plunge once again into full sectarian strife. They have learned from their previous mistakes.

The Syrian presence in Lebanon has become a major obstacle to both Syria and Lebanon. Far from remaining a strategic card in the hands of the Syrian regime, its military presence has turned into a liability. It is no longer a strategic asset. The longer they remain, the more damage their presence will do to political institutions in Lebanon, to a healthy political life and to Syrian-Lebanese relations.

Engage the Major Players The question of Hezbollah is critical. It may lie at the heart of the ability of the Lebanese to create a viable political system and a sense of community. The challenge is to integrate Hezbollah into the structure of Lebanese society and to transform Hezbollah's paramilitary structure. Hezbollah has its own military apparatus in the name of protecting the homeland against Israel.

This is really the most existential challenge facing Lebanon now and after Syria pulls its forces out: How do you give Hezbollah a political stake so that it sheds its military character and becomes a purely political entity? The best way to do this is for the United States and the international community to engage fully in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Without a regional settlement, you're going to have a dissatisfied Syria and a dissatisfied Iran, and both of them are more than willing to use Hezbollah to exert pressure on Israel.

And yes, it is risky for the United States to pressure European countries to label Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, as the Bush administration is doing. Sticks are being used exclusively without carrots. What the United States and the international community must try to do is engage the various players -- including Syria, Iran, Lebanon and Hezbollah -- because without a settlement that includes all of them, you'll never have peace in that part of the world.

Hezbollah is part of the fabric of the Shiite community in Lebanon now, and the Shiite community represents about 55 percent of Lebanon's population. You must deal with the root problem -- the simmering Arab-Israeli conflict and the volatile situation in Iraq.

The war in Iraq has had a direct impact on the situation in Lebanon. One cannot understand recent developments in Lebanon without understanding the upheaval raging in Iraq. Syria is becoming more anxious about its own security, not to mention its interest in Lebanon. The leadership in Damascus is terrified it will be the next target on the Bush administration's list of rogue states. The Syrian leadership and the opposition in Lebanon are both reacting to the situation in the region.

There needs to be a regionwide solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the deteriorating situation in Iraq, or at least a comprehensive diplomatic engagement by the international community. Barring such a settlement and serious engagment, neither Syria nor Iran (and their local clients -- Hezbollah, Hamas and Jihad) will accept the rules of the existing game.

Fawaz A. Gerges is a consultant for ABC News. A professor at Sarah Lawrence College and a Middle East scholar, he is author of the forthcoming "The Jihadis: Unholy Warriors" (Harcourt Press).

Build on the Momentum

By Fawaz A. Gerges
February 10, 2005

THE SUMMIT between Israeli and Palestinian leaders was a welcome first step in a long, complex and risky journey.

Its importance is symbolic and psychological, not substantive, since the two parties could not agree on a joint declaration of a cease-fire or signatures on a document. They announced a de facto cease-fire instead.

Major differences exist between the Palestinian and Israeli leadership on security and the political-diplomatic track.

But the Israeli-Arab gathering this week in Egypt created a new momentum, and if concrete steps are taken, the dynamics of Palestinian-Israeli relations could change for the positive.

After their confidence-building measures, it would be reassuring to see the two sides move forward and tackle the thorny issues of peace-making, including setting the borders of a future Palestinian state, Israeli security, Jewish settlements, the status of East Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is caught between a rock - U.S. and Israeli demands to end the armed intifada (which he did unilaterally) - and a hard place, Hamas and Islamic Jihad's calls on him to remain steadfast and not to make further concessions. Mr. Abbas must show the Palestinians that he is making progress. He must convince them that peace is on the horizon.

If Israel and the United States are serious about this new moment of hope, they must work hard to support Mr. Abbas and give Palestinians a stake in the future, because the Palestinians are watching their leader closely to see if he can deliver the goods.

Although Mr. Abbas persuaded Hamas and Islamic Jihad, both of them radical Islamist organizations, to agree to a temporary cease-fire, the latter's spokesmen in the Gaza Strip struck a cautionary note, saying they would evaluate the summit before committing themselves to halting their military campaign against Israeli occupation.

For example, Hamas said after the summit that it was not bound by the cease-fire. Mr. Abbas' declaration "expresses only the position of the Palestinian Authority. It does not express the position of the Palestinian movements," said Hamas spokesman Mushir al-Masri.

Indeed, Mr. Abbas faces major hurdles at home. His hands are tied, his options limited. He must show progress on the peace process, root out corruption and improve the quality of life by rebuilding Palestinian institutions. If he doesn't, he won't last long. Hamas would likely inherit the spoils.

Mr. Abbas' power base is dangerously narrow. Only 46 percent of eligible voters voted in the recent presidential elections, of which Mr. Abbas won 60 percent. This is in contrast with the 78 percent turnout that Yasser Arafat elicited in 1996 when he was elected head of the Palestinian Authority.

As for Israel, the United States and the international community must impress on Prime Minister Ariel Sharon the need to tackle the big questions relating to a viable Palestinian state. This implies a willingness to delineate the borders of the new state and the location of its capital and to address Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Palestinian refugees.

It's not enough for the United States and Israel to praise Mr. Abbas. President Bush, who had refused to meet with Mr. Arafat, said he was impressed by Mr. Abbas' commitment to fighting terror and invited him to Washington in the spring. His administration appears to be mainly concerned about confidence-building measures between the antagonists and security, not plunging fully into high-level shuttle diplomacy.

But as history will attest, no major progress can be achieved in Israeli-Palestinian peace-making without active engagement by a U.S. president and his senior aides.

Mr. Abbas cannot negotiate with Hamas and Islamic Jihad for a permanent cease-fire without something substantive to back him up. Public opinion polls show clearly that Palestinians support Hamas and Islamic Jihad's armed campaign against Israeli military occupation. Mr. Abbas must convince Palestinian public opinion that his path - not that of the militants - will ultimately bring peace and independence.

It's crucial that Israel act now to release Palestinian prisoners (who number about 8,000), withdraw its troops from Palestinian cities and towns and begin to dismantle settlements on the West Bank. A viable peace settlement is the safest way to marginalize Hamas and Islamic Jihad and ensure Israeli security in the longer term.

Achieving a breakthrough on the Palestinian-Israeli track would likely reduce tensions in Iraq and the region as well as cripple Islamic extremism and bin Ladenism.

Israel and Palestinians Plan Conditional Pledges to Halt Fighting

Fawaz A. Gerges Christian A. Johnson Chair, Middle East and International Affairs, Sarah Lawrence College
Tuesday, February 8, 2005; 2:00 PM

*Fawaz Gerges,*, Christian Johnson Chair in Middle East and International Relations, was online *Tuesday, Feb. 8, at 2 p.m. ET* to discuss the truce talks between Israel and the Palestinians.

"The importance of today's summit is highly symbolic and steps and

initiatives taken in the weeks ahead could positively change the dynamics of relations between Palestinians and Israelis," said Gerges in an interview with washingtonpost.com.

Gerges is the author of The Jihadists: Unholy Warriors (Harcourt Press)

Lexington, Ky.: What will happen with the anti-terrorist wall built by the Israelis? Will it stay as part of a final settlement?

Fawaz Gerges: At the onset, one point must be made clear about the summit meeting between Israeli and Palestinian leaders in Egypt this week: it is a welcome, humble, first step on a complex, prolonged, and risky journey. Its importance is highly symbolic and psychological, not substantive. The two parties could not agree on a joint declaration of a cease-fire or signatures on a document. Instead, they announced a de facto cease-fire. It is worth stressing that major differences exist between the Palestinian and Israeli leadership on security and the political-diplomatic track as well. There is a long distance to travel to reach the safe harbor of peace.

I do not mean to belittle the significance of the Israeli-Arab gathering in Egypt. On the contrary, it has created a new momentum and, if concrete steps are taken in the weeks and months ahead, the dynamics of Palestinian-Israeli relations could dramatically change for the better. In the last four years, the drums of war drowned calls for politics and diplomacy. It is hoped that the two sides will move forward after these confidence-building measures to tackle the thorny issues of peace-making - the borders of a future Palestinian state, Israeli security, Jewish settlements, the status of east Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees.

Detroit, Mich.: Opinions of Sharon in the Arab world and among Palestinians are well known. However, I have not read as much about what Israelis think about Abbas. Obviously, they are happy with an alternative to Arafat. What do Israelis see as positive and negative aspects to the background and character of Abbas?

Fawaz Gerges: Israelis of all colors loathed the late Palestinian President Yasserr Arafat. In the last four years of Arafat's life, Israel and the United States shunned him and refused to deal with him. They considered him the major impediment to peace-making. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon used that justification in order not to engage the Palestinians politically, and he also succeeded in convincing President Bush that his conflict with the Palestinians was an extension of the American global war on terror.

Now that Arafat is gone, the United States and Israel warmly welcomed the elections of the new Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who is seen as being committed to ending the state of war with Israel. Indeed, Abbas has been a consistent critic of the militarization of the Intifada and suicide bombings as well. He convincingly argued that the armed Intifada has done considerable damage to Palestinian society and institutions and has been disastrous to Palestinian national aspirations.

It is no wonder that President Bush, who had refused to meet with Arafat - said he was impressed by Abbas' commitment to fighting terror. "What you're watching is a process unfolding where people are becoming more trustworthy," the president said. Similarly, Israeli leaders praised Abbas' commitment to stability and security.

The critical question is, will the Likud-led government offer Abbas substantial rewards and strengthen his hands? Will the Bush administration remain actively engaged in the peace process and exert pressure on Sharon to make the necessary concessions?

Abbas is caught between a rock - American and Israeli demands to put an end to the armed Intifada- and a hard place - Hamas and Jihad's calls on him to remain steadfast and not to make further concessions. Abbas has to show Palestinian public opinion that he is making progress. He has to convince his people that there is a light at the end of the tunnel. Palestinians are observing Abbas very closely to see if he could deliver the goods. If Israel and the United States are genuine about this new hopeful moment, they must work hard to support Abbas and give Palestinians a stake in the future.

Quebec, Canada: Since the road map plan calls for Jewish residents to leave Gaza and the West Bank, wouldn't it also be fair for Arabs within Israel to leave? What's the difference?

Fawaz Gerges: Palestinians who live in Israel are full Israeli citizens with citizenship rights and responsibilities. Jewish settlers who live in occupied Palestinian territories do not want to be Palestinian citizens. They want to remain Israeli citizens, while living in Palestinian lands. I hope I have clarified the distinction?

Milan, Italy: If there is a lasting peace between Israel and the Arabs, will the Terrorist Containment wall remain in place or will it be torn down?

Fawaz Gerges: For now, Abbas has convinced Hamas and Jihad, radical Islamist organizations, to agree to a temporary cease-fire. But Hamas and Jihad' spokesmen in the Gaza Strip struck a cautionary note, saying they would evaluate the summit before committing themselves to halting their military campaign against Israeli occupation. "We agreed before with Mahmoud Abbas that if he succeeds to achieve our national goals, he should come back to the Palestinian factions to discuss the issue, and after that we will decide our stand," Mahmoud Zahar, a Hamas leader said.

Abbas knows well that he cannot go home empty-handed and negotiate with Hamas and Jihad for a permanent cease-fire. Public opinion polls show clearly that Palestinians do support Hamas and Jihad's armed campaign against Israeli military occupation. Abbas has to convince Palestinian public opinion that his vision and path will ultimately bring peace and independence, not Hamas or Jihad's.

It is crucial that Israel acts now to release Palestinian prisoners (who number around 8000) withdraw its troops from Palestinian cities and towns, and to begin to dismantle settlements. Engaging the Palestinians politically is the safest way to marginalize Hamas and Jihad and ensure Israeli security.

Washington, D.C.: What is the feeling in the Middle East about the new U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice?

Fawaz Gerges: In one word, optimism. Arab critics of the Bush administration expressed guarded optimism that Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, who has the president' ear, brings a fresh attitude to Palestinian-Israeli peace-making. They were impressed by her dynamism, style, and decisiveness, particularly her statement to Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, about the need to make "hard decisions" if he wanted to achieve peace with the Palestinians.

Although Secretary Rice promised to play an active role in the peace process, she tried to lower expectations and stressed the primary role of regional actors themselves. At this point, the Bush administration appears to be mainly concerned with confidence-building measures and security, not plunging fully into high, shuttle diplomacy. It is trying to find its way in what it considers a minefield and does not want to take risks.

Arab/Muslim critics argue that without active engagement by the President and his senior aides, no major progress could be achieved. If history serves as a guide, they say, active American engagement is vital to a breakthrough in the peace process.

Bethesda, Md.: Condoleezza Rice announced that a special coordinator would be appointed to oversee and monitor new security agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. How is that announcement being greeted?

Fawaz Gerges: It is feared that the announcement by Rice of a special American coordinator, General William Ward, to monitor security agreements between Israel and the Palestinians and assist in reforming Palestinian security services, does not bode well for the political track. The announcement is being seen as an indication that the Bush administration is more concerned about security, narrowly defined, not tackling the thorny, political questions. Only time will tell!

Washington, D.C.: What do you see as the next step in the peace process? Jerusalem, the settlements and the other sticky issues have to be brought up in order to continue the process? When do you see as the "appropriate" time that these discussions will take place between the two sides? Do you think a mediator is necessary?

Fawaz Gerges: Indeed, President Abbas faces major hurdles at home. His hands are tied and his options are limited. He must show progress on the peace process and also must improve the quality of Palestinian life. If he does not, he won't last for too long. Hamas and Jihad would likely inherit the spoils. What many people do not know is the narrowness of Abbas' social power base. His election was razor-thin. Only 46 percent of eligible voters actually voted in the recent presidential elections, of which Abbas won 60 percent. This is in contrast to the 78 percent turn-out that the late Arafat elicited in 1996 when he was elected head of the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Abbas must expand his social power base and create alliances with other groups who can foster dialogue and action on structural reforms within the PA. The most existential challenge facing Abbas is the need to "put the Palestinian house in order, which he must do if he is to rebuild its shattered institutions. Moreover, he must reform his own party by not only bringing in new faces, but also by integrating the rising social forces within Fatah itself into the decision-making process at large.

Why this detour? Abbas cannot last for too long unless he delivers on the home front (Rooting out corruption) and the peace process. The United States and the international community must impress on Ariel Sharon the need to tackle the big questions relating to a viable Palestinian state. This fact implies delineating the borders of this state, its capital in east Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, and the right of Palestinian refugees. The U.S. President himself, not just a mediator, must become actively engaged in the process in order to advance peace prospects.

Washington, D.C.: Will a possible mideast peace affect the war in Iraq in any way?

Fawaz Gerges: The conventional wisdom within the Bush administration was that the road to a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement goes through Baghdad, the Iraqi capital. That logic has proved to be false. Let us hope that the administration spends some of its earned political capital on promoting real peace between Palestinians and Israelis.

Achieving a breakthrough on the Palestinian-Israeli track will likely reduce tensions in Iraq and the region as well as hammer a deadly nail in the coffin of extremism and bin Ladenism which used and abused the Palestinian predicament to recruit followers into their cause.

North Bethesda, Md.: Congratulations to the Palestinian people for finally electing a leader that appears to be able to bring his people peace, prosperity and their own state by working with, instead of against the Israelis -- who have wanted peace with its neighbors for 56 years. QUESTION: Are you optimistic that this terrific start can continue? The whole world wants this to succeed.

Fawaz Gerges: It is crucial not to lose sight of the big picture. The two parties have not even begun to tackle the political track. The journey is long and the risks are considerable. But a new momentum is in the air. This momentum must be nourished and supported. The United States has a big responsibility to promote peace between the two semitic people. They have suffered enough. The bloodshed must be ended.

But the task is complex and challenging.

Fawaz Gerges: Will today go down in history as a watershed in Israeli-Palestinian relations? Or will it be seen as a wasted opportunity like many others before it? Let us hope that Palestinians and Israelis seize the initiative and break the cycle of death, pain, and suffering.

Thanks for your good questions!

Zarqawi And the D-Word: Is Democracy Un-Islamic? By Fawaz A. Gerges

If President Bush wanted to conjure up someone from central casting to act as a foil to his inauguration call for worldwide freedom, he couldn't ask for a villain more fitting than the terrorist leader Abu Musab Zarqawi, who, on the eve of Iraqi elections, denounced democracy as an "evil principle."

In a widely disseminated Internet audiotape, Zarqawi didn't merely say that he opposed the mechanics or timing of the U.S.-run elections being held today in Iraq to choose a 275-member assembly and transitional government. And he didn't say he thought Iraqis should wait and vote after U.S. occupation forces depart. No, Zarqawi said that he opposes any elections under any circumstances.

In doing so, he sets up a clash with more at stake than the outcome of today's voting. In the audiotape, which surfaced last Sunday, Zarqawi, the most feared and wanted militant in Iraq, declared a "fierce war" against all those "apostates" who take part in the elections. He called candidates running in the elections "demi-idols" and the people who plan to vote for them "infidels." And he railed against democracy because he said it supplants the rule of God with that of a popular majority. This wicked system, he said disapprovingly, is based on "freedom of religion and belief" and "freedom of speech" and on "separation of religion and politics." Democracy, he added, is "heresy itself."

The questions Zarqawi raises go way beyond the elections in Iraq to the whole issue of modernization of the Arab world. Is democracy un-Islamic? Is there a fundamental clash between the principles of representative government and the principles of Islam?

Increasingly, Muslims themselves are saying no. A small but influential group of Islamic intellectuals is saying that Muslims should see democracy as compatible with Islam. Islamic political parties and movements across North Africa and the Middle East are deciding with greater frequency to take part in elections whenever possible. In the Palestinian Authority balloting, the radical Islamic Resistance Movement, known as Hamas, has entered candidates in races for local offices. In Egypt, Islamic political activists are urging President Hosni Mubarak to retire and permit free elections. And in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the revered Shiite cleric, issued an edict saying participation in the balloting today was a "religious duty."

That explains, in part, the recent increase in violence in Iraq. Zarqawi and other foes of democracy cannot rely on public sentiment to keep people away from the polls. Instead they must turn to fear, instilled by suicide bombings and brutal attacks. Hardly a day has gone by without insurgents threatening to "wash the streets of Baghdad with the voters' blood." The intimidation campaign is relentless. "Oh people, be careful. Be careful not to be near the centers of blasphemy and vice, the polling centers. . . . Don't blame us but blame yourselves" if you are harmed, a Web statement issued in the group's name last week said.

Zarqawi's diatribe against democracy echoed the views of Osama bin Laden who, in an audiotape broadcast in December, endorsed Zarqawi as his deputy in Iraq and called for a boycott of the Iraqi elections. "In the balance of Islam, this constitution is heresy, and therefore everyone who participates in this election will be considered infidels," he said. Bin Laden lashed out at fellow Muslims who support the electoral process, admonishing listeners to "beware of henchmen [such as Sistani and other clerics] who speak in the name of Islamic parties and of groups who urge people to participate in this blatant apostasy." For bin Laden, Zarqawi and other militants in Iraq, the goal is not just to drive Americans out of the war-torn country but also to impose their own reactionary theocratic model on Iraq. In their eyes, democracy is the antithesis of puritan Islam.

Although foreign militants such as Zarqawi number fewer than 1,000, according to Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, they appear to have made informal but effective alliances with homegrown radical Sunni rebels with whom they share an intrinsic loathing of democracy. In December, three militant Iraqi groups, including the guerrilla group Ansar al-Sunna, issued a statement warning that people taking part in the "dirty farce" risked attack. "Democracy is a Greek word meaning the rule of the people, which means that the people do what they see fit," they said. "This concept is considered apostasy and defies the belief in one God -- Muslims' doctrine." Ansar al-Sunna had earlier posted a manifesto on its Web site saying that democracy amounted to making idols of human beings.

The bad news is that these insurgents are gaining momentum and could frighten Iraqis away from the polls today. A very low Sunni Arab turnout could call into question the legitimacy of the elections and the new government. And antidemocratic forces could make further inroads into the Sunni Arab community, especially if Iraqi Sunnis feel excluded and disenfranchised after the vote. A senior moderate Sunni official who is running for office was asked what would happen if the Shiites won a landslide victory. "We will all join the armed resistance," he retorted. The longer turmoil continues, the more likely it is that Iraq could replace Afghanistan as the main recruiting ground for jihadi causes and become a magnet for international terrorism.

The good news is that the anti-democratic rhetoric by Zarqawi and bin Laden crystallizes the political choices facing Muslims worldwide. The jihadis' antidemocratic stance is unpalatable to the overwhelming majority of Muslims. Mainstream clerics and Islamists have condemned the kidnapping and beheading of civilians and other abuses. After the U.S.-led assault on the insurgent stronghold in Fallujah in November, Zarqawi lashed out at senior Muslim scholars and clerics for their silence and tepid backing. "You have let us down in the darkest circumstances and handed us over to the enemy," he reportedly said on an audiotape.

Although leading Sunni Iraqi clerics and scholars have supported resistance against the U.S. occupiers and an election boycott, they insist that they do not oppose democracy and say that they intend to get involved in politics after the vote. In defiance of the jihadis' threats, the Muslim Scholars Association (which has links to insurgents, says it represents 3,000 mosques and is the most influential Sunni group to back an election boycott) called on Sunni Arabs to help write a constitution and join the political process. If the jihadis' antidemocratic message does not resonate with conservative Muslim scholars, it won't fly with most Iraqis.

Outside Iraq, the attitudes of mainstream Islamists, such as the powerful Muslim Brotherhood, toward political participation and representation have come a long way in the last three decades.

For reasons of strategy as well as belief, some Muslim intellectuals are rethinking the relationship between Islam and democracy and are Islamizing, not rejecting, democracy and modernity. Terminology matters. You cannot sell Western liberal democracy to Muslims worldwide because Muslims associate it with Western colonialism and power. But some Muslims are trying to give democracy an Islamic dress while embracing essentials such as elections, human rights and the rule of law.

Sheik Rachid Ghannouchi, leader of the Tunisian Renaissance Islamic party, has written that democracy can shield the Islamic community from autocrats, rather than serve as a sword for fighting secularists. Though a vehement critic of Israel (he once said that Israeli civilians were legitimate targets), he has become a voice of moderation in Islamic politics. He argues that rule of law, elections and citizens' ultimate control over the executive are consistent with the Islamic concepts of shura (consultation), ba'ya (oath of allegiance) and ijma (consensus). And if elected Islamic regimes fail to live up to their promises, Ghannouchi insists that citizens have the right to oust their leaders. While he says that Islamic and secular democracies cannot be the same, he rejects the notion that "Islamic democracy" must mean perpetual rule by the Islamists.

The Islamic democratic movement is a work in progress. Unfortunately, pro-Western Arab and Muslim dictators, not Islamic activists, keep the gates of power locked and block any real democratic opening. In most of the Middle East, they are the jihadis' unintentional allies in the fight against the empowerment of ordinary men and women.

Zarqawi, bin Laden and other jihadis miscalculate monstrously if they think their anti-democratic diatribes will resonate with ordinary Muslims. Indigenous calls for democratic reforms are being heard in almost every corner of the Muslim world, including Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Pakistan. Muslim human rights groups and civil society leaders are challenging the autocratic status quo and risking arrest and persecution. The democratic genie is already out of the bottle.

Young Muslims, in particular, long to be in charge of their lives, and they are a huge constituency. They are fed up with autocrats and false prophets alike. Young Muslims do not want their human rights violated or to live in perpetual fear because of their dissenting views. They want their dignity back and long to be proud of their countries, which are falling further behind the rest of humanity.

By declaring an all-out war against the "evil principle" of democracy, Zarqawi and his followers are thus swimming against the current of Muslim public opinion and the spirit of the times. Few Muslims will buy into their nihilistic and apocalyptic nightmare.

But the Bush administration, by blindly insisting on holding the elections in Iraq today despite widespread violence and misgivings, may not advance the cause of freedom and democracy. Elections are not synonymous with democracy and, unless care is taken, they could play into the hands of antidemocratic forces. Tomorrow, on the morning after the election, the Bush administration and the new Iraqi government must do their utmost to reassure Sunni Arabs and bring them into the political process, particularly by involving them in the writing of a permanent constitution. Treating every Sunni as a potential terrorist deepens fear and a sense of repression that makes the community susceptible to extremists.

In his inaugural address, Bush declared it "the policy of the United States" to promote democracy and end tyranny in the Middle East and vowed to "persistently" challenge "every ruler and every nation" about how they treat their own people." Muslims, not just Americans, will be watching very closely to see how -- or if -- the president translates his rhetoric into reality.

Author's e-mail: fgerges@slc.edu

Fawaz Gerges is a professor of Middle East studies and international affairs at Sarah Lawrence College and author of the forthcoming "The Jihadists: Unholy Warriors" (Harcourt)

Among the Believers
Reviewed by Fawaz A. Gerges

GLOBALIZED ISLAM
The Search for a New Ummah
By Olivier Roy. Columbia Univ. 349 pp. $29.50

In the early 1990s, the Muslim world witnessed a bloody struggle between militant Islamists and local authoritarian regimes. The radicals launched an all-out frontal attack to dismantle the secular political order and replace it with an Islamist one. The fight was so brutal and prolonged that Western governments feared for the survival of their Arab and Muslim ruling allies -- particularly in such pivotal countries as Algeria and Egypt -- and prepared for the worst. Pundits warned that the Islamist revolution was unstoppable, on the march and likely to sweep away failed socialist and nationalist experiments.

Not so fast, cautioned Olivier Roy, a French sociologist and an authority on Islamist movements. Challenging the prevalent conventional wisdom, in 1994 Roy published a sensational book, The Failure of Political Islam, that made headlines the world over. He convincingly argued that the Islamist revolution was already a spent force and, more important, an intellectually and historically bankrupt one.

According to Roy, Islamist movements neither possessed a concrete political-economic program nor offered a new model of society. An Islamist slogan holds that "Islam is the solution" to Muslims' developmental crisis; in fact, the radicals' rhetoric about the Islamic revolution, the Islamic state, the Islamic economy and the Islamic society proved to be empty talk serving as a cheap drug for some of the masses.

Nowhere was the Islamists' failure more blatant than in their inability to go beyond Islam's founding texts, be self-critical, and overcome traditional divisions and narrow sectarian loyalties. Roy noted that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolutionary Iran, often celebrated as a pioneering Islamist project, made two key mistakes. Rather than reaching out to the entire ummah, or Muslim community, it immediately locked itself into a Shiite "ghetto" by limiting its appeal to only fellow Shiites, and it quickly reverted to an ultra-conservative social model that echoed Saudi Arabia's own brand of Sunni puritanism. The only remnant of Khomeini's vision of a new pan-Islamism was the rhetoric. The radicals hoped to create a new regional order based on Islam, but the hard logic of history, power, states, regimes and borders proved much more enduring than Islamists acknowledge in their propaganda. Roy published these insights at the peak of the Islamist revolutionary moment in 1994.

But although the attempt to foment widespread revolution was a failure, Islamism remained a force to be reckoned with in many Arab and Muslim societies. According to Roy, conservative "neofundamentalism" -- which aims primarily at Islamizing society from the bottom up -- has superseded revolutionary Islamism, whose goal is to capture political power and Islamize society by autocratic fiat from the top down.

All of this makes a new book by Roy something of an event. In Globalized Islam, the sequel to his sociological analysis of political Islam's grand failure, Roy addresses two main issues: "post-Islamism" and Islam's global dispersion among modern nation-states.

When Roy writes of "global Muslims," he means either Muslims who have settled permanently in Western countries or those who to try to distance themselves from a given Muslim culture and stress their membership in a universal community of believers. Fully a third of the world's Muslims, who number 1.2 billion people, now live in a sort of diaspora as minority members of secular countries.

This is a difficult situation rife with conflicts. But the dream of belonging to a wider ummah is now no longer grounded in a particular chunk of territory. It has become an abstract, purely imaginary aspiration -- and, sometimes, an obsession. The dispersal of Muslims as part of globalization can be seen to have given rise to new fundamentalist movements on all continents, fueled by disoriented young people.

Roy documents how versions of this neo-fundamentalism have been spreading among uprooted Muslim youths, particularly the children and grandchildren of Muslims who migrated to the West. This ideology fuels radicalism and sometimes succeeds in generating some community support for violent jihadist causes such as those espoused by al Qaeda. These new fundamentalists advocate multiculturalism singlemindedly, but only as a means of rejecting efforts to integrate into Western society. Like their coreligionists living in the West, Muslims in the Middle East and parts of Asia may also feel like members of a besieged minority because of the sweeping changes brought on by Westernization and globalization. Sometimes, you really can't go home again.

But once again Roy turns received wisdom on its head. He argues that, despite the backlash by radicals, the Muslim world is going through a process of transformation and secularization, albeit one overshadowed by the re-Islamization of daily life in countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran. "Islam is experiencing secularisation," writes Roy, "but in the name of fundamentalism."

For Roy, the root causes of the social upheaval roiling the Muslim world and the jihadist revolt against the West lie in the spreading and deepening Westernization of Muslim societies, particularly in the past 30 years.

In The Failure of Political Islam, Roy argued that the green banners of Islamism were closely tied to the red banners of 1970s-era leftism. Here, he makes a convincing case that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda's terror tactics are grounded not in the Islamic tradition of jihad but in far more recent European, radical, ultra-leftist and Third Worldist movements. "The real genesis of Al Qaeda violence," contends Roy, "has more to do with a Western tradition of individual and pessimistic revolt for an elusive ideal world than with the Koranic conception of martyrdom." In this sense, bin Ladenism not only represents a rupture with mainstream Islam but is also a Western import. Roy sees al Qaeda as a fringe movement with no social base of support in the Muslim world; he therefore regards al Qaeda as a national security problem but not a strategic threat. (Neoconservatives are no doubt already sharpening their knives.)

Globalized Islam is a highly original, methodologically rigorous but difficult text. Its difficulty is compounded because Roy has, in effect, incorporated two books into one -- one about Muslim minorities who mainly live in the West and another about a new wave of Islamists who have emerged as a significant force wherever Muslims live. He places both under the rubric of neofundamentalism. The problem is that neofundamentalism becomes an all-encompassing term that explains everything from puritanical Saudi Wahhabis to uprooted Muslim migrants in the West, from the radical Islamism of the Taliban and al Qaeda to peaceful movements like South Asia's Tablighi Jamaat and even professional organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood.

It is also unclear whether Roy's notion of "deterritorialization" -- the sense of belonging to a landless minority -- applies to all neofundamentalists. Ask an Egyptian, Saudi or Pakistani jihadist about the boundaries and frontiers of the Muslim ummah, and he will promptly offer a definite answer, encompassing all Muslim states and based around a core in the Arab world. There will be nothing abstract or imaginary about it.

Roy also seems to greatly exaggerate the role of uprooted Muslims living in the West as the driving force behind militant Islamism. To support his hypothesis, Roy cites the case of al Qaeda's jihadists, expatriates who choose to fight for an imaginary ummah rather than their homelands. He suggests that the Egyptians, Algerians, Yemenis and Saudis who follow bin Laden's siren song made a conscious decision to wage jihad against the West, not their local rulers.

Recent history shows otherwise. Throughout the 1980s and '90s, jihadists targeted the "near enemy" (such detested local regimes as Saudi Arabia and Hosni Mubarak's Egypt) rather than the "far enemy" (the West in general and the United States in particular). But by the end of 1990, the radicals had been militarily defeated in Egypt and Algeria. Instead of closing the jihadist shop, as many did, and calling it quits, terrorists like Ayman Zawahiri of Egyptian Islamic Jihad rethought their business. They turned their guns against the West in an effort to stop Islamism from sinking and simply to stay in business. Frustrated in their attempts to topple Mubarak and the House of Saud, incapable of sustaining their costly confrontation with the "near enemy," Zawahiri and bin Laden internationalized jihad out of necessity and desperation. Had Roy fleshed out this historical context more to consider critical nuances such as this one, he might have added depth to his superb and complex sociological study. •

Fawaz A. Gerges is a professor of Middle Eastern Studies and International Affairs at Sarah Lawrence College and the author of the forthcoming "The Jihadists: Unholy Warriors."

Iraq 'lighting rod' for extremists, says Sarah Lawrence professor

by James Withers
Review Press (Original publication: December 16, 2004)

When Fawaz A. Gerges speaks, every word is crafted with scholarly care, which of course is logical: Gerges earned degrees from the London School of Economics and Oxford University, and has taught at Harvard and Princeton universities.

In 1998, Gerges was awarded a two-year research writing grant from the MacArthur Fellowship, and since 1994 he has held the Christian A. Johnson Chair in Middle Eastern Studies and International Affairs at Sarah Lawrence College. He would have gladly stayed in the cloistered academic world except for the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

"Sept. 11 was a great shock," Gerges said. "There was so much loss and damage it forced academics to get out of our ivory towers."

Gerges is now a consultant and regular commentator for ABC News, and has appeared on various radio and TV shows across the globe from CNN to the BBC. While he is honored to be part of the public debate, Gerges admits his training as a historian is contrary to the sound-bite age.

"I'm supposed to be an historian who delves deep into arguments," he said.

Gerges spent two years interviewing Muslim extremists and in the spring his k, "The Jihadists: Unholy Warriors" will be published by Harcourt Press. According to Gerges, by the late 1990s most jihadists wanted to stop fighting because they were not gaining ground against the rulers of countries such as Saudi Arabia. To reinvigorate the movement, Muslim extremists decided it was time to leave regional targets alone and move on to a different enemy: the United Sates.

"They decided to shift gears and stay in business," said Gerges.

Gerges makes the point that in his interviews, many jihadists did not think much of the leader of al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden, whose base was in Afghanistan, was methodically making plans for an attack as early as 1998, and was even making explicit threats against the U.S. Gerges agrees with the 9/11 Commission Report that the al-Qaida danger was consistently dismissed by many government officials

"We underestimated the nature and intensity of the threat," Gerges said.

After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, al-Qaida lost its operating base, thus making the planning of future attacks difficult.

"The senior leadership is on the run constantly. It is difficult to plot and plan when you are on the run."

However, this does not mean that al-Qaida is gone from the international scene.

"Al-Qaida has become more of a franchise in the past two years," said Gerges. "It has adapted itself to the local situation."

Gerges estimates there are al-Qaida cells in 53 countries and they essentially operate on their own with no formal directions.

Bin Laden and his followers may be on the run, but the conflict in Iraq, according to Gerges, is becoming more of a lightning rod for the extremists.

"The largest active jihadist contingent is in Iraq. Iraq is a fire that could range on for years," said Gerges.

Gerges makes it clear that he sheds no tears for the toppling of Saddam Hussein. " Iraq is free of Saddam Hussein who was a bloody dictator," he said.

But the promise of Iraqi freedom stands next to serious problems. Close to 100,000 Iraqis have died since the start of the war, more than 1,000 American military members have been killed and there is a 60 percent unemployment rate in the country.

Gerges is hesitant about predicting the future; as a serious historian he has no use for reckless speculating. He said, however, that "the American invasion opened a Pandora's box," and that the U.S. must have a concrete date for when it plans to withdraw its troops.

Review Press (original publication: December 16, 2004)

Special Report: Arafat 1929-2004
Thursday, November 11, 2004

*Yasser Arafat* /Fawaz Gerges/ Professor, Middle East and International Affairs, Sarah Lawrence College *Thursday, November 11, 2004; 11:15 a.m. ET*

Yasser Arafat, the man who embodied the cause of the Palestinian people for four decades, died at 3:30 a.m. Thursday at a hospital outside Paris, according to Palestinian and hospital officials. He was 75.

*Full Coverage:* Special Report: Arafat 1929-2004 (Post, Nov. 11)

Arafat never achieved his dream of achieving an independent Palestinian state. Even so, he was beloved and revered by Palestinians as the symbol of their struggle for a homeland, which he nearly single-handedly kept alive for 40 years.

*Fawaz Gerges*, professor and Christian A. Johnson chair on Middle East and International Affairs at Sarah Lawrence College, said in an interview with washingtonpost.com, "The death of Yasser Arafat represents the end of an era and the beginning of a new one. He was a potent symbol of the struggle for Palestinian self-determination and liberation."

Gerges was online *Thursday, Nov. 11, at 11:15 a.m. ET* to discuss the death of Yasser Arafat and what it means to the future of the Middle East.

*A transcript follows.*

*Editor's Note: washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions. *

------------------------------------------------------------------------

*Fawaz Gerges: *Regardless of what outsiders think of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, he represented a potent symbol of the Palestinian struggle for liberation from military occupation. In the eyes of many Palestinians, Arafat was one of the most important founding fathers of their nationalist movement. For many months and years to come, Arafat would continue to cast his powerful shadow over Palestinian society and politics. The critical question is, how can the new Palestinian leadership proceed forward with such a heavy, overwhelming legacy over its shoulders?

_______________________

*Rochester, N.Y.: *Hi Mr. Gerges, Could you explain the various factions that would be potentially involved in future Palestinian governance? Is it fair to say that most are militants/militias?

Thanks very much.

*Fawaz Gerges: *One of Arafat's major shortcomings was that he did not nourish Palestinian institutions and civil society. He also did not establish an orderly process of succession. The truth is that Arafat was a one man's show. He held all strings of power in his own hands. He did not delegate authority nor did he choose a successor. Arafat had a monopoly on the decision-making process which, along with Israeli military occupation -led to the current paralysis that infects Palestinian institutions.

But the broad contours of succession appear to have already emerged. The most likely successor is former prime minister and a veteran peace negotiator, Mahmoud Abbas, who was just elected as chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), putting him on a track to become the next overall leader of the Palestinians.

The second most important individual is current prime minister. Ahmed Qureia, who seems to be working hand-in-hand with Abbas. Qureia's main function revolves on managing day-to-day government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In addition to Abbas and Qureia, there exist new young militant forces within the PLO that could try to compete with the old guard.

Although the process of transition could prove volatile, the Palestinian establishment has already moved to fill key positions which were held by Arafat in order to prevent a vacuum of power and internal infighting.

But no leader could move forward on the two fundamental challenges facing the Palestinian people - reforming institutions and proceeding with negotiations with the Israelis - without possessing a popular legitimate mandate. Holding national elections is crucial to empowering the new Palestinian leadership with a popular mandate to move forward and to try to resolve vexing problems facing the population. One would hope that the Israeli government does not try to undermine the new emerging Palestinian leadership by complicating the process of holding national elections and by refusing to remove its hundreds of military check points throughout the West Bank and Gaza.

_______________________

*Philadelphia, Pa.: *The Palestinian people never achieved statehood under Arafat. What could Arafat have done differently? Was he ultimately a failure?

*Fawaz Gerges: *Arafat would likely be remembered as a leader who put the Palestinian cause on the world map. He kept the struggle for Palestinian statehood and self-determination alive for decades and dedicated his life for this noble cause. Unfortunately, Arafat was more of a revolutionary leader and less of a statesman. He did not make the transition from revolution to state-building. He could have invested in institutional-building, civil society, and power-sharing. He was socialized into authoritarian Arab politics and ruled like other Arab dictators. If there is a term that signifies authoritarian Arab politics, it is the cult of personality. That was Arafat's curse too.

_______________________

*Navy Yard, SE, Washington, D.C.: *Whoever emerges as the new leader is unlikely to be able to negotiate a peace deal as good as the one Arafat walked away from during the Clinton administration. Do you see any leader being able to accept statehood under these conditions, and will the people support him?

*Fawaz Gerges: *One point must be made clear about Palestinian-Israeli peace making: No new Palestinian leader could accept or sign any peace settlement that does not meet the minimal legitimate rights of Palestinians - that is a viable state on all of the occupied West Bank and Gaza with its capital in east Jerusalem. These aspects of a settlement are considered fundamental to a viable Palestinian state. Neither Arafat nor Abbas could compromise on these principles. No one else could.

There is a tendency in the United States and Israel to focus too much on the role of personalities. There are systematic, structural factors which are as important. It would be too simplistic and misleading to argue that Arafat represented the major impediment to Palestinian-Israeli peace-making. The vision of Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, represents as much of an impediment to peacemaking as that of Arafat. Sharon is on record saying that he would not accept a Palestinian state on more than 60 percent of the occupied territories with no capital in east Jerusalem. There is not a single Palestinian leader who would or could accept such terms.

But the most important thing for the new Palestinian leadership is to put its house in order and revive dormant Palestinian institutions and put on the table a blueprint for peace - one that rejects the use of force, violence, and suicide bombings - a blueprint that exposes the real intentions of Sharon and the ultra-right in Israel.

_______________________

*Princeton, N.J.: *Hamas has been relatively quiet throughout Arafat's illness and now during an historic change in power. What do you see Hamas' future role in the Palestinian struggle? If the Palestinian leadership gains momentum and legitimacy, how do you think it will affect Hamas' recent momentum?

*Fawaz Gerges: *Hamas' leaders have been calling for a national unity alliance that encompasses all Palestinian political currents. They appear to be willing to fully join the political process. This is very good news if Hamas could be formally integrated into the decision-making process because its potential participation implies duties and responsibilities. Hamas must accept certain facts and realities, one of the most important of which is that its suicide bombings and targeting of Israeli civilians has done considerable damage to the Palestinian cause. The new leadership must make it very clear to Hamas and Jihad that political participation in the decision-making process requires a new, dramatic shift in its strategy away from military struggle into political struggle. This challenge - achieving national consensus on how to proceed on peacemaking - is the most important one facing the new Palestinian leadership. Palestinians must address and devise a strategy of liberation: political struggle and civil disobedience must replace force and violence as the most effective tools to win the support of mainstream Israeli public opinion and world public opinion as well.

_______________________

*Brookeville, Md.: *Mr. Gerges,

Maybe more a statement than a question ....

It seems Arafat is being praised as one who kept the dream of a Palestinian state alive. But in contrast there already seems to be hope that real progress can be made now that he is gone. I feel this new hope reflects Arafat's limitations as a leader and his tactics as a terrorist are hopefully past.

Do you feel Palestinians are ready to move on and negotiate for peace and land (as I feel their new leaders are) or will Arafat's passing result in a hardened stance to not give in? Thanks

*Fawaz Gerges: *The story of the Palestinian people is very tragic. In the eyes of Americans, all Palestinians appear to have been reduced to either Hamas and Jihad or Arafat. But there is more to the Palestinian national struggle than the violent deeds of Hamas or Arafat's authoritarianism. Many Palestinians have been struggling from within to create a different alternative to the status quo, one that is anchored in the rule of law, human rights, and civic dissent.

Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, has succeeded in convincing Americans that his war with the Palestinians is an extension of the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Sharon succeeded in painting his war as an extension of the American war on terrorism, thanks to Hamas' suicide bombings and President Bush's willingness to buy Sharon's goods.

Keep in mind that Hamas actions played into the hands of Sharon who depicted Arafat as a "terrorist." Yet how many Americans know that Hamas consciously and criminally undermined Arafat and did him in. The problem with Arafat was his equivocation and inability to take initiative and confront Hamas and Jihad.

But the most important failing of Arafat centered on the domestic and internal level. He monopolized power and reduced civil society to tatters. Painful as Arafat's death is for Palestinians who regard him as a fatherly-figure, his exist from the scene provides the Palestinians not just with challenges but also opportunities that could help them overcome their terrible predicament.

Now the Palestinians have an opportunity to begin a new journey free from Arafat's authoritarian shade: A new journey that puts more stress on institutions than personalities. A new journey that holds elected officials accountable for their deeds; a new journey that empowers Palestinian civil society and puts an end to official corruption and cronism.

Let us hope that the new Palestinian leadership will seize the moment and make a leap forward. The Palestinians have suffered too much and deserve better.

_______________________

*Fawaz Gerges: *Human tragedies and shocks often serve as a catalyst for positive, progressive change. One would hope that the death of President Yasser Arafat would serve as a catalyst to push Palestinians and Israelis to recognize their common humanity and shared heritage. The only acceptable and humane way forward is for both Semitic people to share the land and to live together as peaceful neighbors do. Will they take the challenge?

Telling Fairy Tales About Iraq
Sunday, October 03, 2004
BY FAWAZ A. GERGES

On his U.S. tour last week, Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi painted a rosy picture of developments in his war-torn country. This charm offensive, orchestrated in part by the White House, lent important political support to President Bush, who has faced sharp criticism from Sen. John Kerry on Iraq. But how much of what Allawi said was accurate, and how much did he leave unsaid?

Unfortunately for Iraq and the United States, things are not going well. And Allawi -- by presenting such an upbeat assessment and by failing to address the real challenges of integrating his country's disparate factions into a single political system -- missed a golden opportunity to help Americans better understand the road ahead.

In a speech to a joint session of Congress and in interviews with the media, Allawi insisted that the insurgency is dissipating and national elections will proceed as planned in late January. "We are succeeding in Iraq," he told Congress, describing the insurgents as a desperate bunch on the run.

Like Bush, Allawi portrayed the insurgency as mostly a terrorist phenomenon that was part of an "international war" on terrorism fought on Iraqi soil. And he dismissed concerns that Iraq could descend into all-out civil war, while conceding that it is a "tough struggle with setbacks."

In reality, the 17-month-old guerrilla insurgency is getting stronger, more brutal and more widespread. According to U.S. military commanders, the number of attacks on American forces nearly quadrupled from 700 in March to 2,700 in August. Hundreds of Iraqis have been killed during the past two weeks. Kidnapping and executing foreign personnel is now routine. Insurgent militias have succeeded in terrorizing Iraqis and foreigners and have torpedoed reconstruction efforts.

Homegrown Iraqi insurgents exercise effective or partial control over important parts of central Iraq -- including cities like Falluja, Baquba, Ramadi, Samarra, Tal Afar and other towns -- all in the so- called Sunni Triangle. But resistance is not just limited to Sunni Arabs. Widespread dissent among radical Shiite groups also exists. Despite a fragile truce in the holy Shiite cities of Karbala, Najaf and Kufa in the south, fighting between American forces and the al-Mahdi Army of the fiery Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr persists in Baghdad's sprawling Sadr City slum.

There are also indications that guerrillas in various cities and towns are trying to join ranks. For example, the guerrillas in Samarra -- the Mujahedeen Shura (Council of Holy Warriors) -- issued a declaration saying they had agreed to merge with their counterparts in Falluja. This development would represent a significant strategic escalation of the armed resistance because American commanders have long viewed the insurgency as composed of disparate groups lacking a unified chain of command.

Allawi did not tell his American audience that although U.S. troops could regain control of these cities by using overwhelming force, the political and human costs would be devastating. The Sunni community, which already feels estranged and excluded from the nascent political process, could rise up en masse against the Americans. A frontal assault by American troops on the main Sunni cities would also likely cause tens of thousands of casualties and far-reaching political ramifications that transcend Iraq's borders.

Allawi blamed the insurgency mainly on an influx of terrorists from neighboring countries. Although Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist leader, and his radical followers from abroad are suspected of carrying out the deadliest attacks in Iraq, homegrown Iraqi Islamists, nationalists and disaffected young men predominate. A consensus among Iraq observers (American and Iraqi) is that the number of foreign fighters is estimated to be only in the hundreds, while indigenous Iraqi resistance fighters can be mobilized by the tens of thousands.

If this is the case, Allawi's threat to use force to crush the insurgents is bound to complicate matters further.

Could there be another way to integrate Iraq's myriad factions into the political process? Allawi had little to say about the real stuff of politics, which is what Iraq desperately needs these days.

He might start by offering indigenous Iraqi dissenters and fighters an "olive branch," as he has promised. So far, he has not followed through with his promise of peace. He has not bothered to meet with members of the country's largest group of Sunni clerics, the Association of Muslim Scholars, which represents more than 3,000 mosques and has close links to Iraqi insurgents.

If Allawi does not meet with these Sunni clerics, who give public voice to Iraqi insurgents, how will he tame the spiraling insurgency or detach homegrown fighters from foreign militant groups? To show its displeasure, the Association of Muslim Scholars decided not to participate in the January vote. If elections are held without the participation of the Sunni Arab community, as is likely, Iraq could descend into full-blown sectarian strife -- the worst-case scenario.

According to Allawi's aides, the prime minister has also forcefully excluded dissenters like Sadr, the Shiite radical, and has shown little regard for the rule of law. Is this how to build a new, democratic Iraq? Is Allawi creating another authoritarian Iraq?

Iraq does not need another autocrat. It has already had more than its share of dictators who promised heaven but delivered hell. Allawi, though, has pushed sweeping laws through his Cabinet that concentrate more power in his hands.
Aside from reinforcing the importance of Iraq in the 2004 presidential campaign, Allawi's visit to the United States accomplished very little. He failed to allay the fears of many Americans and to convince them there is light at the end of the long, dark tunnel. He had an opportunity, and he let it pass. That's a shame, because there is nothing wrong with acknowledging the hurdles that need to be overcome before the new Iraq rises out of the ashes of its deadly, totalitarian past.
But most important, Allawi should have told the international community about his efforts, if any, to reconcile Iraqis and give them all a stake in their country's future. He should have promised the world to leave no stone unturned in his attempt to resolve the crisis peacefully by fully embracing and respecting reconciliation and the rule of law. After all, reconciliation and inclusion are the most effective weapons in Allawi's arsenal against the spiraling, deadly insurgency.

Iraq's Allawi Puts on a Happy Face
By FAWAZ A. GERGES
Published September 28, 2004

There was no denying that Ayad Allawi's recent public relations blitz lent support to the Bush administration by underwriting its overly optimistic view of developments in Iraq. But symbolism and rhetoric aside, it is crucial to analyze what the interim prime minister said - and did not say.

In a speech last week to a joint session of Congress and in interviews with the media, Allawi insisted that the insurgency is dissipating and national elections will proceed as planned in late January.

" We are succeeding in Iraq," he told Congress, describing the insurgents as a desperate bunch on the run. Like President George W. Bush, Allawi portrayed the insurgency as mostly a terrorist phenomenon that was part of an "international war" on terrorism fought on Iraqi soil. And he dismissed concerns that Iraq could descend into all-out civil war, while conceding that the country is plagued by a "disintegration of law and order" and that it is a "tough struggle with setbacks."

But contrary to Allawi's assertions, the 17-month-old guerrilla insurgency is getting stronger, more sophisticated and more widespread. According to U.S. military commanders, the number of attacks on U.S. forces nearly quadrupled from 700 in March to 2,700 in August. Hundreds of Iraqis were killed over the last two weeks. Kidnapping and executing foreign personnel is now routine.

Homegrown Iraqi insurgents exercise effective control over important parts of central Iraq that include cities like Fallujah, Baquba, Ramadi, Samarra, Tal Afar and other towns - all in the so-called Sunni Triangle. There are also indications that guerrillas in the various cities and towns are trying to merge with one another and join ranks. For example, the guerrillas in Samarra - the Mujahedeen Shura (Council of Holy Warriors) - issued a declaration saying they had agreed to merge with their counterparts in Fallujah. This development would represent a significant strategic escalation of the armed resistance because American commanders have long viewed the insurgency as composed of disparate groups lacking a
unified chain of command.

Allawi did not tell his American audience that although U.S. troops could regain control of these cities by using overwhelming force, the political and human costs would be devastating. The Sunni community, which already feels estranged and excluded from the nascent political process, could rise up en masse against the Americans.
Allawi asserted that the widespread insurgency is mostly due to an influx of terrorists from neighboring countries. Although Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist leader, and his radical followers from abroad are suspected of carrying out the deadliest attacks in Iraq, homegrown Iraqi Islamists, nationalists and disaffected young men predominate. A consensus among Iraqi observers is that the number of foreign fighters is estimated to be only in the hundreds, while indigenous Iraqi resistance fighters can be mobilized by the tens of thousands.

If this is the case, Allawi's threat to use force to crush the insurgents is bound to complicate matters further. A more effective strategy is to offer indigenous Iraqi dissenters and fighters an "olive branch," as the prime minister has promised. Yet so far, he has not followed through with his promise of peace. He has not bothered to meet with members of the country's largest group of Sunni clerics, the Association of Muslim Scholars, which represents more than 3,000 mosques and has close links to Iraqi insurgents. To show its dissent, the Association of Muslim Scholars decided not to participate in the January vote. If elections were held without the participation of the Sunni Arab community, as is the likelihood, Iraq could plunge into sectarian strife - the worst- case scenario for the war-torn country.

As befits someone who once served as Saddam Hussein's lieutenant, Allawi has also used force to silence and exclude dissenters like the Shia radical Muqtada al-Sadr and has shown little regard for the rule of law. He pushed sweeping laws through his cabinet that concentrate more power in his own hands. His aggressive governing methods threaten to plunge the country into a full-blown civil war by not taking into account the deep ethnic and religious divisions that exist among Iraqi communities. Time and again on his U.S. tour, he publicly denied the danger and blamed the media for exaggerating bad news in Iraq.

Instead of educating Americans about Iraq's predicament, Allawi's visit served to harden polarized public opinion about U.S. military involvement there. Aside from reinforcing the importance of Iraq in the 2004
presidential campaign, Allawi's visit accomplished very little in terms of substance. Many Americans remain very skeptical about the overtly optimistic picture painted by Allawi. He neither allayed their fears nor convinced them that there is an early light at the end of the long dark tunnel. He took the easy road by recycling President Bush's positive line, which contradicts the Iraqi reality.

The international community does not seem to buy Allawi's rhetoric either, which is short on substance. He should have been more forthcoming about the difficulties that lie ahead for his country. There is nothing wrong with acknowledging the hurdles that need to be overcome before the new Iraq rises out of the ashes of its deadly past. There is nothing wrong with telling the world about the need to replace the unpopular American military presence with a genuine international alliance.
But most important, Allawi should have promised to double his efforts to reconcile Iraqis and give them all a stake in their country's future. He should have promised the world he'd leave no stone unturned in his attempt to resolve the crisis peacefully by embracing and respecting reconciliation and the rule of law.

By taking the easy road, Allawi missed a great opportunity. It seems unlikely that America's allies will supply substantive aid to Iraq as long as Iraqis lack a political power-sharing arrangement. This is the real
challenge facing prime minister Allawi.

Iraq Needs a Statesman, Not a Strongman
BY FAWAZ A. GERGES
ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED SEPTEMBER 26, 2004

IRAQ'S INTERIM prime minister, Ayad Allawi, in concert with the White House, painted a rosy picture of developments in his war-torn country in a charm offensive last week aimed at Americans to offset the bad news from battleground.
In an orchestrated public relations blitz at the United Nations and in Washington, Dr. Allawi lent his support to the Bush administration by underwriting its overly optimistic view that real progress toward democracy is gaining momentum in Iraq.
In a rare speech to a joint session of Congress and in interviews with U.S. and British news media, Dr. Allawi insisted that the insurgency is dissipating and national elections will proceed as planned in late January. "Elections will occur in Iraq on time in January because Iraqis want elections on time," Dr. Allawi told Congress.

He portrayed the insurgency as mostly a terrorist phenomenon that was part of an "international war" on terrorism fought on Iraqi soil. And he dismissed concerns that Iraq could plunge into a full-scale civil war while conceding that the country is plagued by a "disintegration of law and order" and that it is a "tough struggle with setbacks."

But contrary to Dr. Allawi's assertions, the 17-month-old guerrilla insurgency is getting stronger, more sophisticated and more widespread. Suicide bombings and attacks against Iraqi officials and civilians, coalition forces, foreigners and the infrastructure continue unabated. According to U.S. military commanders, the number of attacks on U.S. forces nearly quadrupled from 700 in March to 2,700 in August.

Hundreds of Iraqis were killed over the last two weeks. Insurgent militias have succeeded in terrorizing Iraqis and foreigners and have torpedoed reconstruction efforts. Kidnapping and executing foreign personnel is routine.

Evidence also contradicts Dr. Allawi's assertion that the widespread insurgency is mostly due to an influx of terrorists from neighboring countries.

Though Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist leader, and his radical Islamist followers from abroad are suspected of carrying out the deadliest attacks in Iraq, homegrown Iraqi Islamists, nationalists anddisaffected young men predominate. The number of foreign fighters is estimated to be only in the hundreds, while indigenous Iraqi resistance fighters can be mobilized locally by the tens of thousands.

Dr. Allawi's professed strategy is to divide Iraqi insurgents from Mr. al-Zarqawi' s militants by offering the Iraqis leniency and Mr. al-Zarqawi's men the punishment that hardcore criminals deserve. Yet so far, the prime minister has not shown genuine interest in following through with his promise of peace.

Members of the country's largest group of Sunni clerics - the Association of Muslim Scholars, which represents more than 3,000 mosques – complain that Dr. Allawi has not met with them, let alone tried to integrate their representatives into the nascent political process. The minority Sunnis were in power under Saddam Hussein.

If Dr. Allawi does not meet with these Sunni clerics, who have close links to Iraqi insurgents, how will he tame the spiraling insurgency or detac homegrown fighters from foreign militant groups? To show its dissent, the Association of Muslim Scholars decided not to participate in the January vote, throwing doubts on the elections' legitimacy. Further, Dr. Allawi's treatment of the Shiite radical Muqtada al-Sadr raises alarming questions about his commitment to political inclusion and reconciliation.

Is this how to build a new, democratic Iraq? Is Dr. Allawi creating another authoritarian Iraq? An Iraqi politician bluntly told Western journalists that Dr. Allawi "appeared to be reverting to his roots as a former member of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party, where political dissent was often silenced with the gun." Iraq does not need another autocrat. It already had more than its share of dictators who promised heaven but delivered hell.

Dr. Allawi is acting like an entrenched strongman with no intention of retiring soon. He has shown little regard for the rule of law, particularly the interim constitution. He pushed sweeping laws through the Cabinet that concentrate more power in his own hands. He has relied more on force and arm-twisting than on a genuine process of persuasion and inclusion. His governing methods are divisive and do not take into account the deep ethnic and religious divisions that exist among Iraqi communities, which threaten to plunge the country into a civil war. He publicly denies the danger and has done little to reduce the threat.

At this critical juncture, Iraq desperately requires a statesman with a unifying vision and political skills who reassures the warring communities of their place and stake in the new Iraq. The key to success and peaceful coexistence is the equitable inclusion and integration of all social and religious segments of the population.

Dr. Allawi's American benefactors must impress on him the urgent need to build bridges to all Iraqi communities and honor the rule of law. Paying lip service to reconstruction and democracy won't do. A policy of reconciliation must be fully embraced, and all Iraqis must be given a stake in their country's future in order to defeat the brutal insurgency that has caused too many deaths and too much pain and destruction.

The Bleeding of Iraq and the Rising Insurgency
Institute for Social Policy and Understanding Policy Brief, September 2004 Policy Brief # 6

Things are not going well in Iraq. The government handover of power has neither moved the country closer to peaceful democracy nor improved a volatile security situation that has turned Iraq into a living hell. Suicide bombings and attacks against Iraqi officials and civilians, coalition forces, foreigners, and the infrastructure continue unabated. The 17 month-old guerrilla insurgency is getting stronger, sophisticated and more widespread by the day and appears to be reaching a new level of intensity. According to American military commanders, U.S. soldiers and their allies were attacked an average of 87 times each day in August, the highest such figure since American and British forces toppled the Baathist regime. One official noted that attacks on American forces rose to 2,700 in August, from 700 in March. Senior American policymakers, including defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, and national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, warn of more bad news to come and that violence would intensify as elections scheduled for January 2005 approach.

A classified national estimate prepared for President Bush in late July spelled out a very gloomy future for Iraq - the worst case being developments that could lead to civil war. Indeed, Iraq appears to be descending into civil strife. Iraqis are killing Iraqis in large numbers - as are Allied forces.

Thousands of Iraqis had been killed and injured since the nominal transfer of sovereignty at the end of June. Since the onset of the war, human rights organizations place overall Iraqi deaths between 10,000 and 30,000. U.S. military deaths in the Iraq campaign surpassed the 1,000 mark (as of last count 1,017), and U.S. troops have suffered over five thousand injuries. In August, 64 American soldiers were killed compared with 43 in June before the installment of the new Iraqi government. Furthermore, insurgents have discovered that kidnapping and executing foreigners can serve as powerful strategic weapons in their campaign to isolate Americans in Iraq and dissuade other nations from sending troops and personnel into the country. They have succeeded in terrorizing foreigners and slowing down and impeding reconstruction projects.

UNDERSTANDING THE UNSURGENCY

These large casualty figures clearly indicate that the war is still raging in Iraq and does not show signs of receding. By keeping the military pressure on the new interim government headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and by exposing its weakness and dependency on the Americans, insurgents aim to drive a wedge between it and ordinary Iraqis and derail the U.S.-led political agenda, particularly the forthcoming elections.

Ordinary Iraqis are keeping a close eye on the interim government to see if it can secure the peace and provide jobs, which are in critically short supply. Security and employment, not democracy rhetoric or the public exhibition of Saddam Hussein and his thugs in the courtroom, are uppermost on Iraqis' minds. Iraqis tell visitors they are terrified to walk the streets and be caught in a firefight between insurgents and American troops, or to let their daughters and wives leave home alone lest they get kidnapped. They are consumed by fear and feelings of vulnerability, being at the mercy of menacing forces beyond their control.

It is on this psychological level - sowing fear - which the armed resistance has proved to be effective in influencing Iraqis' views and actions since American and British forces deposed Hussein and his government 17 months ago. Indeed, the question of security has emerged as the most important factor influencing Iraqis' attitudes towards their new
government. The more security the interim authority provides to its citizens, the more legitimacy it will garner in their eyes.

But the early signs are discouraging. Although Iraqi security forces now exceed 200,000, they have a long way to go to gain the professional training needed to be effective and responsive to a legitimate central authority. Although American spokesmen often talk of "multilateral forces" involved in anti-insurgency operations, most of the fighting is carried out by U.S. troops without the help of Iraqi security forces. Independent observers have also reported several alarming incidents in which Iraqi security forces fired on and killed scores of unarmed protesters.

The Allawi government is also facing a persistent, entrenched insurgency that has grown deep roots within the Sunni Arab community and among a critical Shiite segment as well. In Sunni areas, almuqawama (the resistance) is proudly celebrated for inflicting heavy blows on the American "occupiers" and their local "traitors." In the battle for the hearts and minds of particularly Sunni Iraqis, almuqawama has proved to be more potent than American firepower and has gained momentum and prestige.

American and Iraqi officials must not mislead themselves by portraying the violent struggle in Iraq as the work of foreign fighters, Al Qaeda affiliates, criminals, terrorists, and hardened pro-Hussein supporters. Their portrayal of the armed insurgency as a terrorist phenomenon underestimates the gravity of the Sunni revolt and the widening and deepening of dissatisfaction among Iraqis in general. There is clearly more to the insurgency than this official version, which reduces everything to simplistic single causes and useful political sloganeering. According to Iraqi observers, activists and academics that closely follow the armed insurgency, although foreign Islamist fighters under the command of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian militant suspected in the deadliest attacks in Iraq, play a vital role in the insurgency, homegrown Iraqi Islamists, nationalists, and dissatisfied ordinary young men predominate. They estimate the number of foreign fighters to be in the hundreds, while indigenous Iraqi resistance can mobilize tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of ansar (supporters).

A consensus exists among Iraqi observers who closely follow the insurgency that homegrown Islamist insurgents, not foreign fighters, exercise effective control over important parts of central Iraq or much of the Anbar and Salahaddin provinces that include cities like Falluja, Baquba, Ramadi, Samarra, Tal Afar, and other towns - all in the so-called Sunni Triangle. They, along with hardliners in the clergy, are imposing strict interpretations of Islamic laws on the land. They have blown up liquor stores and beat up individuals they consider to be morally lax. There are also early indications that guerrillas in the various cities and towns are trying to merge with one another and join ranks. For example, the guerrillas in Samarra - the Mujahedeen Shura (Council of Holy Warriors) - issued a declaration saying they had agreed to merge with their counterparts Mujahedeen Shura in Falluja. This development would represent a significant strategic escalation of the armed resistance because American commanders have long viewed the insurgency as composed of disparate groups across the country and lacking a unified
chain of command.

Although American troops could regain control of these cities by using overwhelming force, the political and human costs would be devastating. The Sunni community, which already feels estranged and excluded from the nascent political process, could rise up en masse against the Americans. A frontal assault by American power on its main cities would also likely cause tens of thousands of casualties and far reaching politicalramifications that transcend Iraq's borders.

Resistance is not just limited to Sunni Arabs. Widespread dissent among radical Shiite groups also exists, although it has not turned into a full-scale uprising. Despite the fragile truce reached between American authorities and the al-Mahdi Army of the fiery Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr in the holy Shiite cities of Karbala, Najaf and Kufa in the south, fighting persists between them in Baghdad's sprawling al-Sadr City slum. Ironically, one of the main conditions set by mainstream Shiite leaders, who brokered the peace agreements between al-Sadr and the Americans, was for the latter to pull back and keep their distance from the sacred shrines of Ali and Hussein. The calls are also rising for the Americans to pull out of more areas, notably al-Sadr City - the main social base of Sadr.

All these calls testify to the hostile mood of Iraqis toward what they perceive as the aggressive tactics by U.S. troops. Dexter Filkins of The New York Times captured this volatile sentiment: Where Iraqis once tolerated American soldiers as a source of stability in their neighborhood, they increasingly see them as a cause of the violence. Take out the Americans, the Iraqis say, and you take out the problem. Leave us alone, and we will sort out our own problems.

In the eyes of many Iraqis, the United States has become part of the problem, not the solution. Insurgents have partially succeeded in fueling Iraqis' resentment against the U.S.-led occupation. Their effective and brutal attacks forced the Americans' hand and led the latter to use disproportionate force which alienated Iraqi public opinion further. In a way, the Americans have already lost the struggle for the hearts and minds of Iraqis and are seen as a menace to social harmony and peace by the population.

American military presence appears to have become a hindrance and liability to the success of the Iraqi political project. Military dominance no longer serves a useful political goal and may have lost any legitimizing function. This new reality requires a critical rethinking of American strategy in Iraq which has mostly relied on the preponderant use of force at the expense of diplomatic and political cards. It also goes against the conventional wisdom in Washington that more American troops are needed to stabilize the war-torn country. The United States must set a specific, early date for the exit of its troops from Iraq to convince Iraqis and the world community of its benign intentions. This alternative could shift the internal dynamics of the conflict in Iraq and the attitudes of the world community.

TENSIONS WITHIN THE INSURGENCY

There are signs pointing to rising tensions between Iraqi nationalists and mainstream Islamists, on the one hand, and Zarqawi's network of Tawhid and Jihad (Unity and Struggle), on the other, over tactics like attacking Iraqi civilians and policemen, the infrastructure, and kidnapping foreigners. Arab Islamists also possess a more ambitious agenda. As one of their leaders, who is based in Falluja - "the capital of the Islamist resistance against the Americans" - told Kamal al-Taweel, a specialist on Arab Islamists for Al Hayat newspaper, "we are fighting in Iraq but our sights are fixated on other places like Jerusalem…" Zarqawi's goal, confided this Islamist, is to establish an Islamic government in Baghdad and to get rid of Allawi and to expel the Americans from Iraq. But Iraq is just a first step on the road to toppling the neighboring secular regimes:
"How can we liberate Jerusalem without possessing a base from which to move forward? Liberating Jerusalem and neighboring countries cannot be achieved without establishing an Islamic government [in Iraq] which will serve as a forward base for al-shabab [the vanguard]."

Iraq appears to have become a recruiting tool, if not a recruiting ground, for militant Jihadi causes. It is slowly and gradually replacing Afghanistan as a forward base for the new Jihad. Today the largest concentration of active Jihadists exists in Iraq, not in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Chechnya, thanks to the American invasion and occupation of the country. Rhetoric aside, the U.S.-led invasion has transformed Iraq into "the central front of the War on Terror."

Yes, there are inherent differences between mainstream Iraqi Islamists and militant Islamists of Zarqawi's variety. Although these differences are bound to pit the two allies against one another in the future, for now they seem to be united by their hatred of the "American occupiers" and their Iraqi "collaborators." Thus it would be misleading to jump to unwarranted conclusions and to exaggerate the extent of differences among the insurgents. For example, recently, Zarqawi's men and Iraqi Islamists joined ranks and collaborated in carrying out attacks. According to interviews with leaders of the insurgents, Zarqawi's network of Tawhid and Jihad includes several thousand fighters composed of Iraqis and Arabs. At least in the short term, all Iraqi and foreign insurgents subscribe to a common strategy - discrediting the pro-U.S. Allawi government and expelling American troops from Iraq.

In particular, Iraqi clerics give public voice to this common goal shared by the insurgents. In their mosque sermons, they often dismiss the new government as a pawn of the American occupation and call for its replacement with a more legitimate authority. One of the country's leading Sunni organizations, the Sunni Clerics Association, boycotted the selection of the National Council, which was supposed to serve as a de facto parliament. Some of its members have dismissed the scheduled elections as a "fake."

Homegrown radical Islamists appear to have taken ownership of the armed insurgency. But Iraqi society as a whole has become more Islamized as a direct result of the social turmoil and upheaval wrought by the American-led invasion and occupation. The longer the turmoil continues, the more marginalized secular forces will be. The balance of power among Iraqi social classes has shifted dramatically in the Islamists' favor within the Sunni and Shiite communities as well. The Iraqi social structure, which used to be the least Islamic in the Arab world, is gradually being Islamized from within and more and more resembles its Arab neighbors. Ironically, Islamists, not secularists or liberals, appear to be the main beneficiaries of the destruction of the nationalist Baathist regime. Iraq is a classic case of the law of unintended consequences. President Bush could be well remembered as a catalyst for the new "Islamic Republic of Iraq."

The Islamization of the resistance does not bode well for Iraq's new interim government which will likely face a prolonged, costly war unless the sociopolitical conditions fueling the insurgency are seriously addressed. Unfortunately, the frantic efforts by Iraqi officials to find ways and means to quell the violence that has wrecked the country and that threatens their very political survival fall far short from what is required. Dr. Allawi has relied more on force and arms-twisting than on a genuine process of persuasion and inclusion. He has not convinced Iraqis of his independence of his American patrons and that he is a genuine Iraqi patriot. His governing methods are deeply authoritarian and divisive and do not take into account the deep ethnic and religious divisions that exist among Iraqi communities.

A case in point includes the unveiling of a sweeping law that gives the Allawi government the authority to declare a state of emergency anywhere it sees fit. Another decree restored the death penalty suspended by the former U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council. Plans to announce a general amnesty for insurgents who lay down their weapons were shelved because of opposition byAmerican authorities. The result was to fold Allawi's much vaunted scheme to wean away Iraqi fighters, "who call themselves the resistance," from those "hardcore criminals" like Zarqawi.

As disturbing is Allawi's aggressive and dangerous treatment of dissenters. Contrary to his pronouncements, Allawi has not invested time or resources in trying to co-opt dissenters. According to members of the country's leading Sunni organizations, the Sunni Clerics Association, Allawi has not bothered to meet with them, let alone try to integrate them into the new political space. If Allawi does not meet with these clerics who give public voice to Iraqi insurgents, how will he tame the spiraling insurgency or secure the peace?

Allawi's treatment of the Shiite radical Sadr, who shoulders a big responsibility for sending his loyalists into a direct and costly confrontation against the Americans, shows the extent of his brinkmanship. The received wisdom is that Sadr's commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict is shaky at best and that he has shown little interest in taking part in the nascent political order that the Americans are trying to construct in Baghdad.

But Sadr and his senior aides pin the blame squarely on Allawi for backing out of two peace deals struck by his negotiators, who were led by his national security adviser, Mowaffak al-Rubaie, in the last two months. With the fighting raging in al-Sadr City and Najaf, Dr. Rubaie announced that he had struck deals with Sadr only to see Dr. Allawi renounce them. Allawi has just dismissed Rubaie, a Shiite political leader who is close to the prominent cleric Ayatollah Sistani.

What is going on? Why did Allawi reject a peace deal that would expose Sadr and possibly end his estrangement by bringing him to the fold? Allawi's aides tell foreign journalists that the prime minister appeared to be motivated by disappointment at Sadr's rising popularity among poor Shiites. Allawi and his Shiite allies, say his aides, would prefer that Sadr be eliminated from the Iraqi scene. More than one source corroborated this account and stressed that Allawi's intention is to "kill or capture" Sadr, in hopes of striking a death blow to his increasingly popular movement: "He wants to humiliate Moktada… He needs a victory."

Regardless of what one thinks of Sadr, an immature, reckless politician whose messianic rhetoric resonates with many poor disfranchised Shiites, it would be disastrous to kill him and deepen the alienation and rage felt by his poor loyalists. Many of his followers could go underground and embark on a campaign of suicide bombings that would destabilize Iraq further. Is this the way to build up the new, democratic Iraq? Is Allawi reverting to the old ways and shades of authoritarian Iraq? An Iraqi politician bluntly told Western journalists that Allawi "appeared to be reverting to his roots as a former member of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party, where political dissent was often silenced with the gun."

Surely, for a caretaker prime minister, who is supposed to proceed with caution, Allawi is acting like an entrenched strongman with no intention of retiring soon. Iraq does not need another dictator. It already had more than its share of autocrats who promised heaven but delivered dust, bleeding the country dry and bringing ruin in their wake.

At this critical and existential juncture of its history, Iraq desperately requires a unifier with vision, wisdom, and tolerance of dissent - who reassures the warring communities that they all have a place and a stake in the new Iraq. The key to success and peaceful co-existence is full integration and inclusion, not exclusion and elimination, of all, I stress all, social and religious segments. Sistani, the most powerful religious figure in Iraq, felt the need to warn Allawi against over reliance on force. He called on the interim government to "stop the showers of blood and to use wisdom in dealing with the deteriorating situation without resorting to violence."

Privately, Iraqis, who fully support the interim government, say they possess little confidence in its ability to secure the peace and tame the insurgency. Unfortunately, most have decided to sit on the fence rather than join the fight for the future of their country. Fewer and fewer Iraqis are supplying coalition forces with intelligence about the resistance. If intelligence is essential to defeating the insurgency, this new development does not portend well for the interim government and its desire to pacify the country. It is likely that for now the security situation will continue to deteriorate.

THE CHALLENGE AHEAD

The challenge is to proceed with the difficult tasks of reconstruction, while enduring brutal and costly attacks. Taming the insurgency will ultimately depend on the ability of the new government to expedite the process of sociopolitical reconstruction and fully legitimize the political process. Winning the hearts and minds of dissatisfied Sunnis and Shiites cannot be accomplished by paying lip service to the rhetoric of reconstruction and democracy. Reconciliation must be fully embraced and all Iraqis must be given a stake in their country's future. Inclusion and reconciliation, not exclusion and retribution, are the keys to tackling the mistrust, suspicion, and fear felt by many Iraqis and to beginning the process of healing. Providing jobs to angry young men is more effective in gaining their trust than all the speeches about the wonders of the new order being constructed in Baghdad.

The caretaker government is a work in progress. To gain public legitimacy, it must deliver on its promises - showing independence from its American patrons, holding free elections in January to gain legitimacy, working hard to reconcile various communities, rebuilding and democratizing Iraqi institutions, particularly the security services, and setting a specific date for the withdrawal of American military forces. There is no assurance of success but the costs of inaction are nightmarish for Iraq, its neighbors, and American security.

Iraqi abuse revelations deepen distrust of US
YaleGlobal, 28 May 2004

NEW YORK: The Abu Ghraib prison atrocities are exacerbating an already dangerous situation in Iraq. Morally and politically, the fallout from the abuse crisis is considerable. One of the major repercussions is Iraqis' further loss of trust in the American-led occupation. More and more Iraqis say they have little confidence and faith in the willingness of the United States to assist them in resolving their country's complex problems and establishing an authentic government that reflects their hopes and culture. Reports from Iraq show more Iraqis now view the US-led occupation as part of the problem, not the solution.

Before the revelation of the abuses of Iraqi prisoners in early May, a USA Today/CNN poll conducted throughout Iraq found that 57 percent of Iraqis said that American and British troops should leave Iraq immediately, even though 53 percent said that they would feel less safe. In contrast, early this year a majority of Iraqis said they wanted American and British troops to remain in the country until the transfer of sovereignty. Also alarming is that 71 percent of Iraqis said they viewed the coalition forces as "occupiers," not "liberators," compared with 43 percent immediately after the invasion. A majority of Iraqis also said they trust the United Nations more than the United States to act as an impartial broker and to assist them in forming a representative government.

Clearly, the alleged abuses of Iraqi prisoners could not have come at a worse time for the Coalition Provisional Authority. They have poured fuel on an already raging fire in Iraq and the Arab arena. In my conversations with Iraqis and Arabs, I sensed deep anger and boiling rage. Their response to the prisoners' scandal ranged from shock to resignation. But unlike their American counterparts, many Iraqis do not seem to be surprised that their countrymen were abused by American soldiers. The revelations reinforced their perceptions that Americans have little respect for their culture or dignity and often use disproportionate force to crush their will. In this sense, the scandal has widened the cultural gulf between Iraqis and US troops and complicated further America's efforts to transfer "limited sovereignty" to Iraqis and tighten its hold on Iraq's future.

Field reports also paint gloomy portraits of Iraqis' darkening mood, which does not portend well for the American-led occupation. Deteriorating security, widespread unemployment (more than 50 percent), and rising civilian casualties have driven more Iraqis to join the armed insurgency. According to American military commanders, fewer and fewer Iraqis than before are supplying coalition forces with intelligence about insurgents. As more Iraqis get estranged from the American-led occupation, the United States finds itself locked in a two-front Sunni and Shiite - costly urban guerrilla war with no end in sight.

It is not fully clear yet if the escalation of violence has more to do with the approaching deadline for the transfer of power to Iraqis than with a genuine nationalist uprising. But Bush administration officials continue to underestimate the gravity of the Sunni and Shiite uprising and the widening and deepening of dissatisfaction among Iraqis. Recent reports from various Iraqi cities show a restive population fed up with the status quo. If not handled correctly, the crisis over Iraqi prisoners could push many neutral Iraqis to the opposition camp.

Militants of all political persuasions inside and outside Iraq are already using and abusing the scandal to fan anti-Americanism and to call for revenge. Iraq appears to have become a recruiting tool, if not a recruiting ground yet, for Al Qaeda as well as for all those who are opposed to American policies in the region. The crisis, in particular, is a welcome development for Al Qaeda and its affiliates which will exploit it to justify its broader war against America and its pro-Muslim allies.

In the next few months, the potential for armed escalation is very real. Gen. John Abizaid, the overall commander of operations in Iraq, told the Senate Armed Services Committee he expects an increase in violence after the transfer of power to Iraqis at the end of June. The assassination of the rotating president of the Iraqi Governing Council, Ezzedine Salim, is a case in point. And the gruesome beheading of Nicholas Berg could be an omen of bad things to come. Militants will likely try to outdo each other in attacking Americans and their allies in Iraq and beyond, pretending to punish the United States for its alleged abuse of Arabs/Muslims and for trampling on their honor and humanity.

Although there exists no magical wand that could immediately wipe out the stain of the abuse crisis, American officials must take concrete steps to limit its impact. President Bush's partial apology to the Iraqi victims is a good step on the long road to healing. Also important was the high level visit to Iraq by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the military brass and his statement in Baghdad that there will be no "cover-up." But on their own, these gestures will unlikely allay the fears of Iraqis or put their lingering suspicions to rest.

Full accountability and transparency will be much more effective than words. It is also not enough to hold a few rogue American soldiers accountable. The abuse scandal reflects a bigger political and moral failure on the highest levels in the Defense Department. Although President Bush decided against sacking Rumsfeld and is trying to weather the storm of public opinion at home and abroad, he must insist on full transparency of the investigation and full accountability as well. Nothing less will do. Americans and Iraqis are entitled to know how systematic, extensive, and widespread the abuses were and the role played by senior civilian and uniform officials in the Defense Department and the military. More than anything else, establishing the facts and meting out justice will go a long way towards rebuilding broken bridges of trust with Iraqis and Arabs.

On a broader level, the United States would magnify, not resolve, its problems if it limits the exercise of sovereignty by the new "caretaker government." Last week, The Wall Street Journal quoted US officials in charge of the transfer plan as saying the new government "will have little control over its armed forces, lack the ability to make or change laws and be unable to make major decisions within specific ministries without tacit U.S. approval." A transfer of power in name only will deepen Iraqis' mistrust further and drive many of them into armed resistance. The transfer of power to Iraqis must be credible and genuine. The logic of the American-led occupation must be replaced with the logic of a legitimate Iraqi authority sanctioned and supported by the United Nations with the active participation of the world community.

Empowering Iraqis and sharing the burden of reconstruction in Iraq with the international community will serve vital American interests, not just peace and stability in the Arab heartland.

Fawaz A. Gerges is the Christian A. Johnson Chair in Middle East and international affairs at Sarah Lawrence College and author of the forthcoming "The Jihadists: Unholy Warriors" (Harcourt). He is a senior analyst for ABC television news.

Watching It Unravel
The New York Daily News, Sunday, April 11

As the security situation worsens in Iraq, the Bush administration finds itself at a loss. There's a huge gap between its assurances that Iraq is on its way to flourishing into a democracy and the harsh, complex reality that exists there today.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that last week's violence that claimed dozens of American lives and hundreds of Iraqis is the work of a few "thugs, gangs and terrorists," not a popular uprising over the U.S.-led occupation.

Other officials dismiss Moqtada al-Sadr, the young rebel cleric behind the rebellion, as an "outlaw" and "murderer" - not a leader of an anti-American uprising.

They're gambling that other Shiite clerics will distance themselves from al-Sadr, thus diminishing his influence. American officials also are trying to trivialize the Sunni rebellion in another part of Iraq by blaming most of the attacks on foreign fighters, Al Qaeda and remnants of the former regime.

But Washington's view of these rebellions is dangerously symptomatic of a pattern of policy miscalculations, blunders and misreading of the Iraqi religious and political landscapes.

The administration's attempt to take down al-Sadr demonstrates that it is again embarking on a high-risk strategy without taking into consideration potential repercussions on stability in Iraq and U.S. interests in the broader Muslim world:

- Administration officials underestimate the gravity of the widespread nature of the uprising.

- They're taking a huge gamble by escalating the confrontation against al-Sadr and his followers.

- They do not know the real strength of his social base and the extent of dissatisfaction among Shiites generally.

- U.S. policies in Iraq are alienating moderate public opinion and making heroes out of militants such as al-Sadr, and unifying dissatisfied Shiites and Sunnis against the occupation.

- Counterinsurgency tactics are driving policy, not the other way around, and harm is being done to broader U.S. interests in the Muslim Middle East.

For example, although al-Sadr does not now represent a majority of Shiite opinion, it is misleading to portray him as inconsequential or to risk that Shiites will remain neutral if more Shiite blood is spilled.

Anyone who understands the history of Shiites knows the central role that al-Sadr's family has played in modern Iraq.

Al-Sadr is the son of the most revered Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, renowned for his religious authority but also for his public resistance to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. He was murdered along with two of his sons in 1999. Al-Sadr is the only remaining son.

Though he has a humble religious education and no formal Islamic standing, al-Sadr has effectively capitalized on the family legacy to project himself as a leader.

He welcomed martyrdom as a religious honor and, cleverly, aligned himself with Iraq's most influential religious cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sistani knows well that al-Sadr's strident rhetoric against Americans resonates among many dissatisfied Shiites who have become disillusioned with the occupation.

Shiites, who initially cheered America's toppling of Saddam, fear that again they will be cheated out of their natural rights to rule Iraq.

Far from marginalizing the troublesome al-Sadr, heavy-handed tactics by the American occupation authorities have enhanced his status.

By arresting him or killing his militia, the U.S. would turn him into a nationalist hero and drive his widespread followers underground into terrorism.

More alarming, al-Sadr's rebellion appears to give voice to the frustrations of many ordinary Iraqis, who are now dealing with a lack of security, few jobs and empty promises.

Recent reports show a restive Iraqi population ready to revolt. Popular support for the Sunni and Shiite rebellions is gaining momentum.

According to Iraqi observers, the insurgency has grown deep roots among Sunnis and is being led by Iraqi Islamists, nationalists and tribal leaders — not just by Baathist elements, the people who benefited most from Saddam's rule.

American intelligence officials now also believe that hatred of the American occupation has spread rapidly among Shiites, and that al-Sadr's followers represent just one element of the opposition.

It is crucial that short-term military calculations do not override long-term policy goals - building support for a peaceful, democratic Iraq.

It also is essential to recognize that there is no military solution to the violent struggle unfolding in Iraq. The Bush administration must have the political courage to fundamentally rethink its strategy before the country plunges deeper into chaos.

The logic of the U.S.-led occupation must be replaced with the logic of an international authority under the leadership of the United Nations with the active participation of the world community, particularly Arab and Muslim states.

The goal is to reassure Iraqis and give them time and space to debate various political formulas suitable for governing their country and sharing power.

It will take a few years. Sharing the burden of reconstruction in Iraq will serve vital American interests, not just communal harmony and political stability in the Arab heartland.

Fawaz A. Gerges is professor of Middle East and international affairs at Sarah Lawrence College and author of the forthcoming "The Islamists and the West" (Cambridge University Press).


Sunni Insurgency
The Baltimore Sun, Sunday, April 4

BEIRUT, Lebanon - Since the capture of Saddam Hussein in December, a drumbeat of attacks across central and northern Iraq have claimed hundreds of Iraqi and American lives and have given little hope that the war is winding down.

There are daily reports of insurgent attacks against Americans, Iraqi police and soft targets. In one day last week, four American contractors were killed in a rebel ambush in Fallujah and jubilant residents dragged charred corpses through the streets and hanged two of them from a bridge. Five U.S. soldiers were killed in a roadside bombing nearby. And the U.S. military death toll since the onset of war a year ago is about 600.

Yet U.S. commanders and officials paint an optimistic picture of the security situation and blame foreign led-Islamist fighters - "terrorists"
- or small remaining pockets of Hussein followers for most of the attacks. This reasoning was reinforced by the discovery of a paper by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born lieutenant affiliated with al-Qaida, in which he urged the terrorist network's senior leadership to support his goal of starting a "civil war" in Iraq.

This official version does not consider the existence of an indigenous, Islamist-nationalist resistance within the Sunni Arab community that appears to be the driving force behind the insurgency. Establishing the extent of al-Qaida's involvement is important so long as it does not distort understanding of who are the real players in Iraq. By fixating on al-Qaida and the Islamic extremists, the Bush administration underestimates the fundamental role played by Iraqi Sunni Islamists and nationalists in the insurgency. The minority Sunni Arabs had a dominant position under Mr. Hussein.

According to Iraqi observers, activists and academics who live in the Sunni Triangle and closely follow the insurgency, Iraqi Islamists and nationalists predominate.

A consensus emerged at a recent conference on Iraq organized by the Center for Arab Unity Studies in Beirut and attended by more than 60 Iraqi civilian leaders that Iraqi Islamists - not foreign fighters or Hussein loyalists - are behind most of the attacks in Iraq.

In the first field study conducted in the Sunni Triangle and based on a large random sample of insurgents killed, Suleiman Jumeili, who teaches at the Center for International Relations at Baghdad University and lives in Fallujah, discovered that 80 percent of all those killed were Iraqi Islamist activists. His interviews with their friends and relatives showed that these young men were inspired by the example of "sacrifice and martyrdom" that is the hallmark of the Palestinian Hamas organization and Lebanon's Iranian-backed Hezbollah.

According to Mr. Jumeili, only 13 percent of the dead insurgents were motivated by nationalist sentiments and only 2 percent were die-hard Baathists; foreign Islamists represented 5 percent. Of those 8,500 insurgents imprisoned by U.S. troops, 70 percent are also indigenous Islamists. (When pressed, U.S. commanders conceded that only 150 - less than 2 percent - are foreigners.)

These unscientific findings, which challenge the official U.S. version, were corroborated by other Iraqi specialists at the conference. All presentations asserted that Iraqi Islamists and nationalists have taken over the insurgency and that foreign fighters and pro-Hussein insurgents play a marginal role. The latter are now fighting under the Islamist-nationalist banner.

Although conference participants blamed foreign fighters for the terrorist attacks against Shiites, Kurds and other soft targets, they also said militant factions among Iraqi Islamists consider anyone who works with the occupation a collaborator and thus a legitimate target.

This highly alarming development increases the chances of civil strife because of the Sunni Arab identity of the insurgency. A danger also exists that Sunni Iraqis could provide the next generation of foot soldiers for fringe groups such as al-Qaida.

So long as Sunni Arabs feel excluded, they are likely to remain embittered and drift further toward extremism. They could wreak havoc with any newly installed government and export instability to neighboring countries, even to the United States.

U.S. officials must not mislead themselves and the nation by portraying the violent struggle in Iraq as the work of al-Qaida's affiliates and desperate pro-Hussein insurgents.

There is clearly more to the insurgency than the official U.S. version, which reduces everything to al-Qaida and the Baathists. The indigenous Islamist-nationalist character of the insurgency tells us that U.S. troops will likely face a prolonged, costly war in Iraq unless the political conditions fueling the insurgency are addressed.

The most effective way to tackle the insurgency is to reach out to the Sunni Arab community - which feels punished for the crimes committed by one of its members, Mr. Hussein - and reassure it that it has a central role to play in the new political order being built in Iraq. Integrating Sunni Arabs into the new Iraq will not merely serve civic harmony and stability, but also vital American interests.

Fawaz A. Gerges is a professor of Middle East and international affairs at Sarah Lawrence College in New York.

Hamas Leader Killed
Washington Post, Monday, March 22, 2004; 3:00 p.m ET

Israeli aircraft attacked and killed Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader and founder of Hamas and Israel's top target, as he was pushed in a wheelchair from morning prayers at a Gaza City mosque early Monday, prompting condemnation across Europe and the Middle East and massive demonstrations in Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas Leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin Killed in Gaza.

Fawaz Gerges, chair of Middle Eastern Studies and International Affairs at Sarah Lawrence College, will be online Monday, March 22 at 3 p.m. ET, to discuss Yassin's death, world reaction and likely implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Submit your questions and comments before or during today's discussion.

Gerges specializes in Islam and the political process, fringe Islamist movements, Arab politics, American foreign policy in the Middle East, the modern history of the Middle East, history of conflict, diplomacy and foreign policy, historical sociology and international relations.

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Fawaz Gerges: The assassination of Hamas spritual leader Ahmad Yassin raises serious, critical questions not just about the potential for a dramatic escalation of violence between Palestinians and Israelis but also about radicalization of Palestinian politics further and a spillover into neighboring Arab countries. The decision by Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, to kill Yassin, could have the opposite results from its intended consequences.

Will the assassination of Yassin make Israelis more secure, or will it lead to the shedding of more Jewish and Arab blood? Will his death bring Palestinians and Israeli closer to a peacefull settlement, or prolong their estrangement and conflict? I fear that the answer to both questions is more, not less, instability, chaos, hatred, and bloodshed.

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Harrisburg, Pa.: When the Israeli government kills someone like Sheik Ahmed Yassin, does anyone consider how they expect the Palestinians will react? What reaction do they expect?

Fawaz Gerges: If history serves as a guide, the reaction of Palestinians will be bloody indeed. For example, in March 1996, Israeli assassinated Hamas' chief bomb maker, Yahya Ayyash, who was held responsible for the death of dozens of Israelis. Initilaly, Israeli security services boasted about the success of their assassination operation, yet Hamas subsequently retaliated with a wave of suicide bombings, which killed 62 Israelis and injured many others, and terrorized Israeli society.

If Hamas retaliated so brutally to avenge the killing of one of its famous engineers, one can imagine the extent and nature of its response to the assassination of its spiritual leader. Hamas' officials have already promised to avenge his death by killing hundreds of Israelis. It remains to be seen if Hamas can still deliver on its threats. But the writing is on the wall. Ariel Sharon knows full well that Hamas will retaliate and blood will be shed on both sides. Both sides will be worse off.

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New York, N.Y.: Killing a crippled, blind old man shows how baser and meaner a regime can go. These missiles are paid by US tax payers money. Now we more buying more enemies than we can handle. Your comments?

Fawaz Gerges: The assassination of Yassin introduces a highly volatile factor into the Palestinian-Israeli equation. Until now Hamas made it very clear that its struggle was internal and that it would not expand its attacks outside Palestinian territories. Today there are signs that some Hamas officials accused the United States of being indirectly responsible for the killing of their leader and insunated that they could retaliate against US interests. Other Muslim clerics also denounced Washington's call for restraint and called on Arabs and Muslims to stand up to Washington and assist the Paletsinians in their struggle.

One point must be made clear: American vital interests in the world of Islam are not served by exerting pressure on on side to show restraint, instead of doing so on both sides.

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Washington, D.C.: Two questions:

The U.S. says it had no advance knowledge of this attack - doesn't it seem strange that Israel would not alert the US to an action that could have such far-reaching consequences?

What has been the reaction in Israel? Widespread support? Any criticism from unexpected quarters?

Fawaz Gerges: Although I doubted if Ariel Sharon informed the White House of the attack in advance, the unwillingness of the Bush administration to oppose the so-called Israel's extra Judicial killings and assassinations is seen as a policy of implicit approval of such methods. These killings not only do not serve the long term cause of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking but also intensify hostility and suspicion of the United States in the Arab/Mulsim world. The Bush administration must become more actively engaged in bringing Palestinians and Israeli back into the negotiating table and must impress on Sharon's the need to exercise restraint stop these counterproductive killings.

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Washington, D.C.: If the consequences are so obviously different from stated policy, I must wonder just how un- the unintended consequences could be? Why is it that every step America and Israel take to increase safety only results in further bloodshed and war?

Fawaz Gerges: It is worth noting that Yassin was considered a moderating voice within Hamas. Although this footnote might surprise some American readers who do not see any distinctions among Hamas leaders, the fact is that Yassin managed to prevent more hawkish colleagues from fully plunging into an all out war against Israel.

Now Hamas will fall into the hands of more aggressive leaders, like those of Dr. Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, who have advocated a full onslaught against Israel. After Yassin's assassination, the rallying cry of Hamas leaders is for all-out war, and that there no longer exist any red lines. There is a danger that the further radicalization of Hamas will translate into more suicide bombings against Israelis. This is excatly what I meant by the law of unintended consequences. Will Israel be safer after the exist of Yassin from the scene? It is very unlikley!

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Washington, DC: One hypothesis I have heard bandied about today is the possibility that Sharon/Israel wants to try to start an internal civil war between Arafat's Fatah party and Hamas, as the former is seen to be losing proponents to the latter due to charges of corruption, placidity, etc., and that this might strengthen Hamas... forcing Fatah to have to confront them in order to maintain their own authority in Palestine. Arguments between the two would continue to escalate until they begin fighting eachother either politically or physically, leaving a weaker structure for Israel to exploit.

And of course there is also the theory that this attack is also meant that Sharon is trying to start a full scale war between Israel and Palestine to end things once and for all. I think that sounds a bit conspiracy theory-esque for my tastes. But a lot of people seem to believe it.

Thoughts on either of these two possibilities?

Fawaz Gerges: Yes, a danger exists that the further radicalization of Hamas will not only mean an escalation of violence between Israelis and Plaestinians but also the risk of intra-Palestinian civil war. Sheikh Yassin played a decisive role in keep the lid tight on intra-Palestinians differences and tensions. He would not tolerate any clash with the Arafat's Fatah or with the Palestinian National a Authority. Other Hamas leaders are less careful and more willing to challenge Arafat's authority. In this sense, the assassination of Yassin could potentially add more fuel to a raging fire under the surface of Plaestinian politics. Sharon and his aides know the complex dynamics of Palestinian politics and hope the play them off one againt another.

My own instinct tells that the Palestinians have shown maturity and restraint. They have refused to plunge into the brink of civil strife. Let is hope that the killing of Sheikh Yassin does not create the conditions for internal instability and violence.

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Washington, DC: Regardless of opinions on the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza - and I oppose it wholeheartedly - I've seen almost no mention of the fact that Sheikh Yassin opposed far more than the occupation.

He repeatedly, and regularly, called for the destruction of all of Israel - a sovereign state recognized by the UN.

Instead, articles are mentioning Hamas's charity work, its hospitals and schools, as though that work somehow balances out the same group's murderous bombings.

While I think that his assassination will cause far more problems than it might solve, I object to his being referred to as "an old man in a wheelchair" as though it obviates his responsibility for Hamas's founding, aims, and actions.

Your thoughts?

Fawaz Gerges: Yes, Sheikh Yassin did sanction sucide bombings against Israelis. And yes, suicide bombings do not serve the interests of either the Palestianians or Israelis. In particular, they have done considerable damage to the moral cause of the Palestinians. They have also diverted attention from the brutal Israeli occupation and the dismal plight of the Palestinians.

Having said so, Sheikh Yassin, as an Israeli observer put it, did not put faith in a military solution to the prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflcit. He often spoke of hundred-year truces between Israelis and Palestinians and suggested a temporray cessation of hostilities, implying he would grant de facto recognition of Israel.

Was that enough or adequate? No. But it is a humble beginning that promised a shift in Hamas' strategy. of

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Santa Fe, NM: It's been suggested that Sharon's goals were to be able to evacuate Gaza from a position of strength, and thus to prevent a repeat of the Lebanon debacle. This seems to make sense. Your thoughts?

Fawaz Gerges: I think Ariel Sharon is trying to send a strong message to Hamas and Palestinians that he would continue to strike against their resources and leadership now and after he evacuates the Gaza Strip. His stratgey is to weaken Hamas and keep its leadership off balance. Again, his actions could end up strengthening the militant group and rallying public support in its favor. Hundred of thounsands of Palestinians protested the killing of Sheikh Yassin and thousands of new, fresh recruits are likely to join its cells and squads.

As important, Hamas' status and reputation has been elavated throughout Arab and Muslim lands. In fact, Ariel Sharon's actions are contributing to making Hamas as popular as Lebanon's Hezbollah.

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Cincinnati, Ohio: Exactly what does the Israeli government expect to gain from the assasination of Yassin? In the final analysis they must expect this act to have a positive net effect. Reading news reports and columns though I can see nothing positive come from this save pandering to the hawks in Sharon's government. Am I missing something here?

Fawaz Gerges: Indeed, the killing of Yassin does not appear to provide any positive returns for Israeli security. The opposite is true.

For more than three years, since the outbreak of the armed Al Aqsa Intifada, Ariel Sharon has used all instruments at his disposal in order to militarily crush the Palestinians. The conflict persists. The shedding of Jewish and Arab blood continues. Israelis feel as insecure as ever.

The big moral lesson that both Israeli and Palestinian hawks do not grasp is the folowing: there is no mlitary solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hamas and Jihad will not succeed in forcing Israelis to pack and leave the country. Israelis will not succeed in crushing the political will of the Palestinians to resist military occupation.

The solution is simple: Israel must withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territories and allow the Palestinians self-determination in return for peace and security for Israeli citizens. A just settlement based on historical reconciliation offers the only way out of this deadly cyle of violence and mutual self-destruction.

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Bronx, N.Y.: Does the Israeli public back these targeted attacks?

Fawaz Gerges: Unfortunately, a plurality of Israelis support these extar judicial assassinations. Although these killings have not made Israelis more secure, nonetheless, the Israeli public hopes that they would produce results. Suicide bombings have driven many Israelis to take hawkish positions on security issues, even though Ariel Sharon's brutal tactics have not brought Israelis any peace of mind.

In this sense, Palestinians must reflect on the moral and political consequences of suicide bombings and develop a consensus against the use of such methods. In the same vein, Israelis must recognize the fact that oppressing other people will corrupt the soul of their democracy and humanity as well.

Both sides have much reflection to do in order to prevent the hardliners amongst them from plunging them into the brink of mutual self-destruction.

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Silver Spring, Md.: What makes you think Hamas would be willing to stop attacking Israel for control of just the so-called occupied territories?

Fawaz Gerges: Hamas is not a monolith. It is a political organization which encompasses a broad spectrum of political and ideological orientation.

Take, for example, Isma'il Abu Shanab, who was assassinated by Israelin last August, who was one of the most pragmatic Hamas leaders, who openly accepted an Israeli state. Sheikh Yassin also coached his moderate position in nuanced language. The point to stress is that at the end of the day Hamas, if and when it is integrated into mainstream Palestinain politics, will come to terms with the reality of the Israeli state.

Let us not be misled by the ideological rhetoric of Hamas. This political animal possesses earthly ambitions.

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Washington DC: You state that Israel did not tell the US that it was going to strike, but in 2003, Israel- "In response to suicide bombings, Israel intensifies targeted killings of militants and declares top Hamas leaders "marked for death." and then on Sept. 6, 2003: Israeli air force drops 550-pound bomb on Gaza building where Hamas leaders had gathered; Yassin escapes with a small wound on his hand.

It seems to me that Israel provided the world lots of notice about it's intent.

Fawaz Gerges: Yesterday's assassination of Sheikh Yassin did not come as a surprise. On 6 Sept., he escaped narrolwy after Israel dropped a 555-pound bomb on a gathering of Hamas leaders. On Jan. 16, Israel's deputy defense minister, Zeev Boim, said Yassin was "marked for death" by Israel: "He should hide himself deep undergound where he won't know the difference between day and night." Sheikh Yassin responded, "We do not fear death threats. We are seeking martyrdom."

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Fawaz Gerges: It is my hope that the silent majority on both sides will reclaim its voice of rationality, humanity, and peace and will silence the hardliners who have inflicted too much pain and suffering on each other.

Many thanks.

Among Arab youth, a thirst for reform
Star-Ledger, Sunday, February 8, 2004

Americans are bombarded with alarming reports from the Arab Middle East about intensifying anti-U.S. sentiments and escalating threats to their security. In the eyes of many Americans the Muslim Middle East has become simply a caldron of anti-Americanism and out-of-control violence. But the headlines from the region have missed an important trend percolating among the younger generation in various Arab countries.

From universities in Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Tunis and Algiers that have become de facto safe havens of civic protest across the Middle East to soccer arenas and anti-Iraq war demonstrations, the subtext of this generation's public expression is a deep yearning to be free and enfranchised.

The most breathtaking example of the movement for me was a teen panel at a conference organized by the influential Arab Thought Foundation in Beirut, Lebanon, last month. Eight men and women in their late teens from across the Arab world sat on a panel before 1,000 academics, politicians, diplomats, and activists. One after another, the teens stunned their elders into embarrassed silence with vehement scolding of their countries' leaders, not the U.S. or even Israel.

"You have failed us," shouted a Saudi teen. "I is about time women are put in charge to undo the wrongs done."

Panelists talked from direct personal experience, directing their anger not just against harsh political and economic realities at home but also at their parents' fatalism and defeatist passivity. Colleagues in the audience said they were "shocked" and "moved" by the teenagers' passion, bluntness and freshness. "It was heartening," one said. "There was no finger-pointing at Zionism or imperialism."

In the past few years, after interviewing and circulating among young people in the region and witnessing the new, powerful trends and stirrings, I call the phenomenon "the freedom generation." Young men and women from all walks of life are challenging the autocratic status quo and demanding an active political role in shaping their countries' future. Young people under 30 - almost 60 percent of the region's population - are unsettled about the economic deprivation, political oppression and the conflation of their religion with terrorism.

But unlike their elders, they are not blinded by official propaganda into placing the blame on outsiders for their predicament. They recognize that the root causes of the profound crisis facing the Arab world lie within traditional Arab structures, namely authoritarianism and unreformed patriarchy. They see the shortest route to a better life in reforming their societies and affecting change in their own leadership.

Take a sociology graduate from the Lebanese University whom I met at a demonstration against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in Beirut. Yes, her sign said "No to American imperialism," but the longer I talked to her, the more I realized her anger was directed closer at home, at the dismal failings of her government. She and her generation feel disenfranchised and let down by Arab rulers.

In Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan, I witnessed the new social protest phenomenon that is spreading across the region: Politically repressed people gathered together in anonymous masses at a soccer match or a demonstration against Israeli and U.S. policies often turn into antigovernment rallies with waves of young people rooting for regime change.

At a recent soccer match involving Saadi Gadhafi, Col. Moammar Gadhafi's soccer-playing son, fans from the opposite team chanted "Saadi, Saadi, son of the ruler, your fate will be the fate of Uday." The phrase - it rhymes in Arabic - refers to one of the sons of Saddam Hussein who was killed in an American raid. In this sense, Iran appears to have provided a model for the Arab youth. Its rebellious young men and women led the freedom march in the Muslim world.

BLAMING THEIR LEADERS

Conventional wisdom has it that Arabs and Muslims do not take personal responsibility for their problems of political oppression, economic deprivation, and terrorist fervor and, instead, blame Western imperialism. But that's just not what a startling number of youth believe now. Although young men and women find many faults with the Western powers, they lay the blame for their plight squarely at the feet of their own oppressive regimes.

No, this is not wishful thinking but the beginning of a genuine emergence of a social movement. Of all political groups, the young hold the key - by their demographic weight, activism and freedom-loving spirit - to the transformation of closed Arab societies.

It's a hopeful note for the United States, if its leaders play it correctly. If the United States is genuine about promoting democracy in the world of Islam, it must not be afraid to take risks on peoples' choices. It must push its autocratic allies to open up the political space and dramatically expand political participation and representation. It must also invest in Arab civil society by conducting exchange programs, granting scholarships to women, and investing in health and education programs. Too much of American money is dedicated to propping up the government and military sectors in these societies.

This freedom generation, if enfranchised, will not be as pliant as Arab autocratic rulers. But it could bring a new democratic dynamism to the region, and in the long run, defuse the crisis in Arab-American relations. By being in charge of their own destiny, young Muslim men will reject Osama bin Laden's nihilism and begin the difficult process of institution- and nation-building. There would be no need then for the U.S. army to get bogged down in nation-building in that part of the world.

Fawaz A. Gerges is a professor in Middle East and international affairs at Sarah Lawrence College and is author of the forthcoming "The Islamists and the West" (Cambridge University Press).

NOTES: Fawaz A. Gerges is a professor of Middle East and international affairs at Sarah Lawrence College and is author of the forthcoming "The Islamists and the West" (Cambridge University Press).

A Change of Arab Hearts and Minds
Christian Science Monitor, Wednesday, February 4, 2004

Fawaz Gerges, a professor of Middle East and international affairs at Sarah Lawrence College, has traveled the Arab world during the past five years, researching social and political movements. Behind what is seen from the West as a violent caldron of anti-American Islamism, Dr. Gerges sees signs of a nascent era of civic opening in the Middle East. If cultivated wisely by the US, he says, this movement could actually become something genuinely democratic. Monitor editors interviewed Gerges last week - excerpts follow:

GERGES: In the same manner that the socialist Arab paradigm was discredited in the late 1960s, I think the Islamist paradigm - using religion in order to justify violence and to capture the state - was also discredited in the late 1990s.

We're in the throes of the beginning of a new wave - the freedom generation - in which civil society is asserting itself. Its vanguard is the generation under 30 years old, which represents more than 60 percent of Muslim population.

The rhetoric we're hearing from this generation is very reassuring. In my interviews with young people, they say they're fed up with the autocratic political order, and they're demanding a voice in shaping their countries' future. They're rebelling not just against the political authoritarian order, but also against patriarchy, the social structure, family relations. While their fathers and elders accepted the social contract of the ruling Army officers in the 1950s, young people today would like a new social contract based on representation. They want to be heard, to be in charge of their destiny. If there's one word I often hear, it's inclusion. They'd like a new transparent system - though not fully secular, a system that takes into account the basic strengths of freedom.

The gap in the Arab world has never been wider between those who govern and the ones who are governed.

Do you include Iran in this wave?

Iran really has led the Muslim world in this respect. [Reformist President] Khatami was elected with the support of almost 70 percent of young Iranians. And we're witnessing the beginning of similar signs throughout Arab lands.

In Iran, intellectual debate has included how Western philosophy can mesh with Islamic principles. Is that debate happening in the Arab world?

It's been happening in civil society - particularly in the 1990s. I've interviewed scores of young Islamists, and the biggest question in the Arab world today is: How do you combine modernity and Muslim authenticity?

Do you use "modernity" to avoid saying "Western..."

In the eyes of many, Westernization has negative connotations.

Arab Islamists weren't able to carry out such a coup as their counterparts in Iran. They tried and almost succeeded in Egypt and Algeria. But by the end of the 1990s, they were strategically defeated, because they alienated the main social strata with their militant tactics, ambitions, inability to patiently build alliances, and use of terror on large scales. Political Islamism was discredited as a result of the use of violence and terrorism and its main victims have not been Westerners, but Arabs and Muslims.

But were their ideals defeated?

Arab society appears to have become Islamicized from within. Young Arabs say they'd like to be democrats, but that they are also Muslims. And I catch my own biases, thinking that somehow democracy is incompatible with any kind of politicized religion. But they don't see it this way.

Why now? What's behind the change?

There are three factors driving this new wave. First, autocratic Arab regimes can no longer control the flow of information, thanks to satellite TV stations like Al Jazeera. The new media are challenging the status quo by telling what's happening at home and abroad.

The second factor is the Arab world's profound socioeconomic and political crisis. Unemployment among young men and women is reportedly 78 percent in Egypt; 68 in Syria; 58 in Jordan; 45 in Tunisia. Not having a job means you can't get married, start a family, or have a decent life. So this profound social crisis is mobilizing - forcing - young men and women to play a different role than their elders did.

Finally, Arabs see their world is being recolonized - you have very proud kids who feel outraged because their countries are being invaded, humiliated, and their religion conflated with terrorism.

Are they blaming their plight on the US or their own leaders?

While they fault the US for the injustices inflicted on Palestinians and other Muslim communities, they lay the blame for their plight squarely at the feet of their own repressive regimes. For example, in December at a Beirut conference of thousands of politicians, academics, and activists, one Saudi Arabian girl in her late teens said Arab leaders have failed and should be replaced by women. There was total silence in the big hall - you should have seen the look on the faces of the old guard. We're not talking about a [modern] Lebanese, Syrian, or Palestinian woman; it was a woman from [conservative] Saudi Arabia who reprimanded the autocrats.

You say militant Islamism is a spent force but the violence continues: We've had 9/11, foreign fighters going into Iraq, the promotion of violence from mosques, Palestinian suicide bombers. It doesn't feel as if it's waning.

Throughout the Arab world Islamists have concluded violence and terrorism not only hurt their movement but harm the interests of the Muslim community. Since 9/11 some of the most militant Islamists published books condemning Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri's tactics.

So if the US were to prod autocratic Arab regimes to liberalize, then would they be overrun by a wave of Islamists?

I think there is no danger, now, that any Middle Eastern government will be overrun by Islamists. Islamist movements are having second thoughts about their use of terror in service of the political. They've paid dearly for their miscalculation.

I'm not suggesting that the US should shift gears overnight and get rid of its autocratic Arab allies. But if the US is as genuine about reform as it says it is, if it believes authoritarianism played a decisive role in giving rise to bin Ladenism, it's in the US's own vital interest for its allies to gradually open up the political process, integrate the rising social classes into the fold, and liberalize from within. I suggest the US could also help by investing in education, academic exchange, training of teachers, and other aspects of civil society.

What Arab leaders do you think recognize the problem as you've outlined it and are responding to it?

As a result of social upheaval among young people, almost every Arab cabinet now includes a ministry of youth. For example, listen to Egyptian President Mubarak often talk of the importance of the youth, concern for their future, and how he wants to integrate them into the political process. The Tunisian and Moroccan governments are doing more than other Arab countries to open the socioeconomic and political system, to integrate women - an enlightened authoritarianism. Although other Arab rulers pay lip service to the idea of incorporating young men and women into political life, they're trying to find ways to control this new wave.

You frequently mention women's liberation as part of this movement. Are young men really on board with that?

Young men as much as young women argue that to really reform Arab societies you need to reform family structures and liberate women. In their minds, liberalizing means equality between the sexes.

How do you think they're going to be prepared to deal with the obvious backlash against integrating women?

I don't know how it will work in practice. But we're witnessing a dramatic shift. At almost all Arab universities more women than men are enrolling and graduating. Gender roles are bound to change as more women professionals enter the work force. This development says a lot about structural changes happening in the Arab world.

The fear is that war in Iraq has created a greater sympathy in the Muslim world for bin Ladenism.

Far from empowering the democrats or the reformists, the war in Iraq, has supplied more ammunition to militant elements and alienated moderate secular and Muslim public opinion. But anger is aimed at the US and the local regimes. Demonstrations in Egypt and Jordan against the invasion of Iraq were directed as much at local regimes as at the US. What's fascinating is that tens of thousands of Egyptians at war protests said "no" to Mubarak and shouted antiregime slogans. The Iraq war reinforced perceptions that reforms are urgently needed and that the entire structure must be overhauled from within because it is rotten.

Among Arabs, is Iraq becoming more important in shaping opinion about the US than, say, the Palestinian conflict?

For a moment, I expected Iraq to supersede Palestine in Arab imagination. Saddam Hussein was perceived as a brutal dictator, but most Arabs believe that the US didn't go to Iraq to liberate the Iraqis, that it had ulterior motives. Yet all the studies show that even after the invasion and occupation of Iraq, Palestine remains the most fundamental, critical question in the minds of Arabs. The question of Palestine goes to the heart of Arab identity because Israel is perceived as a creation of the West. As such, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and now the occupation of Iraq, is seen as a continuation of the onslaught against Arabs and Muslims.

Do you think the US investment in [the US Arab language] Radio Sawa and that kind of publicity is worth it?

Radio Sawa has a huge audience of young Arabs. They like the music but don't listen to the news - a huge gap between the cultural aspect and the political. In Arab eyes, the US suffers from a crisis of moral authority. Young Arabs admire American values but are deeply suspicious of US foreign policy. There is a great deal of attraction and fascination toward the American idea. Yes, the US could serve as a catalyst for positive change in the Arab world. But this requires more than propaganda. I'm talking about a long term strategy to assist reformists in tranforming civil society, to take risks on the younger generation's choices, and help resolve festering regional conflicts. The US is rethinking foreign aid strategy in the area. One would hope that, instead of military toys and other prestige projects, some aid would be channeled into civil society projects like reforming the educational and health systems, empowering women, and pushing rulers to open up the political system and respect human rights and the rule of law.

Rudderless in the Storm: Arab Politics Before and After the Iraq War
Dissent Magazine, Winter 2004

While the United States and Britain are engaged in a heated debate regarding the official explanations and justifications offered for the war on Iraq, no similar soul searching has occurred in the Arab world. Arab rulers have little to say about the dismal failure of their diplomacy and their inability to act in a way that would have put the interests of the Iraqi people over those of Saddam Hussein. On the eve of the war, Arab politicians fretted over merely tactical issues-whether to publicize their opposition to the U.S.-led war or to pin the blame on Hussein-rather than helping Iraqis rid themselves of a tyrannical regime.

Inter-Arab diplomacy was more of a public relations exercise than a concerted effort at resolving the crisis. Words were substituted for actions. The Iraqi crisis has added weight to the accusation that Arabs are zahira sawtiya (a merely polemical phenomenon), taken seriously by neither friend nor foe. Regardless of whether the ruling elites appreciated the gravity of the crisis and its potential repercussions on regional order, their inaction highlighted not only the splits within their ranks but also their moral bankruptcy.

The old order was crumbling before their eyes. Yet Arab leaders buried their heads in the sand, hoping that the storm would pass with minimum damage to their autocratic rule. No serious thought was given to taking the lead in trying to force Saddam Hussein out of power, thus forestalling the U.S. war and sparing the Iraqi people. Given the obsessive determination of the Bush administration to go to war against Saddam's regime, the Arabs could not have it both ways: saving both the regime and Iraq's suffering population. They failed to make a clear decision to help the people and so sided indirectly with Saddam.

To act on behalf of the people would have required both visionary leadership, a willingness to take risks, and a tough political realism-traits in short supply in the Arab world. What transpired instead on the diplomatic scene were vacuous formalities, procrastination, recrimination, and inaction: in other words, stasis. Arab rulers proved true to the norm, speaking in double-tongued proclamations and innuendoes to their own populations and the world. They publicly swore by the Almighty to oppose the coming war, while privately feigning impotence and promising to support their superpower patron. Never mind that they didn't test or maximize their bargaining power as Turkey did. Never mind that they didn't level with their citizens about being beholden to Washington and about Saddam Hussein's numbered days. A convincing argument could have been made that Hussein must go for the sake of the Iraqi people and the survival of their state-not just because the White House aimed at the destruction of the Baath regime.

But to ask for forethought would have been asking too much of a cynical, hardened lot who have survived for so long by mastering the art of double-talk and obfuscation. Hardly any lessons were learned from previous crises in 1967 and 1990. The problem with their charade is not only that it has deepened public cynicism-unleashing a frenzy of conspiratorial theories; it has also exacerbated the legitimacy crisis of the Arab political order. Never before have the ruling autocrats been as naked in the eyes of their publics as they are now. Never before has the gap been larger between the Arab ruling elite and the people they rule. It is a miracle that the autocratic Arab state system has endured for so long with so little legitimacy. The possibility of its sudden collapse, along Iranian lines, cannot be discounted. In the meantime, politics mutates into extremism at home and terrorism abroad. The seeds of both lie in the structure of the closed Arab system and the unholy alliance between the ruling social classes and the conservative religious establishment.

What Did the Arab States Want?
The men in power cared neither about Saddam Hussein nor about his captive subjects. Their overriding goal was to preserve the status quo and limit the impact of the crisis on their tribal fiefdoms. They also hoped to please the Bush administration and avoid being targeted by its hard-liners. Their immediate political survival took precedence over everything else, regardless of the long-term corrosive effects of the crisis on their rule and on the geo-strategic balance of power.

When heads of Arab states finally met in Cairo on the eve of the war, they split into two camps. The radicals-Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan-wished to affirm their opposition to the coming war and to ban any Arab state from providing logistical and material support to invading American forces. Although America's allies-Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait-all agreed to register opposition to the war, they refused to go along with the ban on logistical support. After all, these governments had already granted the Bush administration access to their bases and ports by previous agreement. It was, as everyone knew, a done deal. But the traditional form of inter-Arab ritual verbal exchange had to be faithfully observed, irrespective of the complete lack of substance.

In a nutshell, the Arab summit at the eve of the war was a dismal failure. It revealed deep rifts among Arab states and a general lack of foresight and vision. The radicals took the ideological high ground without considering the plight of the Iraqi people and the boiling anger of the United States. The moderates lacked intellectual forethought and the moral courage to establish the ground rules for avoiding war: Saddam Hussein and his close associates would have to go, and then the world community, along with the Arab League, would have to assist Iraqis in reconstituting their shattered institutions along more representative lines. Although that wouldn't have been easy, given Hussein's obsession with retaining power, even he, when faced with a united Arab front and an imminent foreign invasion, might have sought a diplomatic way out-a face-saving formula that ensured his own and his family's survival.

Such a risky strategy by the moderate Arab states would have been preferable to inaction because it would have aligned the majority of Arabs with the Iraqi people. Without that they were reduced to being passive onlookers of the unfolding drama, playing unwittingly into the hands of Hussein as well as of the Bush administration. The split within Arab ranks enabled the former to claim, and perhaps even to believe he had, a valid mandate to cling to power regardless of the costs to Iraq and its people and the latter to claim tacit Arab support for its military campaign.

Arab radicals and moderates did not wish to establish a precedent by forcing one of their own out of power, particularly at the insistence of a crusading superpower with a far-reaching agenda. They were more concerned with preserving their own power positions. The ideologues in the Bush administration did not help matters by their thinly veiled threats to replace all the authoritarian regimes in the region with democratically constituted ones. Arab autocrats, regardless of political orientation, felt targeted, and so they united in opposition to the American democratizing project. They had little incentive to facilitate Hussein's removal from power and thus hasten their own demise.

The cost of their inaction was that Arabs exercised no leverage over the Iraqi crisis, even though it struck at the very foundation of their political order. American officials spent considerable effort negotiating with Turkey and offering billions of dollars for use of its military bases. They also held secret talks with Iranian representatives to ensure Iran's neutrality during the war. In contrast, the United States had no reason to take the Arab states, radical or moderate, seriously.

Arab Public Opinion
Arab societies, not just Arab rulers, were deeply divided on how to deal with the Iraqi crisis. An alarming gap existed between Arab public opinion and its Iraqi counterpart. Deeply suspicious of U.S. foreign policy and socialized into an anti-American mind-set, Arab public opinion, or "the Arab street" as labeled by Western media, was overwhelmingly against the U.S. war. In Arab eyes, nothing good in foreign policy comes from the United States, which is seen to be hostile to their national interests. Forced to choose between liberation for Iraqis at American hands or direct or indirect support for Saddam Hussein, Arab public opinion, still enthralled by Nasserite ideology and Islamist symbols, chose the latter.

In contrast, Iraqis had more nuanced views and were desperate to be rid of their tyrant. Although they did not support a military invasion, they appeared willing to give the United States the benefit of the doubt in its campaign to topple the Baathist regime. They held their suspicion of the United States in check until the dust settled on the Iraqi battlefield. Many Arabs didn't fully appreciate the predicament of Iraqis terrorized by Saddam Hussein. They allowed their ideological preferences and elite interests to take precedence over human rights and freedom for their Iraqi brothers and sisters. The result is that now many Iraqis feel estranged from and deserted by other Arabs. Some are even calling for a realignment that frees Iraq from its Arab environment. A divisive feud is being fought between embittered Iraqis and unrepentant Arabs on the airways and editorial pages of leading newspapers. Its reverberations transcend Iraq and will likely shake the very foundation of inter-Arab relations.

The Iraqi crisis has discredited and weakened the Arab League. More important, it has shattered old myths regarding Arab solidarity and unity, the role of public opinion, and the meaning of "Arabness." Arabs were not only deeply divided, but they, or many of them, tacitly consented to the invasion and occupation of a sister state by a foreign power. Arab rulers stand naked in the eyes of their restive people, and the latter are pointing accusatory fingers at each other for failing Iraq and Iraqis. Iraqis reproach their fellow Arabs for their silence regarding Saddam's crimes against humanity: three hundred thousand Iraqis disappeared during the twenty-four years of his rule.

Now, months after the end of the war, Arab rulers have little to say about their vision for a post-Baath Iraq. Beyond generalities regarding the need for swift political enfranchisement of Iraqis, they have not clarified the role they would like to play in the new Iraq or the contribution they are willing to make to the reconstruction of Iraqi state and society. So far no serious proposal has been put on the table to deploy, for example, thousands of Arab peacekeepers in Iraq, within the context of an international multilateral force, to help secure the peace and intensify pressure on the Bush administration to transfer power. Such a policy initiative would indicate that Arab states are genuinely interested in making a difference in their own part of the world.

It is not convincing to claim, as Arab leaders do, that they are helpless, that the hard-liners in the Bush administration oppose their engagement in Iraq lest they create a new order in their own authoritarian image. The hard-liners in Washington are politically allergic to the whole international community, not just the Arabs. The latter can help shape the course of events in Iraq by joining international efforts to replace the logic of U.S. occupation with the logic of legitimate local authority. Inaction threatens to marginalize the Arabs further.

New Social Contract
A widespread sense of powerlessness pervades Arab political culture. In the old world, myths die hard. Arabs are faced with a grim reality of failed inter-Arab institutions and a paralyzing fixation on the chimera of pan-nationalist identity. The obsession with pan-nationalism has stalled the process of individual nation-building and has enabled brutal dictators to wreak havoc on their societies. Saddam Hussein, for example, justified his wars against Iran and Kuwait as a defense of Arab unity. Many horrors have been committed in the name of this once noble dream.

There is also a moral cost that has to be paid for the obsession with collective identity. Why should the sovereignty and sanctity of the Iraqi regime come before the welfare of its citizens? And does it matter if the country that freed the subjugated Iraqis was not Arab and was pursuing an ambitious agenda, extending far beyond freedom? Those painful questions are just beginning to be debated-but in a highly charged and volatile context. The big challenge is how to replace the discourse of defeat with the discourse of cultural and political renewal.

No tinkering with the existing order will do. Rather, there is an urgent need to structurally reform intra- and inter-Arab institutions and empower civil society. Respect for human rights and individual rights must be legally enshrined. Neither the interests of the separate nation-states nor of their trans-political, pan-Arab union should take precedence over those of the individual citizen. A free citizenry will prove more loyal to its country than a fettered one.

A new social contract is urgently needed to base the power of those who govern on the consent of the governed. Institutions that serve the common interest and generate a broad prosperity must replace the stagnant arrangements that cause today's blight and despair. Top priority should go to addressing the three key development challenges to the Arab world: dealing with the deficits in political freedom, the empowerment of women, and access to knowledge.

For example, this year's Arab Human Development Report, commissioned by the United Nations Development Program and written by more than forty Arab scholars, highlights the danger of the growing knowledge gap between the Arab region and the rest of the world. Data in the report tell a sad story of continued stagnation and decline in many areas of knowledge production and diffusion. The mass media are the most important agents for the public diffusion of knowledge, yet Arab countries have lower information media to population ratios than other nations. More damaging is that the Arab media operate in a harsh environment that restricts freedom of expression; most media are state owned.

Moreover, although the Arab countries represent 5 percent of world population, they produce only 1.1 percent of the world's books. True, they produce many religious pamphlets, but relatively few books that contribute to critical knowledge. Translation is a crucial channel for disseminating ideas and communicating with the rest of the world (at its apogee, Muslim culture was singularly responsible, through translation, for preserving classical ideas). Yet there are more books translated annually in one European country, Spain, than in all twenty-two Arab states. There are just eighteen computers per thousand people in the Arab world, compared with seventy-eight per thousand globally. Only 1.6 percent of the population has Internet access.

Equally alarming are the high rates of illiteracy among women in some of the less developed Arab countries. Many children still do not have access to basic education. And the education they get is declining in quality. College graduates tend to be ill-prepared to compete in the modern world. Those who are better prepared are increasingly disposed to emigrate in search of economic opportunities and political freedom. Roughly 25 percent of first-degree graduates in 1995-1996 emigrated. Between 1998 and 2000 more than fifteen thousand Arab doctors emigrated. The Arab region is being depopulated of its most educated citizens, with serious ramifications to long-term sociopolitical and economic development.

Catching up with the world, and building a knowledge society, requires vital investment in education and scientific research, in families, and in the news media. But most of all it requires opening up and democratizing the closed political process. Arab citizens, the authors of the UN report write, feel oppressed, excluded, and "pushed away from effecting changes in their societies." They must be integrated into the system and given an opportunity to make a difference.

In the end, however, the Arab scholars stress that structural reforms must come from within, through an evolutionary social process. Only Arabs, with international assistance, can succeed in transforming their societies. Change cannot be imposed from without. No external country, regardless of how powerful, can make the necessary reforms. Military and political shocks could even produce backlash and further delay the process of liberalization and democratization-indeed, in the minds of many Arabs, democracy is already closely associated with European colonialism.

It is no wonder that so much rides on the Iraqi project. On the one hand, the flourishing of democracy in Baghdad could lead many Arabs to disinvest from their historical grievances against the West. Failure in Iraq, the creation of yet another American-supported authoritarian regime, will reinforce widely held opinions that democracy is but a tool designed to perpetuate Western hegemony over the vast portion of the Muslim world that belongs to the Arabs. But success requires Arab initiative: where will it come from?

U.S. Action Is Now Critical to Iraq's Future
Newsday, December 19, 2003

If the capture of Saddam Hussein serves as a catalyst for fresh thinking and enlightened new policies, it could provide a limited window of opportunity for internal reconciliation and healing in Iraq and represents a psychological breakthrough for Iraqis.

The critical variable that will ultimately tip the balance in one direction or another depends on the ability of the United States to legitimize the process of Iraqi social and political reconstruction.

Still, the capture lifts the veil of fear, puts to rest any lingering doubts that Iraqis had about Hussein returning to power and will likely demoralize his diehard Baathist supporters and other members of his intelligence apparatus.

But it's critical to keep the capture in perspective, given the worsening security situation, the expansion of the armed resistance and the difficulties hindering sociopolitical and economic reconstruction.

There is a consensus among U.S. military commanders in Iraq and other observers that Hussein did not have operational control over the armed resistance. Thus it remains to be seen if the insurgency would intensify or expire as a result of his arrest. The initial evidence is not reassuring.

Next, independent analysts of Iraq note the armed resistence encompasses a wider spectrum of political and ideological forces - not just Hussein's diehard supporters - orginary Iraqis who have become dissatisfied with the American occupation, Iraqi nationalists and Islamists and a few hundred Arab fighters who have entered Iraq.

The likelihood exists that the insurgency could intensify similar to what occurred after the killing of Hussein's sons in July. In fact, some analysts argue that many Iraqis, who initially were reluctant to join the ranks of the armed resistance because they did not want to be identified and associated with the Hussein regime, now could throw caution to the wind and join the fight.

The struggle for influence and power could potentially unleash devastating shocks in the next few months. The mood and social conditions of Iraqis are very volatile. With Hussein's exit, their anger and wrath could easily be directed against the U.S. occupation.

How can the United States convince Iraqis that it is not there to stay for too long; that it is genuine about their political empowerment; that it does not intend to exploit their resources; and that it does not wish to create a puppet government.

Legitimizing the process of political reconstruction requires the Bush administration to show vision, courage and implement risky policies. Firstly, all Iraqi communities, including the Sunnis who feel marginalized as a result of the collapse of the Sunni-dominated Baathist regime, must have a stake in Iraq's new order.

Secondly, there's an urgent need to fully internationalize the Iraqi project and involve the United Nations and the world community in reassuring Iraqis and giving the time and space to debate, argue, and struggle over the future direction of their country. Internationalizing the process of political and social reconstruction will not just lend it credibility but it will also convince Iraqis that the United States possesses no designs on their country.

Finally, the question of what to do with Hussein is highly critical for the future stability and peace in Iraq. The challenge how to provide Hussein with a fair, open and transparent trial that is seen to be legitimate by most Iraqis and world public opinion. This requires strong international oversight and supervision of any Iraqi tribunal. It is worth noting that the justice system in Iraq - suppressed since a 1958 coup - is just beginning to function.

At this stage, Iraq does not possess the legal infrastructure to conduct high-profile, complex trials. Iraq also does not have an independent, sovereign government. In the eyes of many Iraqis and world public opinion, the United States, calls the final shots. Therefore, a combined tribunal with Iraqi judges and international jurists would go a long way to heal Iraq's deep wounds and serve the process of internal reconciliation.

Although Hussein will try to expose his past connections with the U.S. foreign-policy establishment, the advantages of an open and fair tribunal outweigh any disadvantages. The new Iraq must respect the transparency of the rule of law and human rights and must not be entangled by any shortsighted U.S. policy designs.

Hussein did not go down fighting. He did not commit suicide as he consistently promised to do if he were to be captured. He surrendered without resistance, without firing a shot. His capture signifies a dramatic end to a bloody and terrorizing legacy. One hopes that his trial would serve as a positive catalyst for a new promising beginning for Iraq and Iraqis.

Saddam: Arab Reaction
The Washington Post, Tuesday, December 16, 2003

The capture of Saddam Hussein was greeted with euphoria at the headquarters of the U.S. occupation authority in Baghdad on Monday, but in the towns and villages to the north and west of the capital, where anger at the occupation is most intense, Hussein's arrest may have little impact on the insurgency that has roiled the country in recent months, report The Post's Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Thomas E. Ricks and Anthony Shadid.

What do Iraq and the rest of the Arab world think of the allied presence now that Hussein is in custody? Has anything changed?

"The question is how can the U.S. exploit this small window of opportunity to pacify the insurgents and secure peace," said Fawaz Gerges, professor of Middle East and international affairs at Sarah Lawrence College and author of the forthcoming book, "The Islamists and the West," in an interview with washingtonpost.com.

Gerges was online Tuesday, Dec. 16 at 3 p.m. ET to discuss the Arab world, post-Saddam.

Gerges has just published a major treatise entitled "The Tragedy of Arab-American Relations: What Went Wrong?"

A transcript follows.

Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.

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Chicago Ill.: What do you think the chances are that the U.S. will not be successful in Iraq and that, much to the benefit of bin Laden and other militant forces, Iraq will become a failed, possibly fractured, state. Can Iraq survive without a strong Arab/Islamic nationalist outlook and orientation? How critical is solving/ ameliorating the Arab/Israeli conflict in this regard? Fawaz Gerges: It's essential to contextualize the capture of Saddam Hussein within the context of the deteriorating security situation in Iraq and also the need to legitimize the process of social and political reconstruction in the county. The capture of Hussein represents a small window of opportunity that must be capitalized on in order to retrieve the Iraqi project. Yes, his capture represents an important psychological breakthrough for the Iraqi people. Yes, it puts to rest any lingering fears that the Iraqi people have had about Hussein returning to power. It also represents a watershed by demoralizing his Baathist supporters and other members of his former army officers and security apparatus.

But I think it's crucial not to inflate or overexaggerate the importance of his capture for two reasons. First, the consensus appears to be that Hussein did not have an operational control over the armed resistance. He could not do so because he was mainly preoccupied with his personal survival. And this raises the question of his capture on the deteriorating security situation in Iraq ... To what extent his capture will reduce the number of armed attacks against the occupying forces. And again, the consensus appears to be a big question mark.

Secondly, there is a recognition among analysts of Iraq that the insurgency represents a wider spectrum of political and ideological forces -- not just Hussein's diehard supporters. You have Iraqi Islamists, Iraqi Nationalists, ordinary citizens who are dissatisfied with the American military occupation and a few hundred Arab fighters who have joined the armed resistance against the U.S.

So in this sense the likelihood exists that the Iraqi insurgency could intensify rather than expire as a result of Hussein's capture. In fact, some analysts argue that many Iraqis who were reluctant to join the ranks of the armed resistance because they did not want to be identified and associated with the Hussein regime now could throw caution to the wind and attack the occupied forces. So one has to be careful about making definite statements about the effects of Hussein's capture on the security situation in Iraq. And, of course, the big question that remains on the table is how can the U.S. legitimize the process of political and social reconstruction in Iraq? How can the U.S. convince Iraqis that is genuine about transferring power to them, about not exploiting their resources, about not trying to create a puppet government.

To summarize, although the capture of Hussein represents an important step in the political reconstruction Iraq, it does not address the deep underlying security questions and the urgent need to legitimize the process of social and political reconstruction. A great deal needs to be done.

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Hollister, Calif.: Is the capture of Sadaam not only a bit irrelevant to insurgent activity insofar as he appears to have had little control over those activities; and does it not actually expose the U.S. to the danger of a 'show trial' in which Saddam reveals the support he received from the U.S. throughout the 1980's thus embarrassing the U.S. in the Arab world?

Fawaz Gerges: This is a highly critical question. It raises three interrelated points. The first point is, what will be the effects of his capture -- not just on the deteriorating security situation but also on the difficult and complex task as rebuilding Iraqi institutions. The first point I would like to stress is that the consensus among specialists of Iraq is that Hussein's capture will unlikely dramatically effect the security situation unless the U.S. takes concrete steps to address the underlying political problems of Iraq. Those include, how can the U.S. involve all Iraq communities including the Sunni community which feels undermined and marginalized as a result of the collapse of the Sunni-dominated Baathist regime.

All Iraqi communities must have a stake in the new order that is evolving in Iraq. Next, there's an urgent need to fully internationalize the Iraqi project and involve not just the U.N. but the world community in giving Iraqis time and space to debate and argue and fight over the future direction of their country.

Last, the question of what to do with Saddam Hussein is highly critical for the future stability and peace in Iraq. The key fundamental question is providing Hussein with a fair, open and transparent trial that it seen to be legitimate by most Iraqis and most world public opinion. This requires strong international oversight of any tribunal that might take place inside Iraq. We know that the justice system is just beginning to function. That the legal structure hibernated under the surface for over 50 years as a result of the coming of the military to power in 1958. So any trial that takes place in Iraq must be combined with a strong international, legal supervision and oversight in order for this trial to serve the process of reconciliation and internal healing in the country. And it's also important to remember that Iraq does not have an independent sovereign government.

In the eyes of many Iraqis and world public opinion, the U.S., being the occupying power, calls the shots. This is why it is essential to have a strong international oversight to try Saddam Hussein outside the country so that the trial will be seen as legitimate and that the final outcome of the trial could serve the goal of peace and stability and reconciliation in the country.

And yes, Saddam Hussein will likely have his day in court and will likely try to expose the U.S. for its past shadowy dealings with his regime, but the big question that we should not lose sight of is the the effect of the trial on the future of the new Iraq. The trial should tell us that there is a new open, tolerant Iraq that would give even its enemies a fair and transparent trial.

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Hyderabad, India: How far can the jihadist extremists exploit sympathy for Saddam Hussein (such as there is)?

Fawaz Gerges: Before the American invasion of Iraq some of us warned that the American onslaught could have the opposite results from its intended consequences. It could play -- not only into the hands of jihadi militant and provide them with more ammunition and recruits in their war against the U.S. and Muslim regimes but it could also antagonize moderate Arab and Muslim public opinion and deepen anti-American sentiments in the world of Islam.

Unfortunately, some of our fears have materialized. Jihadi militants have benefited greatly from the U.S. invasion of Iraq and occupied Iraq appears to have become a recruiting tool for jihadi causes.

It's also important to note that anti-U.S. feelings have reached a highly dangerous level -- not just in the world of Islam but also throughout the world. America's status and credibility have suffered considerably. So have America's vital interests. But I don't believe that the capture of Hussein would play into the hands of the jihadi militants for two reasons:

First, jihadi militants loath the secular Iraqi dictator and secondly, the manner and way in which Saddam Hussein was captured hammers a deadly nail in the coffin of his reputation -- not just in Iraq but throughout Arab and Muslim lands.

The emperor was found without clothes. He did not resist his captors. He did not go down fighting. He did not commit suicide as he consistently promised to do if he were to be captured. He surrendered without resistance, without firing a shot. The cry in the Arab world today is that Saddam Hussein proved to be a coward, a disgrace to his country and his people. I don't think Saddam Hussein will serve as a rallying, recruiting point -- not just for the jihadis but for any cause.

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Atlanta, Ga.: Do you think Iraqis perceive that there is an Israeli connection to the new Iraqi Governing Council? And if yes, are these perceptions likely to hamper the US efforts to rebuild Iraq?

Fawaz Gerges: Yes, there's a widely held perception in Iraq and throughout the Arab world that Israel is playing a role in assisting the U.S. in its war against the Iraqi insurgents but also in political and commercial connections with the new Iraqi leadership. This widely held perception pours fuel on an already raging fire in Iraq that the U.S. and Israel are trying to wean Iraq off its Arab identity to recreate a new Iraqi political identity in America's and Israel's image. Conspiracy theories abound about Israel's secretive role in the new Iraq and this is not helping matters. It's no wonder why it's crucial for the U.S. to fully involve the international community in the social and political construction of Iraq in order to allay Iraqi fears and to puncture holes in these deeply held myths and to give Iraqis time and space to debate the future direction of their country.

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Washington, D.C.: So what is the Arab world reaction to the capture of Saddam Hussein?

Fawaz Gerges: A great deal of agonizing is taking place in the Arab world since the announcement of Hussein's capture. The fact that Saddam Hussein was subjected to humiliation, the fact that Saddam Hussein did not resist his captors, the fact that this particular achievement could embolden the hardliners within the Bush administration and then expend their appetite for further military adventures -- all these anxieties show how conflicted the Arab mood is and how complex it is.

There is a dichotomy in the Arab position. Although Arabs don't care for Saddam Hussein, they were disturbed by the humiliation inflicted on the Iraqi dictator. On the one hand, there was no love affair for Saddam Hussein in the Arab world; one the other hand, most Arabs tend to be deeply suspicious of U.S. foreign policy. And it is this dichotomy that explains the ambivalence and the tensions and the contradictions in Arab responses to Hussein's capture. The U.S. suffers from a crisis of moral authority and credibility in the Muslim Middle East. There's a widely held perception that the U.S. has not practiced what it preaches, that it does not take Arab and Muslim affairs into account and that it's colonizing one of the leading Arab states.

Although Arabs do not care for Saddam Hussein, they suspect the U.S. as having ulterior motives in invading and occupying sister Iraq. The big point to stress is that Iraqi vital interests as well as American vital interests require that the Iraqi project become fully internationalized and that the U.N and the world community play a vital role in reconstructing state and society there. This would answer and allay Iraqi fears and Arab fears about the notion that the U.S. invaded Iraq to exploit its resources and dominate its political system.

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Herndon, Va.: Is the question really one of religion? I am an Egyptian Christian (Coptic) and so surprised to hear my Muslim friends support this man. If they know he is killing their people, what is the support for? What do the Arab leaders want anyway?

Fawaz Gerges: One point must be made very clear. Arabs and Muslims don't care for Saddam Hussein. There is no love affair for him in the Arab and Muslim world. Arab and Muslim responses to the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq have little to do with supporting Saddam Hussein and more to do with suspicion and opposition to American foreign policy. This ambivalence, of course, does not obscure the fact that the Arab responses to the Iraqi crisis lacked vision and appreciation of the predicament and suffering of the Iraqi people but Arabs by default and indirectly lent their weight and support to the Baathist dictatorship. But the truth must be told. Arabs did not and do not support Hussein. They just object to America's meddling in inter-Arab and intra-Arab affairs. This is why it's crucial that the U.S. addresses the underlying problems with the world of Islam that it replaces the logic of its military occupation of Iraq with the logic of legitimate authority, an authority that is not manufactured in Washington but is accepted and agreed upon by Iraqis themselves and that the U.S. invest actively in reaching a fair and just settlement between Palestinians and Israelis.

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Washington, D.C.: Shoudn't the Iraqis be the ones to get the reconstruction contracts before foreign governments do? And why did President Bush say that the Iraqis would have a partial say in the trial of Saddam Hussein?

Fawaz Gerges: It's critical that Iraq and the Iraqis be the main beneficiaries of the economic reconstruction. After all, the Bush administration justified its invasion of Iraq on the ground that it was planning to relieve Iraqis and make a difference in their lives and end their suffering by bringing democracy and prosperity into the country. This was the rhetoric. The reality of power politics and the political economy of occupation reveal a different story -- a story about giant corporations making huge profits, a story about economic and financial profit. This is why it is crucial that the process of socio and political reconstruction be transparent and inclusive in order to prevent corruption and also to empower Iraqis by giving them a huge stake in the emerging future. This goal remains to be seen.

On the question of what the president says on the trial of Saddam Hussein, the opposite is true. The U.S. would like Iraqis themselves to be in charge of conducting the trial. In fact, American officials support the Iraqi position that the trial should take place in Iraq and that the five-judge panel that was established by the Iraqi Governing Council a few days ago was and is fully supported by the U.S.

There is a great deal of danger that if the trial takes place in Iraq without strong international supervision, it could be seen as de-legitimate. Let's keep in mind that the U.S., whether one likes it or not, is the occupying power and that the Iraqi Governing Council was handpicked by Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator in charge in Iraq.

So it is essential that there should be a debate inside Iraq and in the international community about what to do with Saddam Hussein, what kind of trial should be conducted and what kind of role Iraq and the international community should play in this trial. Until Iraq develops a sovereign and independent government, any talk about letting Iraqis have the final say is a code word for America's last word.

Dismantling al-Qaida
The Baltimore Sun, November 23, 2003

THE RECENT suicide car bombings in Saudi Arabia and Turkey indicate a dramatic shift in al-Qaida's tactics.

The militants who launched the car bombs clearly want to undermine the pro-Western governments in Riyadh and Ankara, but the attacks must also be viewed in broader terms. In the past year, al-Qaida and its regional affiliates have been attacking pro-Western Muslim regimes and soft targets from Tunisia to Indonesia in a shift that is justified ideologically but is driven by necessity: Al-Qaida does not appear to have the capability to mount large-scale attacks inside the United States at the moment.

Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, his second in command, have written of the need to shift the fight with the United States to "the heart of the Islamic world, which represents the true arena of the battle and the theater of the major battles in defense of Islam."

It is clear much of the terrorist activity in the past year in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Tunisia, Pakistan and Yemen has been regionally motivated and organized with less command and control from al-Qaida's senior leadership. This is a result of a gradual erosion of al-Qaida's leadership and its inability to launch spectacular operations on U.S. soil. This view is gaining ground in the counterterrorist community, but U.S. officials are wary of making such claims after failing to detect the presence of the Sept. 11 hijackers.

Since Sept. 11, U.S. officials and outside analysts agree, nearly 65 percent of al-Qaida's leaders have been killed or captured. About 3,400 al-Qaida suspects have been arrested in the United States and overseas, from Tunisia to Indonesia. Important logistical networks in Spain, Italy and Germany have been dismantled.

According to U.S. intelligence, most of the operatives who helped plan Sept. 11 have been accounted for, and those who have been captured have described their roles in the attacks. Al-Qaida's financial infrastructure is being steadily dismantled worldwide.

Much of the strength and growth of the organization during the 1990s resulted from its ability to operate from a geographical base with impunity, first in Sudan and then in Afghanistan. The training camps, safe houses and caves were the critical infrastructure for al-Qaida. That base is now gone. The leadership has splintered and gone underground.

Bin Laden appears to be in hiding in the remote mountains of Pakistan and no longer in regular communication with his foot soldiers or his most senior deputy, Mr. Zawahiri. The London-based Control Risks Group said last week that al-Qaida's network has been largely dismantled and is leaderless.

Forward movement, therefore, has devolved to regional affiliates and individuals such as al-Qaida's cells in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan and Indonesia, which appear to be restricted to soft domestic targets in those countries. It is revealing that the Nov. 8 bombing in Riyadh was a compound inhabited mostly by Arab and Muslim expatriates, not exactly an "infidel" target. Similarly, most of the casualties in the bombing of two synagogues and two British institutions in Istanbul were Muslims, not Christians or Jews.

The bombings were condemned by clerics, civil society, the Arab press and public opinion throughout the Islamic world. Arabs and Muslims are becoming aware, though belatedly, that terrorism is a plague that threatens not only Americans and Europeans but also Muslims.

Besieged and under attack by local authorities, al-Qaida's local affiliates seem to be blindly plunging toward the brink, similar to what occurred in Egypt when local, isolated cells of militant Jihad and the Islamic Group attacked a Luxor temple and massacred 68 Egyptians and foreign tourists in November 1997. Neither group recovered from that attack.

In the late 1990s, bin Laden played a critical role in persuading Mr. Zawahiri to suspend his attacks in Egypt and to instead target the United States, Christians and Jews. He said internal strife alienates the Muslim constituency, whose support for al-Qaida is urgently needed, and diverts resources from its confrontation with the West. Mr. Zawahiri must be pleased that the path has returned to his deeply held convictions.

Since the fight against terrorism cannot be won on the battlefield, societies, not just governments, must take the lead in discrediting and undermining the ideologies fueling this raging fire. Both Muslims and Westerners have a vested interest in developing social mechanisms to discredit terrorists.

In the end, more inclusive, inter-faith and inter-civilizational initiatives will likely prove to be the most effective means to reach out to and mobilize the middle of Arab and Muslim public opinion against the false prophets of the bin Laden and Zawahiri variety.

Development crisis in the Arab world
The Star-Ledger, Sunday, October 26, 2003

After the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the idea that Arab culture and religion are responsible for stifling progress and tolerance toward "the other" in the Arab/Muslim world has gained currency in the United States. According to this idea, Arabs are incapable of embracing modernity and reforming their stagnant societies.

Further, only shock tactics would shock the Arab/Muslim world out of its political slumber. In a sense, the Iraq war was sold as an effort to force positive change across the Middle East and beyond. Iraq was to serve as a laboratory, a case study of forced transformation and adaptation of the Arab region to the modern world and Western democracy.

But this view of Arab culture and religion aren't quite accurate, says this year's Arab Human Development Report, commissioned by the United Nations Development Program and written by more than 40 Arab scholars. The report, released last week, stresses that the existential crisis facing the Arab world has less to do with religion and culture and more with three key development challenges: deficits in political freedom, empowerment of women and access to knowledge. These challenges stem from attitudes purveyed by repressive governments and conservative religious groups, but they are not innate to Arab or Muslim thought.

The report -- last year's version was criticized by Arab officials and radicals alike --said in the area of freedoms the "challenges may have become graver." Extreme security measures and policies adopted by the United States and Arab governments as part of the "war on terrorism" have led to the erosion of civil and political liberties of Arabs/Muslims.

But the focus of this year's report is on the growing knowledge gap between the Arab region and the rest of the world, and the urgent need to build a "knowledge society." Data in the report tell a sad story of continued stagnation and decline in many areas of knowledge production.

The mass media are the most important agents for the public diffusion of knowledge. Yet Arab countries have lower information media to population ratios than other nations. More damaging is that the Arab media operate in a harsh environment that restricts freedom of expression and that most media institutions are state owned.

Moreover, while the Arab countries represent 5 percent of world population, they produce only 1.1 percent of the world's books. True, they produce many religious pamphlets, but relatively few books that contribute to critical knowledge.

Translation is an important channel for disseminating ideas and communicating with the rest of the world. (In its heyday, Muslim culture was singularly responsible, through translation, for preserving classical thought.) Yet there are more books translated annually in one European country, Spain, than in all 22 Arab states. There are just 18 computers per 1,000 people in the Arab world, compared with 78 per 1,000 globally. Only 1.6 percent of the population has Internet access.

Similarly alarming is the high rate of illiteracy among women in some of the less developed Arab countries. Many children still do not have access to basic education. But the most important challenge facing Arab education is its declining quality. College graduates tend to be ill-prepared to compete in the modern world. And many are predisposed to emigrate in search of economic opportunities and political freedom.

About 25 percent of first-degree graduates in 1995-96 emigrated. Between 1998 and 2000 more than 15,000 Arab doctors emigrated. The Arab region is being depopulated of its most educated citizens, with serious ramifications to long-term sociopolitical and economic development.

Building a knowledge society requires vital investment in critical education and scientific research, families and the news media.

But most of all it requires opening up and democratizing the closed political process. Arab citizens, the authors of the report write, feel oppressed, excluded and "pushed away from effecting changes in their societies." They must be integrated into the system and given an opportunity to make a difference.

Taking sides in the current debate, the report's authors stress that structural reforms must come from within through an evolutionary societal innovation process. Only Arabs, with international assistance, can succeed in transforming their societies. Change cannot be imposed from without. Military and political shocks could even produce backlash and further delay the process of liberalization and democratization.

Although the report is critical of inequities produced by globalization, it locates the causes of the crisis within internal Arab structures. It lays the blame squarely at the feet of the unholy alliance between oppressive regimes and the conservative religious establishment. This alliance led to interpretations of Islam inimical to human development, particularly freedom of thought, political accountability and women's participation in public life.

If liberalizing and democratizing Arab societies is crucial to creating a knowledge society, how will this complex process occur given the existence of the powerful union between the ruling elite and the reactionary religious establishment? The report is silent on this question.

But raising this important issue underscores the vital role of the international community, particularly the United States, in nudging and pushing Arab autocrats to gradually and structurally reform Arab politics.
There is an intense political struggle in today's Arab world between enlightened, reformist voices -- like the authors of the U.N. report and others -- and reactionary forces that have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.
The outcome of this struggle will determine if the Arab world overcomes its development crisis and makes the leap forward. The Bush administration must listen to these enlightened, liberal Arab voices and help them to democratically transform their societies from within.

Widening the divide
The Baltimore Sun, September 22, 2003

FAR FROM achieving security for Israel's citizens, its decision to "remove" Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat at a time of its choosing threatens to plunge Palestinians and Israelis into an all-out war resulting in more bloodshed and suffering.

Chaos, not order, will likely prevail.

If and when Israel moves against Mr. Arafat, it will deepen the sense of victimization and powerlessness among Palestinians and radicalize and militarize their society further. Despite his dismal record domestically, Mr. Arafat "embodies Palestinian identity and aspirations." Neutralizing him would thus play into the hands of militant Hamas and Islamic Jihad and supply them with more recruits to launch more attacks against Israelis.

Israel accuses Mr. Arafat of encouraging violence against its citizens and refusing to order Palestinian security forces to prevent attacks. It's true that Mr. Arafat flirted with limited violence and undermined the efforts of his former prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas, to unify all Palestinian security forces under a transparent command. But it is misleading to hold Mr. Arafat accountable for the suicide bombings by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Both of them act independently from and contrary to the interests of the Palestinian Authority, and their actions have brought about its ruin. Sources close to Mr. Arafat say he has not moved against the militants not for fear of internal civil war but because he does not believe that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is serious about an equitable peace.

It is equally misleading to reduce the current stalemate in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to the role played by Mr. Arafat. There are structural constraints, such as the military occupation and the presence of an estimated 222,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza, which must be tackled head on to give Palestinians hope. Even if Mr. Arafat disappeared from the scene today, no Palestinian leader would be able to sign a peace treaty with Israel without the dismantling of most settlements and ending the military occupation. In this sense, the hard-liners in the Likud Cabinet represent at least as much of an obstacle to peace as does Mr. Arafat.

In his resignation speech to a private session of parliament, Mr. Abbas was more critical of the Americans and Israelis than he was of Mr. Arafat for not doing enough to help him convince his people there is a ray of hope at the end of the tunnel. "The fundamental problem," wrote Mr. Abbas, "is Israel's unwillingness to implement its road map commitments and to undertake any constructive measures."

Mr. Arafat could not have undermined Mr. Abbas and publicly ridiculed him by labeling him "the Karzai of Palestine" - a collaborator - if he had been able to show real progress in the peace process. Neither Mr. Abbas nor any potential successor will likely succeed unless he improves the lives of Palestinians. Therefore, the most effective way of marginalizing Mr. Arafat and the militants is empowerment of the Palestinians, not further military escalation.

In fact, Israel's decision has already produced the opposite results from the intended consequences. Thousands of Palestinians have visited Mr. Arafat's shattered compound to express solidarity with their besieged leader. He has regained lost popularity and re-emerged as the most influential Palestinian actor. Even Syrian leaders, his enemies, felt obliged to have their foreign minister call him and convey their "unconditional" support.

A critical lesson learned since the outbreak of the armed Palestinian intifada three years ago is that there is no military solution to this tragic conflict. Suicide bombings will not drive Israelis away. Similarly, no further repressive measures used by the Likud government will succeed in forcing the Palestinians to accept its dictate.

There is a more humane and rational alternative to this futile cycle of escalation and counter-escalation - a peace settlement that recognizes the legitimate interests of both sides by granting security for Israel and self-determination for Palestinians.

Copyright (c) 2003, The Baltimore Sun

Understanding Iraq's resistance
The Christian Science Monitor, September 10, 2003

(BEIRUT, LEBANON)With increased bombing of soft targets and daily killings of US troops, the Bush administration characterizes the Iraqi armed resistance as a terrorist phenomenon. Although this has emerged as a major obstacle to reconstruction in Iraq, the reality is too much more complex and dangerous to simply broad-brush it all as "terrorism."

Armed resistance in Iraq represents a broad spectrum of political and ideological forces that need to be understood individually before they swell, coalesce, and become a major threat. The perception in Washington that attacks against US forces and other targets are conducted mainly by hardened elements of the old Saddam Hussein regime
- along with Ansar al-Islam, a small fundamentalist Kurdish group with no proven ties to Hussein - is dangerously myopic.

Though elements of the Hussein regime predominate, other important groups - whose interests converge with those of the old regime - play vital roles. Secular Baathists, indigenous Iraqi fundamentalists, Arab Islamists, and dissatisfied Iraqis all resist the US occupation.

Sunni Salafits, indigenous Iraqi Islamic fundamentalists who have received little public attention, appear to be heading the fight, along with secular Sunni Baathists. Even though they haven't articulated any ideological blueprint to accompany their jihadislogans, they're religiously motivated and determined to establish an Islamic state.

Various Arab press reports estimate the Salafit resistance numbers to be in the hundreds, but their ranks are likely to swell with new recruits if their tactics become even more organized and effective. The escalation of violence in the past two weeks alone suggests that the resistance has become bolder and deadlier. It is only a matter of time before Sunni Salafits (who represent a small segment of the Iraqi population) link with their more-sophisticated Arab counterparts, who are more militant and global in orientation. Hundreds of these jihadi fighters from various Arab countries entered Iraq immediately before and during the US-led war, and others are still slipping into the country through Iraq's porous borders. Although some, if not most, of these fighters sympathize with Al Qaeda, they cannot all be lumped together as President Bush has done, calling them "Al Qaeda-type fighters."

Islamist websites and Internet chat rooms suggest that Iraq has emerged as a powerful recruiting tool for Islamist militancy. Before the war, I and others who study the region warned that Iraq could become a symbol of Islamist resistance similar to that of Afghanistan during the Soviet incursion in the 1980s. Our predictions, unfortunately, seem to be on target.

Islamists - those fighters who have been waging global jihad since the 1980s to establish Islamic-ruled states - tend to be highly disciplined and socialized into a culture of martyrdom. Some of the armed tactics used in Iraq - suicide and car bombings - are vintage jihadi tactics tested in southern Lebanon, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan.

Iraq appears to be replacing Afghanistan and Bosnia as a magnet for jihadirecruits from various Arab countries to confront the forces of "unbelief." These Islamists share a specific goal: the expulsion of US forces from Iraq, even at the cost of creating chaos.

Furthermore, individuals and groups dissatisfied with the US occupation, though not supportive of the old regime nor affiliated with Islamists, are also launching revenge attacks.

Many Iraqis I've spoken to also suggest that dismantling the 350,000-man Iraqi Army has embittered large blocs of well-trained soldiers - now unemployed - and provided them with an incentive for undermining the American project. Increasing numbers of Iraqis dissatisfied with the current order could ultimately tip the balance of the various powers against the US presence.

The good news is that attacks in Iraq don't seem to be centrally coordinated. The bad news is that the attackers are becoming bolder, improving their deadly methods. Bombings of the Jordanian Embassy, the UN headquarters, and Shiite targets are cases in point.

So far the armed resistance is limited to the "Sunni triangle" - Hussein's former stronghold around Baghdad - although recent attacks on Shiite clerics in the south could unleash upheaval in this community. Shiites, who represent more than 60 percent of the population and were those most abused by Hussein, largely give the US the benefit of the doubt and haven't joined the resistance.

Leading Shiite clerics - both secular and religious - have rejected calls for confrontation by Hussein and younger Shiite clerics. But worrisome signs within this majority community indicate rising restiveness and anger among the Shiites. Particularly alarming is the car bombing in Najaf last month that killed one of the country's most senior Shiite leaders, Ayatollah Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim. It could sow seeds of sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shiites. The US can't afford to alienate this community further.

Defining everything broadly as a "terrorist" threat won't resolve the underlying problem in Iraq - which is the lack of legitimacy of the US military presence in the eyes of Iraqis. Nor will it prepare the American public for a prolonged and costly struggle in Iraq.

Three steps are needed to legitimize political reconstruction and retrieve the Iraqi project. First, Iraq must be fully internationalized and the world community must be brought in as a real partner to shoulder the burden of reconstruction. Internationalizing the Iraqi project will convince Iraqis that the US is not there to stay and will weaken and delegitimize the armed resistance in the eyes of Iraqis.

Second, the challenge facing the US is how to reduce US military presence in Iraqi towns and cities while providing security for citizens. This balancing act requires the resources and training necessary to put more Iraqi policemen on the streets, along with multinational forces.

Finally, US authorities must expedite the process of transferring power to Iraqis. The sooner Iraqis choose their representatives, the quicker armed resistance will disappear because it can no longer claim legitimacy for its attacks, and politically enfranchised Iraqis would turn against the militants.

* Fawaz A. Gerges is professor of Middle East studies and international affairs at Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, N.Y. and author of the forthcoming 'The Islamists and the West.' This article is based on research he did in the Middle East this summer.

(c) Copyright 2003 The Christian Science Monitor. All rights reserved.

Empty Promises of Freedom
The New York Times, July 18, 2003

BEIRUT, Lebanon

With President Bush vowing to bring democracy to Iraq and the Middle East, Arab governments have begun professing a new commitment to encouraging democracy. Kings, emirs and dictators alike suddenly appear to have discovered the value of human rights and civil society and are trumpeting initiatives to promote them.

The problem is that there remains a huge gap between the rhetoric used by these governments and the reality of their response to peaceful dissidents and opposition groups. For every democratizing action, there's an authoritarian reaction.

In Morocco, King Mohammed VI has been trying to change his country's autocratic image and embrace democracy. Yet a court recently imprisoned a journalist, Ali Lamrabet, for "insulting" Mohammed in satirical articles.

In Saudi Arabia, the royal family said that it would confront religious hard-liners and open up the political system after terrorist bombings in May that killed 34 people. Yet later that month the Saudi government ordered the dismissal of the editor in chief of the daily newspaper Al Watan, Jamal Khashoggi, after he published articles criticizing the clergy for propagating extremism. His dismissal revealed that the royal family is more interested in appeasing the conservative religious establishment than in real reform.

In Jordan, King Abdullah II, who had dissolved Parliament in 2001, ordered legislative elections. However, a court barred Toujan Faisal, a democracy advocate (and the only woman who had ever won a seat in Jordan's Parliament), from running in the elections last month. It ruled that she was disqualified because she had been convicted last year of "insulting the dignity of the state" by accusing an official of corruption in a letter she posted on the Internet.

In Egypt, a move that on first glance appears promising - the ruling party proposed democratic reforms that include the establishment of a new National Council for Human Rights and the abolition of state security courts and hard-labor sentences - is deceptive. By establishing its own human rights council, the government would in fact find a means of trying to force out the independent organizations that already exist.

The history isn't encouraging. Those groups often complain about the Egyptian authorities' systematic efforts to intimidate them. Some human rights advocates have spent time in Egyptian prisons. It took three years of considerable American and European pressure to free a democracy activist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who was arrested in 2000 and sentenced to seven years of hard labor for daring to monitor parliamentary elections.

Egypt would be more convincing in its talk of democracy if it abolished the emergency laws in effect since the 1967 Middle East war. Using these laws, the authorities have effectively impoverished intellectual and political life by arresting dissidents under the pretext that they are endangering public peace.

This is not to say that the gap between talk and action in nations that aren't American allies is any better. In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad has promised liberalization. But last year, 10 people, including two members of Parliament, got 3- to 10-year sentences for advocating wider political freedoms and criticizing the authorities.

It's been clear to me, as I've been doing field research in Arab countries over the last few years, that people in the Middle East want democracy. Thousands of courageous Muslims have paid dearly for speaking out against state oppression and religious fanaticism and for demanding political enfranchisement. These democrats hold the key to the Arab world's future and deserve America's support.

It's also clear that Arab autocrats - even those who woo the West with democratic language - won't do anything unless they're nudged and pushed. Shamefully, President Bush and his senior aides spent most of their meeting last month with the leaders of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia pressing them to fight terrorism. What they should have been talking about was the importance of promoting democracy and reform. This emphasis sends the wrong message to Arab rulers and citizens by reinforcing the widely held perception that the United States uses democracy as a whip to punish its enemies, like Iraq, while doing business as usual with its autocratic allies.

Moreover, it is shortsighted. If America wants to end terrorism, it needs to understand that ultimately, democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law are the most effective way to undermine extremism. That change will come about only when the United States begins exerting pressure on its allies, not just its foes.

Who Listens To Abbas?
Newsday, June 13, 2003

Poor Mahmoud Abbas, the new Palestinian prime minister. No sooner had he had his historic meeting at Aqaba with his Israeli counterpart, Ariel Sharon, and President George W. Bush, than the troubles began.

Last week, as a show of force and for the first time ever, the three main Palestinian armed groups, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, launched a joint attack against Israeli troops, killing four soldiers and challenging the very authority of Abbas and his promise to the Americans and Israelis about ending the armed Palestinian intifada.

Not to be outdone, Sharon ordered his forces to assassinate a senior Hamas political leader, Abdel Aziz Rantisi, injuring him and killing several Palestinians during the raid. Yesterday, Hamas retaliated by blowing up a bus in Jerusalem, killing and injuring scores of Israelis. And so, the cycle of violence continues, threatening to devour both the road map and Abbas himself.

Abbas is being squeezed by all sides to produce concrete results. Palestinians, not just the militants, are angry at him for not stressing at Aqaba the issue of Palestinian suffering and their legitimate aspirations. They expect him to free them from Israeli military occupation and improve their well-being (75 percent of Palestinians live below the poverty line, and unemployment is as high as 60 percent, according to United Nations sources).

On the other hand, Americans and Israelis are using Abu Mazen, as Abbas is known, to sideline Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and are pressuring him to crack down against militant groups, regardless of whether such a confrontation results in a Palestinian civil war.

Abbas is called upon to deliver no less than a miracle - isolating and replacing an autocratic but charismatic leader; pacifying a deeply politicized, mobilized and militarized society; and negotiating a viable peace settlement with one of Israel's fiercest hawks, who leads the most hard-line government in Israel's history. Nothing short of a magic wand will achieve this tall order.

Barring a dramatic shift in U.S. diplomacy and Israel's negotiating position, the odds are stacked against Abbas. He faces formidable internal obstacles. He possesses neither the charisma to inspire the Palestinian shabab, the politicized youths, nor the power base to challenge Arafat and the militants. In fact, Abbas owes his new position to Arafat, his old patron.

The Bush administration and the Israeli government are quick to assume that Abbas can act independently and marginalize Arafat. This is far from the truth. More than ever, Abbas needs Arafat and the people around him so that he can be seen as legitimate, representing the interests of the shabab.

Abbas repeatedly has demanded that Sharon lift Israel's siege on Arafat and has rejected efforts to exclude him from the peace effort. He has made it clear that Arafat is the leader of the Palestinian people.

Abbas suffers from a major handicap - being viewed by many Palestinians as being forced on them by the Americans and the Israelis. His speech in Aqaba angered many Palestinians, not just the armed groups, who believed that Abbas did not dwell on their dismal plight. The intensity of dissent and dissatisfaction within Palestinian society forced Abbas to hold a press conference in which he promised to remain steadfast when it comes to Palestinian nationalist aspirations - ending Israel's military occupation, freeing Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails and insisting on the right of return for Palestinian refugees.

Abbas cannot afford to distance himself from Arafat, who, despite everything, remains popular and retains control of most of the Palestinian security forces. Abbas knows that if Arafat feels marginalized, he can easily withhold support from Abbas and can even dismiss him. Worse still, Arafat would sabotage any cease-fire and encourage armed resistance and terror in order to provoke the Israelis.

Abbas has also been reluctant to act decisively against Hamas and Islamic Jihad because he still lacks the standing and legitimacy in Palestine and does not have the physical means necessary to crack down on the militants.

Although some Palestinian security forces are being reconstituted, with assistance from the CIA, they have been weakened considerably by Israeli attacks. A showdown with Hamas would likely lead to a civil war. It is little wonder that Abbas is engaged in intensive talks with Hamas and Islamic Jihad to reach an agreement to "stop terrorism" against Israelis. But he was blunt when asked if he would use force against Hamas: "A civil war - never."

This does not mean that Abbas will refrain from using force against the militants if and when Sharon orders his troops to withdraw from Palestinian towns and cities and if Hamas continues its attacks against Israelis. But he says he prefers using persuasion, not coercion, to stop the attacks and has been working diligently to negotiate cease-fires with Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other secular groups.

Abbas is a figurehead with a great deal of potential. The only way he can gain legitimacy at home and convince the shabab of the futility of violence is if he succeeds in making a marked difference in their lives and giving them a stake in the future.

His ability to act decisively depends to a large extent on whether the U.S. and Israel appreciate his predicament and move swiftly to help him in improving the Palestinians' quality of life. But they can fully empower Abbas if they make a genuine commitment to reach a peace treaty with the Palestinians based on justice and historical reconciliation.

(c) Newsday, Inc. 2003

Iraq: Iran Concerns 
A Web Discussion with Fawaz Gerges, Professor of Middle Eastern and International Affairs, Sarah Lawrence College
WashingtonPost.com, April 23, 2003, 3:00p.m., ET

A wave of anti-American sentiment is spreading throughout southern Iraq.  U.S. officials are worried about the growing number of Iranian operatives who are pouring into the country, supporting a Shiite resurgence and opposing U.S. plans to install a friendly government.

Fawaz Gerges, professor of Middle East and international affairs at Sarah Lawrence College and author of the forthcoming book, "The Islamists and the West," was online Wednesday, April 24 at 3 p.m. ET, to discuss the relationship between Iran and Iraq and the Shiite community and Iran's concerns with Iraq in the post-Saddam era.

Gerges is also author of "America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures
or Clash of Interests?"

A transcript follows.

Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over
Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests
and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

washingtonpost.com: Thank you for being with us today Professor Gerges.  What role is Iran playing during the reconstruction of a government in  Iraq? Is it true that Iranian operatives are moving in, supporting the Shiites and that they oppose U.S. plans for the country?

Fawaz Gerges: Iranian leaders perceive Iraq to be a very important theater for the politics and security and culture and religion of Iran. Let's remember that more than 60 percent of the Iraqi population are Shiites and in this particular sense, being the only Shiite state in the dominant Sunni world of Islam, Iran has a vested interest in making sure that the
Shiites in Iraq are fully represented and their political and religious weight is given prominence. Iran is also deeply concerned about America's military presence in Iraq. After all, President George W. Bush has referred to Iran as part of the Axis of Evil. In this context, Iranian leaders are anxious about Iran being the next target after Iraq and they do not want the Persian Gulf to become an American military lake. This possibility would threaten not only the strategic interests of Iran in the Gulf but also the political survival of the Islamist regime in Tehran.  For all these reasons, I would not be surprised if Iran does not get involved in the internal affairs of the Shiite community in Iraq in order to have negotiating cards to use against the U.S. in case of a confrontation.

Wheaton, Md.: Isn't it inevitable that Iran (and Turkey) will invade Iraq as soon as the U.S. pulls out?

Fawaz Gerges: There's a high risk that if Iraq descends into civil strife as ethnic, political and religious tensions escalate out of control that its regional neighbors, particularly Turkey, Iran and Syria, would feel tempted to militarily and politically intervene in Iraq in order not only to protect their allies and interests in Iraq but also to create spheres of influence in the country.

West Chester, Pa.: Professor Gerges, thank you for being with us today. In your book "The Islamists and the West" you postulate that democracy is bound to fail in the Arab world since the concept of democracy does not exist in Islam. Could you please elaborate on this? Thank you.

Fawaz Gerges: I don't subscribe to the assertion that Islam is incompatible with democracy. On the contrary, I would argue that Islam can be used and utilized to advance a variety of political and ideological constructs, including liberalism, socialism and fundamentalism. In fact, Islam has been used and abused by a variety of political actors who basically impose their own ideological interpretations on Islam wrapping these interpretations with Islamic symbols. In this context, it's not Islam that we should be focusing on but rather the political and ideological orientation of groups and individuals who have particular agendas to advance. Islam is not the independent variable here.

Cumberland, Md.: I have read that there are present in Iraq many Shiites with ties and possibly being funded by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Council. Should we make an effort, even if military force is necessary, to deport these individuals back to Iran?

Fawaz Gerges: The critical question is much broader and more complex than that. What the American invasion has done not only to shift the internal balance of power dramatically in favor of the Shiite community long marginalized by the Saddam Hussein regime but also show the political weight and strength of conservative religious forces. In fact, if elections were to take place in Iraq today, political Islamists would win easily. These conservative religious forces tend to be influenced by the Iranian model and would like to Islamicize the state and society. They look to Iran and to Iranian conservative Mullahs as an inspiration. It'snot just Muhammad Baker al-Hakim who basically is influenced by the Iranian model. A host of Iraqi Shiite clergymen are also intoxicated with Ayatollah Khomeini Islamic revolution. The question here is not just one person but rather a social force being unleashed which is influenced by the Iranian model and would like to recreate that Islamic model in Iraq.  The answer to this social dynamic does not lie in the use of force which could prove to be counterproductive but rather in creating counterbalances, counterweights to the conservative religious forces. This effort will take time, resources and investment in institutional building. What the U.S. and the international community should do is to assist Iraqis in building intracommunal and intercommunal coalitions and alliances that transcend narrow ethnic and religious lines. These intra- and intercommunical and religious alliances could serve as a counterweight to the pro-Iranian conservative religious clergy. They could provide the building blocks of a more liberal, more inclusive political order in a post-Hussein Iraq.

Mexico City, Mexico: What do you think of the so called "jihadism"? Is it real or is it just a piece of the neoconservative discourse?

Fawaz Gerges: When the U.S. invaded Iraq a few weeks ago, many calls for jihad (resistance or Holy War) reverberated in Arab and Muslim lands. Mainstream distinguished Muslim scholars and preachers urged Muslims to resist the American invasion of Iraq. Using the concept of jihad as a mobilizational tactic to motivate young Arab men to volunteer, to travel to Iraq and assist their Iraqi counterparts. Ironically, the concept of jihad was not used as to mean "Holy War" as the conventional wisdom in the West has it, but rather as part of a call for resistance against the invading American troops. This was truly a major devlopment in Muslims religious use of the term "jihad." Similar to that, the concept of a just war in the Christian West. In the end, however, we should not exaggerate the operational value of the calls for jihad. The war over Iraq was a nationalist, geostrategic struggle, not a religious confrontation. Many people both in the world of Islam and the U.S. perceive it in this way, even though some try to impose a layer of religion on an essentially nationalist, geostrategic conflict.

Viborg, Denmark: How do you see the future of the Saudi regime with its big Shiite population now that Shiites will play a vital political role in Iraq? Shiites have been dominant in Iran but that's not an Arabic country, Iraq is ...

Fawaz Gerges: Saudi Arabia does not have a large Shiite population as do Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait. But what the Iraqi crisis has shown is that suppressed religious and ethnic minorities tend to have major grievances that undermine not only internal stability but also the social and nationalist fabric that preserves national unity. If the Iraqi crisis has taught us anything, it's that the concept of citizenship, not ethnicity, religion or tribe, should be the overriding umbrella unifying a national community.

I think Saudi Arabia along with other Arab and Muslim states, if they are to preserve political stability and national unity, have little choice but to fully empower their civil society regardless of its ethnic and religious composition.

The big question is the following: If Iraqis succeed in rebuilding their lives, state and society, and creating representative institutions, Iraq could serve as an example for other Arab states to imitate. But if Iraq fractures and descends into civil strife, I fear that militant forces would be empowered and authoritarian, autocratic regimes would crack down further against dissent and civil society. So the question is really up in the air at this stage. It mainly depends on developments in Iraq in the next few months and few years.

Washington, D.C.: Professor Gerges, I apologize that I have not read your recent book which I am sure addresses this question, but do you subscribe to the view that a "clash of civilizations" between the East and West is inevitable, or do you believe that instead, national interests will remain one of the most, if not the most important factor governing international relations?

Fawaz Gerges: My book addresses the very same question and my judgment is that the conflicts that are taking place between the world of Islam and the U.S. have more to do with political and economic aspects than with a clash of cultures or civilizations. One point must be made very clear, the Iraqi regime was one of the most secular regimes in the Arab world. It had no claim to either Islam or Islamic politics. The confrontation between the U.S. and Iraq is an essentially nationalist and geostrategic struggle and has little to do with religion and culture. Unfortunately, President George W. Bush's use of religious terminology generated a similar religious rhetoric on the other side. And yes, there are some small constituencies in the U.S. and the world of Islam who would like to convince us that the two camps are bound to clash because of their ideological and religious differences. In fact, Osama bin Laden tried very had to mobilize the Muslim Umma, the Muslim community worldwide, by claiming that his attack on the U.S. was an extension of the clash of religions that has been waged by the U.S. against Muslims: "the clash of the camp of belief vs. the camp of disbelief." Fortunately, there were few buyers for this polarized narrative. Bin Laden's apocalyptic nightmare did not materialize. Most Muslims saw through his inflated, poisonous  rhetoric.

One would hope that these two small segments in the western and Muslim camps are not provided with the ammunition to wage their unholy war at our own expense.

Woodbridge, Va.: Professor,Where are the women of Iraq? The media has been swooning over the fact that Iraqi's can finally practice their religion the way they want to, and yet we see no women. Did the U.S. free the Iraqi's or just the men? 
Thanks.

Fawaz Gerges: By the end of the 1970s Iraq not only had one of the most secular civil societies in the Arab world, but also some of the freeist women as well. Despite its brutality and suppression of personal freedoms, the Iraqi regime used oil wealth to create a highly advanced educational system along with the largest middle class in the Arab world. Of course, Saddam Hussein's military adventures along with the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 have bled Iraqi civil society dry and crushed its middle class, including the freedoms enjoyed by Iraqi women. Iraqi women paid a heavy price. They were squeezed between Saddam Hussein's tyranny and the harsh economic sanctions that directly affected their well-being, their families and their lives. They were the main victims of the harsh reality visited on Iraq in the last 24 years.  Iraqi society has become much more conservative, much more religious, much more self-enclosed and provincial than it used to be. There remains little of the old sophisticated Iraq, the capital of cultural production and Levantine capitalism.

The freedoms enjoyed by Iraqi women were sacrificed at the altar of economic and social dislocation. It will take awhile for Iraqi civil society, particularly women, to reemerge out of the rubble of political authoritarianism, the harsh economic sanctions and military occupation.

Bethesda, Md.: Mr. Gerges, thanks for taking the time to answer our questions. Any kind of democracy in Iraq will most likely elect a Shiite leader. Does that necessarily mean an anti-American posture long term?  If a Palesinian state is established as a result of U.S. pressure on Isreal, will this diffuse much of the hatred towards Americans by Arabs?

Fawaz Gerges: The Bush Administration has underestimated the religious fervor in Iraq. In their effort to sell the war to the American public and the world, Bush administration officials lost site of the political repercussions of the destruction of Iraqi institutions on Iraqi's future.  If elections were to take place in Iraq today, religious conservative forces would win easily. These conservative forces tend to be anti-American and deeply suspicious of liberal values. But I think this is not a foregone conclusion. There are many shade sof opinion within the Shiite community and the struggle can evolve in a variety of ways depending on how the U.S. conducts its relations with Iraq in the next few weeks and months. The irony is that the U.S. could find itself faced with the prospect of an Islamic state in Iraq. The fear does not lie in just how this state would interact with the U.S. but in the political effects on internal stability in Iraq. There's a high risk that Iraq could fragment and descend into civil strife if an Islamic state was to materialize.

The simmering Palestinian tragedy is the most fundamental issue in how Arabs perceive their relationship with the western powers, particularly the U.S. Resolving the Palestinian issue would go a long way in reducing the state of tensions and grievances of Arabs and Muslims against the U.S. Not only does reaching a settlement between Palestinians and Israelis usher in a more stable regional order but it would also reduce anti-American sentiments throughout Arab lands. By helping to resolve the festering Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the U.S. would establish a more peaceful regional order and would minimize threats to its own vital interests. As a result, everyone wins.

WashingtonPost.com: That wraps up today's show. Thanks to everyone who joined the discussion.
 
 

Critical Player: The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution to Have Powerful Political Voice
ABCNews.com, April 21, 2003

April 21 — After two decades as the main Shiite group opposing Saddam Hussein's regime, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is expected to be a key player in the shaping of a new, post-Saddam political system. Following are some questions and answers about the group.

What is SCIRI? 
The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq was founded in 1982 by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, a Shiite cleric who had fled to neighboring Iran after being persecuted and jailed by Saddam's regime. The group was based in Iran until Saddam's overthrow in 2003, and received support from Iran's Islamist government. 
Its military wing, the Badr Brigades, is believed to have 8,000-10,000 fighters, many of them recruited from Iraqi Shiite prisoners captured by Iran during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. 

How much support does SCIRI have among Shiites living in Iraq? 
Although it is difficult to measure the political weight of SCIRI, it is safe to say that the group has a critical social base that makes it a power to be reckoned with in determining Iraq's future. It is one of the most organized political-religious movements within the Shiite community. It has widespread appeal among the large number of Shiites who have gravitated toward a more radicalized form of Islam as a result of the oppressive socio-economic and political conditions imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. 

What is SCIRI's attitude toward the United States? 
The group's rank-and-file followers tend to be deeply suspicious of the United States. Religiously oriented Shiites felt betrayed by the first Bush administration when it failed to support their revolt against Saddam's regime in 1991. Their views also parallel those of their religious cohorts in Iran. 

How does SCIRI compare with other opposition groups in Iraq? 
In terms of political weight and social base, SCIRI is far more embedded inside Iraq than the U.S.-backed Iraqi National Congress (INC). The INC has a long way to go before growing deep roots in the country. Its close dependence on and alliance with the current Bush administration is more of a handicap than an advantage in trying to consolidate a nationalist posture. On balance, it is perceived to be a pawn in Washington's geostrategic game. 

What is SCIRI's political stance? How religious is it? How credible is its democratic rhetoric? 
SCIRI's rhetoric is very religious. Its leaders say they are committed to a democratic project based on a vote for every man and woman. Its detractors fear that this commitment would usher in an Islamist Iraq because the Shiite community represents more than 60 percent of the population. It is difficult to say what positions SCIRI represents because the group has not developed a comprehensive program that sheds light on its ideological premises. Its ultimate aim is to create an Islamic state and society in Iraq. 

What are the likely prospects are for SCIRI's influence in the future? 
Despite SCIRI's boycott of a U.S.-backed organizational meeting held April 15 and its statements about resisting any U.S. occupation, the group will likely play a critical role in influencing the course of events in the new Iraq. Given its broad social base of support, it can neither be ignored nor dismissed. Its integration into the Iraqi body politic will serve as a stabilizing mechanism. 
The danger lies in the potential for civil strife. If Iraq fractures and descends into chaos, SCIRI would likely emerge as a dominant political force in the country. It has the potential to be transformed into the Hizballah of Iraq. 

What would it mean for Iraq if SCIRI played a prominent role in its future governance? 
If SCIRI is integrated peacefully into Iraqi politics, it will likely play by the rules of the political game and serve as a stabilizing force. Its inclusion, not its exclusion, disarms and pre-empts the religious hard-liners within its rank.
 
 

War in Iraq
Washington Post, April 3, 2003

Will the U.S.-led war in Iraq help make the United States safer from terrorist threats such as al Qaeda? How does the Arab word view the toppling of Saddam Hussein by coalition forces? How will the United States' post-war reconstruction efforts affect the Arab and Muslim opposition? 
Fawaz Gerges, Chair of Middle Eastern Studies and Arab Affairs at Sarah Lawrence College, was online to discuss his book "America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?" and the war in Iraq. 
The transcript follows. 
Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions. 
 
Fawaz Gerges: I would like to say a few words on how the American invasion of Iraq has alienated or appeared to have alienated most of the important moderates as opposed to radical secular and religious forces in the Arab world. I see a new realignment encompassing a broad spectrum of political opinion is crystallizing against American foreign policy in the world of Islam. Moderates and radicals alike are now united in a position to what the United States is doing in Iraq. These moderate voices remain the only hope for the U.S. in its effort to help Middle Eastern societies reform their autocratic structures and develop democratic political systems. The invasion is radicalizing Arab and Muslim politics further and empowering reactionary elements who stand to benefit the most from this crisis. 
 

Washington, D.C.: The only results I foresee happening because of this war are more instability and terrorism. I think it will have the opposite effect than what the U.S. administration intends. 
Are there any positive reconstruction scenarios that can create a better relationship between Muslims and the U.S.? 
Fawaz Gerges: The wisdom in Washington was that the war would bring democracy into Iraq, democratize and transform the Muslim Middle East and empower those liberal voices who look to the U.S. We were also told that the war would strike at the roots of militancy and terrorism in the Muslim Middle East. But far from empowering the liberal voices the war is already radicalizing Arab politics and providing ammunition to anti-western, anti-liberal, anti-reformist voices. By deepening the sense of the humiliation and defeat felt by Arab youth a constituency that presents more than 55 percent of the Arab population, the war will likely make this constituency a fertile recruiting ground for militant causes like that of al-Qaeda. Regardless of the outcome of the American invasion of Iraq the war is likely to exacerbate the crisis of political legitimacy of the pro-western states and undermine regional stability. The political reverberations of this crisis will not only effect the destiny of Iraq but will also lead to the intensification of political repression in the Arab world and further polarization of American relations with Muslim societies. Although it is quite early to speculate on the nature and structure of the war's effects on America's relations with the Muslim world there is no doubt that the US is entering a highly volatile and dangerous phase in its relations with Middle Eastern societies. 
 

Fairfax, Va.: Mr. Gerges -- I saw you last night on cable -- I think it was CNN with Paula Zahn. Can you believe the question she asked you about whether the Palestinian issue was just a "gimmick" that Arabs are using to be angry at the U.S. You handled that ludicrous question very well. 
Americans must realize that the Israel/Palestine conflict is THE problem for most Arabs, and that our homeland security would almost be assured if we poured our energy into finding peace between Israelis & Palestinians, rather that fighting a war in Iraq. Am I cynical to think that, if the U.S. had the political will, we could force Israel and tempt Palestinians into any reasonable compromise using money as the leverage point? What do you think? 

Fawaz Gerges: I think you are absolutely correct. The Palestinian conflict is one of the most important issues in how Arabs perceive their relationship with the US. I am referring here to identity politics not to official politics. I think most of us who study the Middle East appreciate the centrality of the Palestinian issue to how Arabs and Muslims define their relationship with the West - particularly the United States. Unfortunately, although the Bush administration says that it is committed to helping Palestinian and Israelis reach a genuine and just settlement, it has not invested the necessary or the needed political capital in order to nudge the Israelis and Palestinian back to the negotiating table. This administration, or at least the hardliners within the administration, do not seem to be willing to stand their political capital trying to help resolve the festering Palestinian/Israeli tragedy. In fact the hardliners believe that the road to a Palestinian/Israeli settlement goes through Baghdad and this fact explains their obsession with Iraq and complacency toward the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. It remains to be seen if the administration will double its efforts after the Iraq war is over to try to assist the Palestinians and Israelis in reaching a peace settlement. 
 

Arlington, Va.: One of the Administration's standard responses to the uniform rejection that has met our Iraq policy in the MidEast is that many of the "moderates" you allude to say one thing behind closed doors (i.e., get rid of Saddam any way you can), and another for public consumption. 
How much truth do you think there is to this? 
Fawaz Gerges: The moderates I referred to are not the ruling classes in the Arab world. The moderates I referred to are the leading secular and religious leaders. People like Sheik Muhammad Tantawi, Sheik Youssef Qaradawi and many others represent the mainstream Muslim establishment. Those leaders are very consistent in their position to war. If you read carefully the social and political scene in the Muslim and Arab world the dissent and opposition to the war is almost unanimous. No equivocation, no ambivalence, no double talk. Civil society, both secular and religious, both moderate and radical, tends to be opposed to the American invasion in Iraq. What I meant when I said that the American invasion appears to have alienated most of the important moderate as opposed to radical forces is civil society leaders, opinion makers, and renowned scholars. I did not refer to the official position of Arab and Muslim governments. But even most of the Arab states who are providing logistical support to the Unites States in its war against Iraq were and are opposed to the war. Americas overwhelming pressure forced them to tow the line. Unfortunately the gap is becoming wider and wider between the official position of Arab governments and their civil societies. In the eyes of many Arabs and Muslims their governments have shown themselves not only to be impotent in trying to help a fellow Arab state but also subservient to their patron the United States. This is why regardless of the outcome of this invasion the war is likely to exacerbate the crisis of political legitimacy of the pro-western order in the region. 
 

Springfield, Mo.: What effect will the newly released fatwah have on Islamic public opinion toward Iraq? 
Fawaz Gerges: Very good question. One point must be made very clear, this is more of a nationalist geo-strategic conflict than a religious one. Yet in the eyes of many Arabs and Muslims President Bush's use of religious symbolism imposed a layer of religion on an essentially nationalist struggle. The calls for jihad serve as a rallying point for young Arab men to support their Iraqi counterparts in resisting the American invasion. Many young Arab men are outraged by the images of death and destruction they see on their television sets. They are also responding to calls by moderate Muslim clerics to help their Iraqi counterparts. Most of these young men do not care for or about Saddam Hussein but they are motivated by other nationalist or religious sentiments or a combination of both. They view the American invasion as an attack on the Arab nation and Islam. In the end however one should not exaggerate the operational value of the new calls for jihad. The conflict is an essentially nationalist one. 
 

Laramie, Wy.: Professor Gerges, 
Thank you for being online today. I understand and sympathisze with many of the international community that worry about American unilateralism and inconsistancy in international policy. But I don't understand why many in the Arab world view the war in Iraq as an attack on Islam. I think even the most cynical American wouldn't think that George Bush has a desire to wipe out Muslims. 
Can you please explain? Also, how was the NATO defense of Kosovo viewed in the Arab world? 
Thanks.

Fawaz Gerges: Many Arabs and Muslims agree that Iraq and the region would be a better place without Saddam's tyranny. What they object to is the overwhelming use of force by the United States. They expect the U.S. of having a hidden agenda to dominate the region and control its resources - mainly oil. We need to understand from the point of view of many Arabs and Muslims - they see and sister country being attacked, shocking images of civilian casualties - particularly children and women - and inflame public anger and rage. Thus they don't buy the American narrative that this war is meant to liberate Iraqis and bring in democracy and an open society. They see death, destruction and suffering. Yes, many Arabs and Muslims are grateful for what the US did in Bosnia, even though belatedly, to reduce the suffering of Bosnian Muslims. But at least in Bosnia there was an international consensus that something has to be done to stop the war and the brutal targeting of Muslims. In Iraq the situation is perceived differently. The war is seen to be unprovoked, unjust and unnecessary. The American narrative that Iraq presents a mortal threat either to its neighbors or the United States finds few buyers, not only in the world of Islam but in the world at large. So does the claim that there was a direct link between the Iraqi regime and the Sept. 11 attacks against the United States. 
 

Philadelphia, Pa.: What role do Arab-Americans play in forming attitudes about America back in the Middle East? 
Fawaz Gerges: That is a very difficult question to answer because Arab and Muslim Americans tend to be deeply divided and torn on the fundamental issues of the day. I think the perceived crackdown and disrespect for the civil rights of many Arabs and Muslims in the United States after 9/11 have done a great deal of damage to America's image and credibility in that part of the world. Theoretically the Arab-American and Muslim-American community are well positioned to play an important role in rebuilding the bridges of trust between the US and their communities overseas. But unfortunately the inflammatory rhetoric in certain circles in the United States, along with the extension of the war against terrorism beyond its original mandate, has not helped matters. Many Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans find themselves in a terrible bind. There loyalty questioned at home here in the US and they are not taken seriously by their communities overseas because they tend to be seen as victims not as independent social agents who can influence the American political process from within. 
 

Fawaz Gerges: At this stage the challenge is how to limit the damage, minimize the costs and isolate the reverberations of the Iraqi earthquake. Short term, civilian casualties must be avoided at all costs. The longer the war continues the angrier public backlash will be. Long term, American policy makers must endeavor to empower Iraqis themselves to govern themselves and help them rebuild the state and society as quickly as possible. American policy makers must double their efforts to resolve the festering Israeli/Palestinian tragedy and there is a great need for a consistent and convincing American foreign policy towards human rights and democracy. Democracy should not be used as a stick to punish enemies, while shutting ones eyes and ears to human rights violations by local allies. This inconsistency breeds cynicism and deepens anti-American sentiments in the world of Islam. 
 
 

Fuel on Mideast ire: Arab moderates are now joined with radicals against the U.S. 
The Star Ledger,  March 30, 2003

For an administration on a mission to bring democracy to the Middle East, the start of the Iraqi campaign couldn't have been reassuring. Troops were met with guerrilla gunfire, not daisies and welcome mats. In Egypt, Jordan and elsewhere, the street was aboil with anti- American rage. Arab nationalism seemed revived by the resistance of Iraqi troops. From the mosques poured words of revenge. Free speech, in the Arab world, doesn't translate into affection for the United States. 

Fawaz Gerges, a professor of Middle East affairs and international studies at Sarah Lawrence College, talked with Perspective Editor Deborah Jerome-Cohen about the impact of the war. 
 

One moderate Palestinian commentator recently said about the Bush administration, "They've handed the terrorists the region on a golden platter." Is the war in Iraq adding to the kind of hatred that led to Sept. 11? 

Let's look at the big picture. The American invasion seems to have alienated most of the important moderate forces in the Muslim world along with the radical forces. A new realignment against American foreign policy is crystallizing, encompassing mainstream moderate and militant forces.
 
Moderates and radicals alike are now united in their opposition to what the United States is doing. Osama bin Laden and his militant ilk no longer have a monopoly urging Muslims to wage jihad to defend the faith. Now you have distinguished moderate Muslim clerics imploring Arabs to resist invading American forces. Al Azhar University in Egypt, the most important institution of learning in the Arab world, issued a ruling to join Iraqi counterparts in resisting the American invasion. This is of immense importance. It's comparable to the papacy calling on Catholics to fight a just war to defend the faith. What about the more secular Arab voices? Even liberal secular commentators have expressed their anger and opposition to the American invasion. One of them, Hazem Saghie, a columnist for the London-based Al Hayat, wrote an editorial warning readers against "the coming American tyranny" and "an American empire that cannot be questioned." We are squeezed between Saddam Hussein's totalitarianism and American imperialism, he wrote. And this is a secular, pro-Western voice. Is the jihad religious or politi cal? The religious fatwa being issued should not obscure the fact that this is a nationalist geostrategic conflict. The goal is to defend the Iraqi homeland, not to wage holy war against the United States. Muslims are trying to reclaim or construct a just war based on Islamic principles. This is not a clash of civilizations. What you have are two narratives clashing on the question of what is a just war. Is there a drive to recruit young men to fight in Iraq? Yes, Al Azhar and other clerics are calling for Arab and Muslim young men to go into Iraq and fight with Iraqis. Those calls will likely resonate. There are reports of hundreds of young men flooding Iraqi embassies in Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and so on, who might either be responding to calls of moderate leading clerics or acting on their own. These young men are more concerned about defending an Arab Muslim state invaded by a foreign power than in the kind of religious jihad of Osama bin Laden. That said, the pool of young recruits for militant causes will be expanded by this war, too. So there is not much sympa thy for the argument that the United States is engaged in a war to liberate the Iraqi people and sow the seeds of democracy through the Middle East, addres sing the roots of terrorism? There are few buyers of that narrative -- that this war will democratically transform the entire region and empower liberal voices. Far from that, the outcome is likely to play into the hands of reactionary forces, who stand to benefit the most. Reactionary forces are already positioning themselves to capitalize on the war and its aftershocks.
 
As to striking at the roots of militarism and terrorism, that's just wishful thinking. All the war does is deepen the sense of humiliation and defeat. Among Arab youth, who represent more than 50 percent of these populations, this war will make them a fertile recruiting ground for jihadi causes. If the purpose of this war is to hammer a deadly nail in the coffin of terrorism, it will likely produce the opposite result. It will further radicalize Arab politics and alienate the mainstream moderate religious and secular forces. 

The struggle against terrorism cannot be won on a battlefield. It will be won by reaching out to the floating middle of Arab and Muslim public opinion. To what degree are al Jazeera and American television exacer bating the misunderstandings be tween the United States and the Arab world? From the American media we get one narrative. From the Arab and Muslim world there's another narrative. Not only is communication getting more difficult, we are witnessing a thick layer of misconception imposed on the conflict. Will these misunderstandings persist after the United States unseats Saddam? We are entering a highly unpredictable and volatile period. The challenge is how to limit the aftershocks.
 
A great deal must be done when this chapter is over to begin the process of healing. The United States must make a genuine commitment to assist Iraqis to govern their country and rebuild. This is a very long-term endeavor. Democracy will not come to Iraq for another 20 years or so. Policymakers must redouble their efforts to resolve the Palestinian- Israeli tragedy. And the United States must pursue a consistent and convincing policy on human rights and the rule of law. Right now, in the eyes of many Arabs and Muslims, the United States is using democracy as a stick to punish its enemies, (Palestinian leader) Yasir Arafat and Saddam Hussein. Why not try to curb (Israeli Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon when he uses collective punishment against the Palestinians? 

And the United States must appreciate the limits to the use of force in international politics, particularly in the Middle East. Yet there was widespread support for the United States in the 1991 Gulf War. Absolutely. In 1991 Saddam tried to swallow another country. Most of the Muslim states thought that U.S.-led allies were pursuing a just campaign. 

This time, few people trust the broader goals behind U.S. policy. U.S. war planners thought the Shi'a community would rise up against Hussein. What they failed to understand is that there is a strong sense of civic nationalism in Iraq. Many Iraqis, including Shi'as, are as suspicious of the American invasion as they are of Saddam Hussein. Between 1981 and 1989, Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini tried to mobilize Iraq's Shi'a community by playing on the Shi'a-Sunni divide. In general, they didn't respond. Saddam's brutality led the religiously oriented segment of the Shi'a community to revolt against his rule after the 1991 war, with horrific consequences. 

The Shi'a used to be one of the most secular and sophisticated groups in Iraq -- they were traders, the link to the world outside Iraq -- and the government co-opted many of these secular elements, who have played a leading role in Iraqi state and society. The Shi'ite community is not just segmented along religious and ethnic lines, but also along lines of class, ideology and interests. This is why you're not seeing an uprising. Religiously oriented Shi'a would like to throw over Saddam. But secular, urbanized Shi'as are just as suspicious of the United States as they are of Saddam. How is the war likely to affect our friends among the Arab states? It's likely to exacerbate the crisis of political legitimacy in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other pro-Western governments. The war exposes their subservience to the United States. The pro-U.S. states are walking a tightrope between providing logistical support to the United States and trying to appease public sentiments. Right now, democracy in the Middle East wouldn't bring us governments friendly to the United States. Do we install a friendly government in Iraq, or a possibly unfriendly but demo cratic one? How do you effect change? From within, or do you force it? Obviously, this administration has decided to enforce change. But far from empowering liberal voices, this particular war plays into reactionary elements who stand to gain the most. Liberals are screaming: What have you done? You are radicalizing Muslim politics and giving ammunition to jihadi forces. 

Why do you have to destroy a country to bring democracy to it? No external power can bring or impose democracy. Iraqis themselves must transform the country. The United States can assist the Iraqi people by aiding them, by investing in civil society, by making commitments to human rights and rule of law. How will Iraq affect the Is raeli-Palestinian crisis? If the administration is interested in democracy, why hasn't the administration invested any energy and political capital in trying to resolve this crisis? 

Does the administration have the vision and will to invest considerable resources to resolve the conflict? Are the hardliners within the Bush administration willing to exert pressure on Israel to stop the settlements and begin genuine negotiations with the Palestinians? Is the administration willing to invest political capital and confront its fundamentalist base? Obviously not, despite Colin Powell, Tony Blair, and many Israeli citizens and American Jews. Looking ahead two months from now, what do you see? I see the United States entrapped in the moving sands of Iraq. I see increase in resistance to the American military presence in Iraq. I see an intensification of Arab rage and political repression. 

There is no doubt of a military victory. The danger lies in the political reverberations. And I fear the ripple effects will be with us for the next 20 years. Ultimately, this adventure will come to haunt the United States and the Muslim Middle East. 

Muslims Called to Jihad
Los Angeles Times, March 26, 2003

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq has blurred the lines between mainstream, liberal and radical politics in the world of Islam and has dissipated much of the empathy felt by Arabs toward the U.S. in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

Perhaps most alarming, U.S. policy toward Iraq has alienated many of the important moderate voices, both secular and religious, which until now had been unwilling to join with militant anti-American forces.

Cairo's Al Azhar University -- the most-respected institution of religious learning in the Muslim world -- has issued a fatwa, or religious edict, advising "all Muslims in the world to make 'jihad' against invading American forces." The statement warned that Islam itself is the direct target of the "new crusaders' invasion," aimed at humiliating and subjugating Arabs and controlling their resources.

Given its historical and religious symbolism and weight, Al Azhar's ruling is likely to resonate with the faithful.

Prominent Muslim clerics and political leaders have echoed Al Azhar. Mohammed Sayed Tantawi, a reformist who, as the grand sheik of Al Azhar University, was one of the first clerics to condemn the Sept. 11 attacks and to dismiss Osama bin Laden's jihadi credentials as fraudulent, ruled that attempts to resist an American attack are a "binding Islamic duty," and he asked Arab leaders to block any aggression against Iraq. Maligned previously as a pro-Western reformer, despite his support for Palestinian suicide bombers, Tantawi's new stance shows the extent of the realignment.

Moderates and radicals now appear to be united and determined to oppose the American war. The leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt -- a mainstream Islamist organization with membership numbers in the millions -- called on his followers everywhere to join in jihad in defense of Iraq. The Muslim Brotherhood has not been considered militant since the 1970s, when it disavowed violence and agreed to play by the rules of the political game.

Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, whose organization had been moving away from militancy in recent years, was even more explicit: Americans "will not be met in this region with roses, flowers and perfumes. They will be met with arms, martyrdom and rifles."

The big questions now are: How will the new calls to arms be translated in operational terms and will the battlefield be limited to the Iraqi theater?

Bin Laden must be laughing in either his grave or cave. His strategic goal was to mobilize Muslims worldwide to heed his call for jihad. But his apocalyptic nightmare initially fell on deaf ears. Then, leading Muslim clerics cautioned young men not to be swayed by the calls for jihad from fringe groups like Al Qaeda and said that only legitimate institutions and accredited scholars should be heeded. Yet what was unthinkable 18 months ago has happened. The U.S. has alienated those in the Islamic community who were its best hope. The challenge now is to limit the damage.  

The Winter of Arab Discontent: U.S. Invasion Crystalizes Islamic World Against America
ABCNews.com, March 21, 2003

March 21 — Now that the war in Iraq has commenced, America's relations with the Muslim world will be tested further in the months and years ahead 

Distinguished Islamic institutions and renowned, moderate Muslim clerics have urged Muslims to join in jihad (holy war) to resist the U.S.-led onslaught. 
Osama bin Laden and his militant ilk no longer have a monopoly calling on Muslims to wage jihad to defend the faith.
 
On Iraq, lines have become blurred between mainstream and radical politics in the world of Islam, thanks to the U.S. approach, which is widely seen as unjust and hegemonic. 
A new realignment, bringing together a broad spectrum of political forces against the United States, is crystallizing in Arab and Muslim lands. 

American policy toward Iraq has alienated most of the important political secular and religious actors who, until now, had been unwilling to join with radical anti-American forces.

Last week, Al-Azhar, the highest, oldest (1,000 years) and most respected institution of religious learning in the Muslim world, issued a fatwa (religious edict) advising "all Muslims in the world to make jihad against invading American forces." 

The statement warned that Islam itself is the direct target of the "new crusaders' invasion" which aims at humiliating and subjugating Arabs and controlling their resources. 

Resonating Call to the Faithful 
The calls for jihad against the American invasion transcend ideological lines and the secular-religious divide in the Arab world. 

In the absence of legitimate political authority, religious figures and Islamist groups vie with each other to fill the vacuum and to satisfy the public hunger and rage. 
Given its historical and religious symbolism and weight, Azhar's ruling will likely resonate with the faithful, particularly outraged young men. 

Although Islam possesses no organized church, the significance of Al-Azhar's call to Muslims could be compared to that of the Papacy if it were to call on Catholics to fight a just war to defend the faith.

Prominent Muslim clerics and political leaders have echoed Al-Azhar and sounded the alarm. Sheikh Mohamed Sayyed Tantawi, Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, a reformist, who was one of the first clerics to condemn the 9/11 suicide bombings against the United States and to dismiss bin Laden's jihadi credentials as fraudulent, ruled that attempts to resist an American attack is "Jihad" and a "binding Islamic duty." 

He also impressed on Arab leaders the need to exert their utmost efforts to block any aggression against Iraq, a veiled warning for pro-U.S. Arab allies who support Washington's military campaign. 

Maligned previously by conservative and reactionary clerics as a pro-Western reformer, Tantawi's new stance shows the extent of the realignment of political opinion against American foreign policy in the world of Islam. 

United Fronts 
Moderates and radicals now appear to be fully united and determined to oppose the American war. 

For example, soon after Al-Azhar issued its fatwa, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt — one of the well-organized and mainstream Islamist organizations, which has branches in several Arab countries and whose membership numbers in the millions — called on his followers everywhere to join in jihad in defense of Iraq. 

The Muslim Brothers have not been considered a militant group since the 1970s when they forsook violence and agreed to play by the rules of the political game. 

Secretary General of Hezbollah, Party of God, Sayyed Nasrallah, a known radical, was more defiant and explicit in his warning to the United States: "We tell [the Americans] that they will not be met in this region with roses, flowers and perfumes. They will be met with arms, martyrdom, and rifles." The big question is, how will the new calls for arms be translated in operational terms, and will the battlefield be limited to the Iraqi theater? 
A widely-respected Egyptian-born cleric based in Qatar, sheikh Youssef Al-Qaradawi, who swiftly denounced al-Qaeda's terrorism after 9/11, accused the Bush administration of launching a war in Iraq against Islam and Muslims and behaving like "a god."  Qaradawi stressed that fighting U.S. troops is "legal jihad" and that "death while defending Iraq is a kind of martyrdom." These alarming words not only express the intensity of Arab/Muslim opposition to the coming war in Iraq but also reflect the deepening cultural and religious divide between the official American position and the Muslim societal response. 

More Than a Clash of Words 
President Bush's references to religious symbols in explaining his confrontation with Iraq have generated a similar Muslim oratory, bringing the two camps closer to a clash of civilizations. 

Religion is being superimposed on a geo-strategic conflict with potential disastrous repercussions for both sides. 

Bin Laden must be laughing in either his grave or cave, depending on his whereabouts. One of his strategic goals was to portray the struggle with the United States in religious terms — one between "the camp of belief vs. the camp of unbelief" — and to mobilize the Umma, the Muslim community worldwide, to head his call for jihad. 

Bin Laden's apocalyptic nightmare fell mostly on deaf ears and the Muslim community did not rise up. Leading Muslim clerics cautioned young men not to be swayed by the calls for jihad by fringe groups like al Qaeda and stated that only legitimate institutions and accredited scholars are qualified to do so. 

What was unthinkable a year and a half ago has happened — two versions of a just war theory, one Western and the other Muslim, are clashing over Iraq. 

The challenge facing the silent majority now is how to limit the damage and isolate the reverberations from the Iraqi crisis. 

The Road to Rebuilding Trust 
The good news is that both mainstream Western and Muslim leaders have called on their peoples to show tolerance and restraint toward each other. 

In their sermons and speeches, Tantawi, Qaradawi and other Muslim clerics and politicians make clear distinctions between the U.S. government and the American people. 

They have appealed to their followers not to target civilians and to keep the focus on Iraq. They seem to appreciate the widespread public opposition to the war in the United States and other Western nations. 

Similarly, the opposition to war by church leaders dilutes the religious fervor of those who would make this a clash of civilizations. 

These hopeful signs can be built on to regain the momentum of peaceful co-existence and to rebuild the bridges of trust between Islam and the West. 
 

Stretching the truth to link Iraq, al-Qaida 
The Baltimore Sun, March 4, 2003

IN THE face of widespread opposition to rushing to war against Iraq, Bush administration officials have underscored the urgency to act by trying to link the Baghdad regime to al-Qaida.

Initially, U.S. officials were reluctant to draw a direct link between Iraq and Osama bin Laden's network for lack of solid evidence. They have now thrown caution to the wind in order to show al-Qaida is "in partnership" with Iraq.

Some CIA analysts reportedly complained that senior administration officials have exaggerated the significance of some intelligence information about Iraq and its potential links to terrorism in order to strengthen their political argument for war. 

Although CIA Director George J. Tenet closed ranks with the administration and told the Senate Intelligence Committee that spy agencies had unearthed powerful evidence showing a connection, he acknowledged that Saddam Hussein does not have operational control over a terror cell headed by an Islamist terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in Baghdad.

The administration has not conclusively shown that Mr. Zarqawi is "an associate and collaborator" of bin Laden's. Some CIA analysts also expressed skepticism about whether the information showed a direct Iraqi tie to al-Qaida.

These analysts also disagree about Mr. Hussein's control of a radical Islamist group, Ansar al-Islam, in northeastern Iraq. European intelligence officials, who extensively investigated Mr. Zarqawi, said there is no indication of a direct link between Mr. Zarqawi and Baghdad.

Even if Mr. Zarqawi had found refuge in Iraq, this would not justify the rush to war.

Mr. Tenet also told the Senate intelligence panel, "We see disturbing signs that al-Qaida has established a presence in both Iran and Iraq." Are we to expect then that Washington will make a case for war against Iran, which is part of the "axis of evil" and which U.S. officials suspect of trying to develop nuclear weapons? The administration's case against Iraq not only lacks hard evidence but also consistency.

At times administration officials have stretched the truth to convince skeptics of Iraqi terrorist ties.

In his testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell seized on a new audiotape believed to be of bin Laden urging Iraqis and Muslims to resist a U.S. attack as evidence that the al-Qaida leader was "in partnership with Iraq." White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said the tape suggests "a strong statement of alliance" between Iraq and al-Qaida.

A close examination of the recorded message does not support the administration's contention. Bin Laden urges Muslims to fight the United States for the sake for God, "not to support the archaic systems that pervade all over the Arab states, including Iraq."

He makes it clear the goal is not to protect the ruling Baath Party or Mr. Hussein but to defend Islam and Muslims. The 16-minute tape is replete with references to the godless nationalists and socialists in Baghdad and elsewhere in the Arab world: "The socialists are infidel wherever they are, whether they are in Baghdad or in Aden."

Bin Laden's call is more a case of that old saw "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" rather than a reflection of an "alliance" or a "partnership" with the godless Iraqi regime. He also tries to capitalize on the widespread opposition to the coming war in Muslim lands by reinventing himself as a defender of the Iraqi people in order to attract young recruits.

A relationship existed between Mr. Hussein and bin Laden, but it is different than the one assumed by the Bush administration. After Mr. Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden (then living in Saudi Arabia) reportedly contacted senior Saudi rulers with a proposal to build an army along the same lines in Afghanistan to expel the "apostate" from Kuwait.

The snub by the royal family and its decision instead to invite Americans into Saudi Arabia sent bin Laden into exile with a global mission of holy war. There is nothing in the history of the two men, past and present, that prepares them to be bedfellows. Mr. Hussein has supported terrorism, but mostly against his fellow Arabs and Muslims, not Americans or Israelis.

U.S. officials must be wary that their nightmare scenario could come true: If Iraq fractures and descends into chaos as a result of a devastating war, it will likely become a hotbed of terrorism like Lebanon and Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. Bin Laden and his ilk will find a new base to plan and launch terrorist attacks against the "infidel" Muslim regimes and their "evil" patron, the United States.

America's Moslem Miscalculation
The Institute for War and Peace Reporting  March 3, 2003

The war is creating a major realignment within the Islamic world, with even moderate Moslems calling for jihad against the US. 

In selling its case to invade Iraq and topple its government, the Bush administration asserted that the war will hammer another deadly nail in the coffin of terror by showing terrorists and their state supporters that Washington is determined to use pre-emptive force to protect its vital interests. Although American officials did not establish a direct link between the Iraqi president and either al-Qaeda or the September 11 attacks, they argued the Iraq war will make the United States less vulnerable to terrorist attacks. 

In their effort to garner domestic and international support for the war, President Bush and his security team promised to bring democracy to Iraq and empower liberal voices throughout the Muslim Middle East. Their aim is to transform the whole region in America's image by transplanting Jeffersonian democracy into the heart of the Arabian desert. By doing so, they hope to strike at the root causes of militancy and extremism. 
But a US invasion of Iraq that results in large numbers of civilian casualties will deepen the sense of victimisation and defeat already felt by Arab youths and incline them to join cells of the al-Qaeda variety. In this way, US policy toward Iraq will play into the hands of al-Qaeda and give it a new lease on life. Far from undermining militancy and combating terror, war will sow the seeds of further militancy. The ripples of the Iraqi crisis will reverberate throughout Arab lands, further threatening regional stability and the legitimacy crisis of pro-Western Arab states. 

The US invasion of Iraq is a God-send for Osama bin Laden and other militant elements. Far from empowering liberal forces in Iraq and other Muslim states, as some of the hardliners in the Bush administration assert, the American invasion is already radicalising Arab politics and playing into the hands of reactionary groups. 

Washington's war has blurred the lines between mainstream, liberal and radical politics in the world of Islam, and with it squandered most of the empathy engendered after 9/11. A new realignment against the United States that brings together a broad spectrum of political forces is crystallising in Arab and Muslim lands. Distinguished Islamic institutions and renowned - and moderate - clerics have urged Muslims to join in jihad to resist the US-led onslaught. 

Al-Azhar, the highest, oldest and most-respected institution of religious learning in the Muslim world, issued a fatwa, or religious edict, advising "all Muslims in the world to make jihad against invading American forces". Although Islam possesses no organised church, the significance of al-Azhar's call is comparable to a Papal call on Catholics to fight a just war to defend the faith. The Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Sheikh Mohamed Sayyed Tantawi, a reformist who was one of the first clerics to condemn 9/11 and who dismissed bin Laden's jihadi credentials as fraudulent, ruled that attempts to resist the US attack ON IRAQ are a "binding Islamic duty." 

Until now Tantawi has been attacked by conservative and reactionary clerics as a pro-Western reformer. His new stance shows the extent of the realignment of political opinion in the world of Islam. 

Another widely-respected Egyptian-born cleric based in Qatar, Sheikh Youssef Al-Qaradawi, accused the Bush administration of declaring war against Islam - and behaving like "a god". Qaradawi, who also denounced al-Qaeda terrorism after 9/11, said fighting US troops is "legal jihad" and "death while defending Iraq a kind of martyrdom." 

Moderates and radicals now appear to be fully united in opposition to the American war. In an editorial in al-Hayat, a leading secular-liberal writer warned of the "new American tyranny . . . an empire that cannot be questioned." Similarly, a leader in Egypt of the Muslim Brotherhood, a well-organised and mainstream Islamist organisation with millions of members in several Arab countries, called on his followers everywhere to join in jihad in defence of Iraq. The Muslim Brothers have not been considered a militant group since the 1970s when they forsook violence and agreed to play by the rules of the political game. 

Bin Laden must be laughing in his grave - or cave, whichever the case may be. His apocalyptic nightmare of a clash of religions and cultures is finally resonating in both camps. What was unthinkable a year and a half ago has happened: two versions of a just war theory, one Western and the other Muslim, are clashing over Iraq. 

The challenge now is how to limit the damage inflicted by the US invasion of Iraq, minimise its costs and isolate its reverberations inside Iraq and the wider region. Half-measures won't do any longer. The United States must not only enable Iraqis to govern their country, but also must assist them in the complex and costly task of socio-political reconstruction. It must redouble its efforts to resolve the festering Palestinian tragedy and to provide the means to build a viable Palestinian nation-state. The promotion of human rights and the rule of law must be high on Washington's agenda. 

American policy-makers must recognise the limits of the use of force in international politics, particularly in the Muslim Middle East where accumulated grievances against US foreign policies abound. The Iraq war pours fuel on an already raging fire. In the long term, the potential risks of the American adventure in Iraq outweigh any imagined benefits not only to Iraq and the region, but also to America itself. 
 

Can Iraq Be Won?
The Edge Malaysia, March 3, 2003

In moving to topple Saddam Hussein's regime, the Bush administration stakes its case on two critical arguments. First, President Bush and his senior aides insist that the coming Iraq war is an extension of the military campaign against terrorism. It would spare America and the world, in the words of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, "the danger that Iraq's weapons of mass terror could fall into the hands of terrorists."

Second, the Bush team is pledging to bring democracy to Iraq, a transformation that - it is hoped - will spur democratization across the region. A peaceful, democratic dawn in Iraq, they assert, would soon break over other authoritarian Arab states as well. By transforming the political landscape of the Middle East, American officials hope to strike at the root causes of Islamic extremism.

Messrs. Bush, Rumsfeld, Cheney and Wolfowitz like to pose as realists, but just how realistic is such thinking? Is it based on a sober assessment of the complex realities in Iraq and the region? Or is it driven by ideology and wishful thinking? Will a war against Iraq help the US in its fight against terrorists, or will it make Americans more vulnerable?

Despair and alienation have taken hold of the younger generation of Arabs, who represent over 50% of the region's population. Political repression and the silence of Arab public opinion should worry America and its Arab allies, not reassure them, because it means that there is no way for the public to channel its interests, demands, and frustrations peacefully.

A US invasion of Iraq, with large numbers of civilian casualties, would deepen the sense of victimization and defeat felt by Arab youths and make them inclined to join Al Qaeda-style holy war cells. Far from undermining militancy and combating terror, a war will likely play into the hands of Al Qaeda, giving it a new lease on life.

Indeed, militant Islamists, hoping to recover from the devastating blows they have absorbed since the war on terror began, are already positioning themselves to capitalize on the coming war with Iraq. In the last few weeks, Al Qaeda's propaganda messages have pointed increasingly at the Iraqi crisis. The organization seeks to reinvent itself as a
defender of the Iraqi people.

In this, Al Qaeda finds a receptive audience. The dominant Arab-Muslim narrative stresses that the coming war has nothing to do with fighting terror. Rather, it is intended to settle old scores and make Washington the arbiter of Arab destiny and resources, particularly oil. By attacking Iraq, the US could win the armed confrontation with Hussein, but probably lose the broader - and more vital - political struggle for
the future of the country.

American officials do not seem to recognize how difficult, costly, and prolonged the task of creating a peaceful order and a viable democracy in Iraq will be. There is a lack of appreciation of how deeply entrenched are Iraq's sectarian, tribal, and ethnic loyalties. A sense of humility and skepticism is missing.

The building blocks and institutions necessary for a functioning polity, let alone a democracy, do not exist. Since the advent of army rule in 1958, successive regimes have terrorized Iraqis into submission and bled the country white through their military misadventures. Monitored and oppressed for 45 years, Iraqis have lost faith in the political system and turned inward, to tribalism and religious/ethnic factionalism. Civil
society has been crushed and the middle class decimated-thanks in no small part to the UN-led economic sanctions that have been enforced since 1991.

Of course, reforming and democratizing the Iraqi political system is not impossible. On the contrary, the Iraqis have suffered more than most and have learned the hard way the perils of authoritarianism and oppression. They recognize their vested interest in overcoming their divisions and rebuilding their political community. Iraq also possesses human and material resources that should work in favor of democracy in the long
term.

But democracy cannot be delivered to Iraq by an outside power. Only Iraqis, with international assistance, can transform their country. This task requires time, patience, hard work, and luck. It will likely take one or two decades, not just a year or two, the proposed time frame of American military presence in Iraq after the expected ouster of Hussein. 

Unless America is willing to police the new order for many years and invest vast political and economic resources in assisting, not imposing, the reconstruction of state and society, Iraq will fracture and descend into chaos.  Its neighbors will be destabilized.  New jihadi groups will arise. Not only will there be no peace and democracy in Iraq, but the West's security interests will be endangered further. Sadly, this worst case scenario is hardly entertained by American officials, who now seem to be prisoners of their own rhetoric.

Fundamental Arab reform can't be had by force
Christian Science Monitor January 21, 2003 

Whether the US wars with Iraq or not, it should understand that only through careful diplomacy - not force - is there hope for undermining extremism and diminishing anti-Americanism in the world of Islam.

There is no need to sell the idea of America to Muslims, because many of them are dazzled with the American dream.

It's America's "unjust, inconsistent" foreign policy that most Muslim grievances focus on.

Now State Department officials appreciate that winning Muslim hearts and minds requires a broader political strategy than relying on slick commercials produced by the revived Office of Public Diplomacy.

Indeed, recent pronouncements by US Secretary of State Colin Powell and his aides show signs of movement in the right direction by taking into account the root causes of Arab despair.

Mr. Powell recently introduced the "US-Middle East Partnership Initiative" which aims to spread democracy and political reforms in the Middle East, including the empowerment of women. The "three pillars" of this proposed US-Middle East bridge are education, business, and political and private-sector reforms. Although only $29 million is allocated for the first part of the initiative, "significant additional funding" was promised next year.

Powell's director of policy planning, Richard Haass, acknowledged that "successive US administrations, Republicans and Democrat[s] alike" had erred by not making "democratization a sufficient priority" with its Arab allies. He made it very clear that an important part of the solution lies in promoting democracy and providing economic and educational opportunities for the alienated youths who have served as a fertile recruiting ground for militant groups.

But what's alarming is the negative reception this progressive step has gotten in the ranks of pro-US Arab governments and civil society leaders. Arab officials criticized it for misplaced focus on reforming Arab politics at the expense of trying to resolve the dangerous Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Witness how the secular, pro-US regimes use the threat of the Arab street to maintain the authoritarian status quo: Egyptian and Saudi foreign ministers warned the administration that interference in their internal affairs would be unacceptable and would generate a further public backlash against the US.

More disconcerting is that few Arab opinionmakers have taken the new ideas emanating from Washington seriously and most dismiss them as part of a propaganda ploy designed to distract attention from the coming war in Iraq. Moreover, they've derided the Powell initiative to help democratize the Arab world by suggesting that $29 million is a paltry sum - "Just six cents for every Arab!" opined a leading liberal Arab columnist.

Rejecting Powell's initiative and labeling it "suspicious," Egyptian opposition parties, along with human rights organizations, vowed "to organize public protests against it."

Why incite the populace against a US initiative, humble as it is, intended to nourish civil society? Why discredit democracy further in Muslim eyes by cynically linking it to mischievous US designs? Or is the goal to capitalize on widespread anti-American sentiments and garner popular support even at the expense of democracy?

Anti-Americanism in the Arab world has become a tool used by all political factions handicapping its politics and slowing any move toward democracy.

Clearly there is a general misunderstanding of the potential US role in furthering democracy among Arabs and Muslims as well as of the required conditions for it. On the one hand, Muslim liberals believe that the US possesses a magic wand that can easily open Muslim eyes to democratic paradise. On the other hand, Islamists and leftists more or less subscribe to a conspiracy theory holding Washington mainly responsible for the absence of democracy in the Arab world. Both positions indirectly imply that Arabs and Muslims aren't to blame for the dismal political and economic situation in which they live - that it's the fault of the US.

Neither the US nor any external power can do the work for Arabs and Muslims by exporting a well-tailored democratic model. Democracy can't be offered on a silver platter - nor can it be achieved without democrats.

Experience shows that liberal forces must struggle to expand the political space and thus earn a place among the community of democrats. Those genuine democrats, who tirelessly defend personal freedoms and liberties of all members of society, not just their own, are in short supply in Arab lands. The politics of exclusion and intolerance predominates.

The most the US can do is to serve as a facilitator, to show by deeds, not just words, its commitment to sustainable development and peaceful resolutions of regional conflicts.

In particular, the Arab-Israeli dispute has exhausted meager local resources and impeded political evolution. To encourage genuine democratic transition, the US must exert unflinching pressure on its Arab allies to expand political participation and to show respect for the rule of law and the free assent of peoples.

This requires a convincing and consistent approach to human rights, missing in the US approach to the Middle East. For example, while the US demands the democratization of the Palestinian Authority, it maintains cozy relations with other Middle Eastern dictators.

American officials must recognize that there are limits to what they can do to structurally reform the Arab Middle East. Only Arabs and Muslims, with international assistance, can, and should democratically transform their own societies.

(c) Copyright 2003 The Christian Science Monitor. All rights reserved. 

President Bush told Iraqi opposition leaders at the White House recently that he favored a sweeping transition to democracy in Iraq and a brief military occupation after the expected toppling of Saddam Hussein. 

While the Iraqi participants said they felt reassured by the president's commitment, they had emphasized the importance of creating an Iraqi political partner for the United States before Mr. Hussein's ouster.

But the Bush administration does not appear to share the opposition's urgency to immediately empower Iraqis to govern themselves. According to plans being finalized by Mr. Bush's security team for policing and democratizing Iraq after the overthrow of Mr. Hussein, Iraqis outside and inside the country are assigned a minor role.

Under these plans, as reported by The New York Times, the U.S. military would be the central player in running Iraq for at least 18 months, with a U.S. commander calling the shots. The proposals do not envision transferring power to an Iraqi-run government for several years. Obviously, the administration has little faith in the Iraqis' ability to close ranks and form a functioning, representative polity soon after their liberation.

To allay Arab fears that the United States seeks to be a colonial power in Iraq, The Times reported, U.S. officials plan to create an international civilian administration - not an Iraqi one - perhaps designated by the United Nations, to reconstruct the country.

Is this the most sensible way to convince Iraqis and other Arabs that the United States doesn't want to subjugate them or control their oil? How can the United States democratize Iraq without Iraqis being in charge of the democratization process? Does the administration appreciate the intensity of internal opposition to its contingency plans?

These are not academic questions. They carry implications not only for the success of the American military-political effort to reconstruct a post-Hussein Iraq, but also for creating a democratic model for other Arab states to emulate.

For any U.S. effort to be regarded as legitimate by Iraqis and other Arabs, Iraqis must be treated as partners and play a vital role in their country's reconstruction, particularly in the management of its oil.

While U.S. officials are aware of the widespread conviction abroad that control of oil - not disarming Iraq - is the driving force behind U.S. policy, their plans reportedly envision raising revenues from oil sales not only for rebuilding Iraq but also for defraying some of the costs of the military occupation. Although last week Secretary of State Colin Powell stressed that oil will be used to benefit Iraqis, he did not deny reports, Newsweek said, about using oil money to pay for administration and occupation costs.

This action would reinforce charges of U.S. imperialism in the world of Islam. Many Iraqis would be embittered and would view the United States more as a mercenary than a liberator, thus sowing the seeds of misunderstanding and potential resistance.

U.S. officials don't seem to appreciate that democracy cannot be brought to Iraq by an outside power. Only Iraqis, with international assistance, can transform their country. Despite its half-hearted measures to prop up the Iraqi opposition (the United States has just begun the military training of some opposition fighters), the administration seems unwilling to create a transitional Iraqi government with real authority.

Divisions within the administration, coupled with the fragmentation of the Iraqi body politic and Mr. Hussein's brutal rule, have worked against the formation of a united opposition front inside and outside Iraq. Nevertheless, Iraqi opposition groups, who bickered during their conference in London last month, did compromise and passed resolutions that stress power-sharing.

The United States, along with the United Nations, the European Union and Iraq's neighbors, can facilitate the birth of a new Iraq by helping Iraqi opposition groups strengthen their cooperation and build alliances with their various communities at home, including the tribes and the armed forces.

This is not wishful thinking. Recent developments appear to have unsettled the Iraqi regime and showed the Iraqi people how weak it is. The continued U.S. military buildup is bound to encourage army officers and tribal chiefs to find a way to shield their country from the perils of the coming war. If they cannot rise up on their own, they might be disposed to form an alliance with an active, mobilized opposition, publicly supported by the international community, including the Arab states, to remove Mr. Hussein from power. This formidable alliance would serve as a core of the new Iraqi government.

Now is the time for the Bush administration to show by deeds that it is committed to helping Iraqis lead the way in reconstructing and transforming their own country. After all, this is their future, their destiny, their responsibility.

Copyrite 2003 (c) The Baltimore Sun

Al Qaeda leaders have recently unleashed a new campaign of psychological warfare. Hardly a week goes by without the terror network issuing threats against Westerners, particularly Americans.

At times the Bush administration appears to fall prey to this campaign by sending ambiguous messages to the American people about the efficacy of its efforts to eradicate terror and ensure their security. Fearing the worst, an FBI internal assessment two weeks ago warned the nation to brace itself for "spectacular" attacks by Al Qaeda.

Critics of the administration swiftly expressed their dismay that it has failed to locate Osama bin Laden or to eliminate him. They also accused the administration of a lack of focus in the fight against Al Qaeda and of being distracted by its potential military plans for Iraq.

Administration aides offered quick rebuttals and marshaled facts and figures to show that their effort against Al Qaeda has made considerable progress.

If the war against terrorism has gone well, why then is Al Qaeda still capable of launching "spectacular" operations?

This ambiguity stems from the fact that the administration is legitimately concerned about declaring victory against Al Qaeda lest future attacks play into Al Qaeda's hands. Washington also seems to have little appreciation of the terror group's shifting tactics and strategy.

In the last few weeks, Al Qaeda seems to have been waging a propaganda and psychological struggle to sow fear and inflict economic damage.

The post-9/11 terror, relying on decentralized operations and aiming mainly at "soft" civilian targets, is designed to defy the U.S. and to indicate that Al Qaeda's reach is global.

Al Qaeda has shown itself to be highly adaptable and resourceful by scattering its surviving fighters, estimated in the low hundreds, from Afghanistan into various destinations, and by building alliances with other fringe Islamic groups.

But these recent attacks, bloody and costly as they are, should not blind us to the fact that Al Qaeda is a shadow of its former self. Despite the pontifications of its leaders that it will deliver faster, harder strikes against the most vital American centers, it no longer possesses the means to plan, organize and launch strategic operations of the scale of Sept. 11. The war has slowly but steadily dismantled the group's infrastructure.

The network lost its vital operational base in Afghanistan. Its partner, the Taliban regime, is history. Its financial and military infrastructure in Europe, particularly in Germany, France and England, was dismantled.

Moreover, hardly any state, regardless of its political orientation, could afford to aid or harbor Al Qaeda's fugitives, a testament to the effectiveness of the global anti-terror coalition. The deepening of regional cooperation has netted scores of Al Qaeda operatives worldwide.

Bin Laden's surviving foot soldiers are forced to operate underground in a hostile world with no official refuge. As a result of the tightening of the international noose around Al Qaeda's neck, the network, or what is left of it, acts like a serial criminal band, killing at random. This is a sign of weakness and desperation, not strength.

Though the Bush administration should not lower its guard or be complacent, it must avoid falling into the trap of fear and panic laid down by Bin Laden's men. It is true that Bin Laden and his chief lieutenant remain in hiding. But their resurfacing will make them vulnerable.

The one remaining real danger lies in Al Qaeda's effort to reinvent itself as a defender of Palestinians and Iraqis and thus expand its pool of recruits. One of Bin Laden's major failures since 9/11 revolves around the lack of new recruits.

The U.S. must find ways to frustrate the network's tactics and limit the pool of recruits available for jihadi, or holy war causes. Working closely with allies and friends is the most effective way of putting Bin Laden and his organization out of business once and for all.

The recent assassination of a senior U.S. diplomat in Jordan should not have been a surprise given the deepening of anti-Americanism in Arab lands and the clarion call in Washington for war against Iraq.

Although intelligence experts and U.S. officials are likely to point fingers at al-Qaida, evidence exists that unconnected Muslim individuals-- outraged by U.S. policy toward the Palestinians or Iraq - can apparently be nudged by the inflammatory rhetoric of al-Qaida leaders to kill Westerners, particularly Americans.

I fear dissatisfied individuals and groups will act independently because they know al-Qaida will be held responsible for terrorism. This wave of free-lance terrorism is bound to increase and spread if and when the United States decides to militarily oust Saddam Hussein. Eradicating terrorism becomes more difficult when enraged peoples take matters into their own hands. It also supplies al-Qaida with more willing foot soldiers to join its suicidal squads.

There are few buyers in the world of Islam for Washington's masculine approach on Iraq. U.S. officials must recognize that although Arabs do not care for Mr. Hussein, they neither buy the Bush administration's attempt to link him to al-Qaida nor the thesis that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction represent a threat to international peace.

Far from undermining militancy, a war will play into militant Islamists' hands and supply them with the needed ammunition to continue the fight against their new enemy -- the United States. Islamists already are positioning themselves to capitalize on the coming war with Iraq to recover from the devastating aftershocks of Sept. 11.

From the outset, Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants have used an anti-American message as an effective tool to recruit soldiers. In a recent audiotape broadcast on Al-Jazeera, a leading Arab TV station, bin Laden's chief deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, refers to a war against Iraq as having less to do with Mr. Hussein and more with consolidating U.S. hegemony over "the Arab-Islamic world" and Israeli "supremacy" in the region. This theme, which may be dismissed by U.S. officials as propaganda, is taken for granted by Arab commentators and civic leaders.
The dominant Arab-Muslim narrative stresses that the coming war is intended to settle old scores and make Washington the arbiter of Arab destiny and resources, particularly oil.

It is no wonder that al-Qaida's anti-American message resonates powerfully in the Arab and Muslim political imagination. It provides the fuel that powers the terrorist engine and keeps it running.

Pro-U.S. Arab regimes will likely weather the coming storm in Iraq much as they survived the 1991 Persian Gulf war. Despite its lack of legitimacy and vulnerability, the Arab ruling elite has proved to be durable, capable of maintaining control during a crisis.

Since 1970, this elite has managed to consolidate power and crush all threats to its security. Particularly since 9/11, the pro-U.S. Arab governments have tightened their grip on civil society and have cracked down against not only the fringe opposition but also the mainstream. In this context, the Arab street is not in a strong position to explode and
endanger the stability of America's Arab allies.

But a U.S. war against Baghdad will sow the seeds of further extremism, nihilism and terrorism.

During my recent travels in the Middle East, Arab educators expressed anxiety about the desperation and fatalism that has taken hold of their people, particularly the Arab youths, a constituency that represents more than 50 percent of the population. Political repression and the silence of the Arab street, coupled with the absence of political channels to let the
public release its frustration, should worry the United States and its Arab allies, not reassure them, these educators said.

A U.S. invasion of Iraq, with large numbers of civilian casualties, would deepen the sense of victimization and defeat felt by Arab youths and make them inclined to join holy war cells of the al-Qaida variety. Thus the pool of recruits for militant causes would likely expand and swell the ranks of al-Qaida and other fringe Islamist groups.

Our policy toward Iraq appears to play unwittingly into the hands of al-Qaida by giving it a new lease on life. This is worrisome because the recent attacks in Bali, Yemen, Kuwait, Pakistan and Tunisia and other plots clearly indicate al-Qaida has partially regrouped and has built informal alliances with radical groups in Pakistan, Yemen, Algeria, Kuwait, Indonesia and other countries. Al-Qaida has shown itself to be adaptable and resourceful and able to continue the fight.

The United States must rethink its war against terror, focusing on the longer-term view, by remembering that multilateralism and coalition-building were critical to our early successes. The killing of a senior al-Qaida leader and five low-level associates in Yemen this week could not have happened without the cooperation of local authorities. But this regional counterterrorism is not adequate on its own to stem al-Qaida's support and influence in Muslim lands.

Unlike conventional war, fighting terrorism will not be won on the battlefield but by reaching out to mainstream Muslim public opinion and addressing the complex social and political roots of extremism.

Copyright © 2002, The Baltimore Sun

Hearts, Minds and Terror
The Los Angeles Times, October 31, 2002

President Bush and his senior aides seem to have a good grasp of the threats still posed by Al Qaeda. However, they lack a nuanced understanding of this radical fringe's appeal to alienated young Muslim men who increasingly may be acting on their own. The White House, instead of preparing for war with Iraq, should be seeking creative strategies to decrease the pool of recruits and block further inroads into the world of Islam by the militants.

Connecting the Bali nightclub massacre to an attack on American troops in Kuwait and the bombing of a French oil tanker off Yemen, Bush said earlier this month that "it is going to take a while to fully rout Al Qaeda. We just learned a lesson.... It's going to take a while to succeed."

In recent testimony before a congressional panel, CIA Director George J. Tenet emphasized that Al Qaeda was still capable of planning and carrying out attacks in multiple theaters of operation.

Al Qaeda's senior leaders, though weakened and on the run, survived the first phase of the war in Afghanistan. They have succeeded not only in motivating hardened foot soldiers but in inspiring sympathizers to launch independent terror attacks, sowing fear and inflicting economic damage. Al Qaeda's strategy seems to aim at affirming its existence and defying the U.S.

For example, a recent audiotape by Osama Bin Laden's closest lieutenant, Ayman Zawahiri, assumed responsibility for suicide bombings against French engineers in Pakistan and German tourists in Tunisia. While Zawahiri also praised "holy warriors" for the attack on the French oil tanker and gun battles with U.S. Marines in Kuwait, he did not accept direct responsibility in Al Qaeda's name.

This post-9/11 campaign relies on small-scale, decentralized operations and aims mainly at "soft" nonmilitary targets. Deadly and effective, these operations are easier to plan and carry out than were the complex, spectacular World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa. They also do not require as much supervision by Al Qaeda's surviving leadership and depend largely on the initiative of loyalists.

Young men who are unconnected to Al Qaeda but outraged by U.S. policies toward the Palestinians or Iraq can apparently be nudged by the inflammatory rhetoric of Al Qaeda leaders to pursue freelance terrorism and kill Westerners on their own, complicating and prolonging the U.S. war on terror. The assassination of a senior American diplomat in Jordan appears to fall into this freelance category.

The U.S. must take seriously the rage against U.S. foreign policies in the world of Islam. The festering Palestinian wound fuels anti-Americanism, as does the U.S. stand toward Iraq even as Washington maintains cozy relations with more pliant dictators. A U.S. invasion of Iraq, with large civilian casualties, would only make these young Muslims more inclined to join jihadi cells of the Al Qaeda variety.

Although most Arabs do not care for Saddam Hussein, neither do they buy the administration's attempt to link him with Al Qaeda. They know full well his brutal suppression of Muslim activists and the loathing that Bin Laden has for his secularism.

The dominant Arab-Muslim narrative stresses that an attack on Iraq would be designed to settle old scores and make Washington the arbiter of Arab destiny and resources, particularly oil. "This is a war against Islam and Muslims, not against terrorism," is the common complaint. U.S. unilateralism and insensitivity to Muslim concerns threaten to turn Bin Laden, alive or dead, into a martyr and rallying point for the dissatisfied.

Initially after 9/11, Bin Laden's politics of despair and suicide were discredited in Muslim eyes, thanks mainly to the administration's coalition-building and limited goals. Arrests of key Al Qaeda lieutenants in Pakistan, Morocco, Yemen, East Asia and Europe and the freezing of financial assets took their toll on the network. The most effective means of putting Al Qaeda out of business is to work more closely with European and Muslim allies to tackle the political and social roots of extremism.

To reach the large "floating middle" of Muslim society, the U.S. should pay more than lip service to the urgent tasks of peaceful resolution of international conflicts, to sustainable development and to a consistent, persuasive approach to human rights and liberty for all.

Copyright © 2002, The Los Angeles Times

Illusions Of Iraqi Democracy
The Washington Post, October 8, 2002

In its effort to garner domestic and international support for a military campaign to disarm Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein's regime, the Bush administration has promised to bring democracy into the country and strategically transform the whole region. President Bush and his senior aides note that liberating Baghdad would usher in a peaceful, democratic dawn in Iraq that would spill over into other authoritarian Arab states. It is a tall and ambitious order for the Middle East. But as America moves closer to war with Iraq, the policy debates have focused on procedural issues, not on the internal conditions in Iraq that will determine the likelihood of a peaceful, democratic state after Hussein's departure.

Iraq's fragmented society and blood-soaked political history should make anyone wary of predicting the swift creation of a viable democracy there. The U.S. establishment does not seem to appreciate how deeply entrenched are sectarian, tribal and ethnic loyalties and how complex would be the job of reconnecting Iraqi communities, estranged from one another by decades of divisive official policies. Iraq always has been difficult to manage and govern. Hastily glued together by Britain in the 1920s to serve its imperial interests, it was placed under the Hashemite monarchy, brought from nearby Hijaz (today's Saudi Arabia), which lacked public legitimacy because of its close ties with colonial Britain and its narrow social base of support. The Hashemites were detached from everyday life; state and society remained separate. Reliance on the army for its hold on power meant that it was only a matter of time before "the man on horseback" would overthrow the monarchy and rule Iraq with an iron fist. Ambitious army officers were in a hurry to do away with the old order and to remake Iraq in their own image: hierarchical, rigid and authoritarian.

Abdul Karim Qasim's brutal 1958 coup inaugurated a new militaristic era in Iraq and sowed the seeds of perpetual power struggles and bloodshed. Between 1958 and 1968, army officers turned their guns against one another and terrorized Iraqis into submission. Their rivalry, along nationalist-communist lines, mirrored that of Iraqi society and was resolved mostly by physical elimination and exclusion. The mentality of the mob prevailed and both groups committed atrocities and massacres that resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of activists and innocent civilians. Iraq became the most violent and volatile country in the region.

Mohamed Heikal, an astute observer of Arab politics, has asserted: "Iraq has always been a border state between civilizations and a place where empires collided and armies clashed. Violence has become ingrained in the Iraqi character."

The bloody upheavals of the 1950s and 1960s transformed Iraq from a semi-constitutional state into a totalitarian one. When the Baathists took over in 1968, they aimed at consolidating their control over society and making Iraq a regional power to be reckoned with. They used blood, iron and oil to enforce their authority. Dissent was forbidden and opponents were summarily executed. By the time Hussein seized control in 1979, the security state was close to swallowing civil society. After the fall of the shah of Iran, the new sultan in Baghdad showed that his political ambitions transcended Iraq. Hussein dreamed of becoming the unchallenged sheriff of the Persian Gulf and the leader of the Arab world. He plunged Iraq into two devastating wars in the Gulf that cost the country hundreds of thousands of human casualties and hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars.

Iraqis, monitored and oppressed since 1958, have lost faith in the political system and turned inward to the safe harbor of tribalism and religious and ethnic factionalism. Every community -- Kurds, Sunnis, Shiites -- fends for itself and has built an "iron wall" to shield its members. Civil society has been crushed and the middle class has been decimated, thanks mainly to the U.N.-led sanctions since 1991. The building blocks and institutions necessary for a functioning polity, let alone a democracy, do not exist. The tragedy of Iraqi politics, and Arab politics in general, is that both the ruling elite and the dominant opposition are anti-liberal and anti-democratic. Society is deeply scarred and its foundations of trust are frayed to the breaking point. Subversion and plotting have replaced natural political processes as the means to obtain power.

If the United States attacks Iraq, Saddam Hussein's regime probably will crumble much faster than expected. He has alienated most social groups, including important elements within his own Takriti clan. But there will likely be resistance from the security forces, the Republican Guards and some Sunni tribes. These forces will fight because their very survival is at stake -- unless the Bush administration provides them with credible assurances of safety.

The United States should have no illusion about either the costs of urban warfare, particularly on Iraqi civilians, or the herculean task of reconstructing a post-Hussein Iraq. A likely scenario is that a U.S. military invasion would result in a civilian massacre. Tribal revenge would probably be exacted, complicating the process of reconciliation and healing. A slaughter in Baghdad would surely deepen mistrust between the ruling Sunni community on the one hand and the Shiites and Kurds on the other.

Initially, a military liberation of Baghdad could unleash joy in the streets of Iraq. But unless the United States is willing to forcefully police the new order for many years to come, Iraq will fracture and descend into chaos, destabilizing its neighbors and giving rise to new jihad groups that will attack Americans. Not only will there be no democracy in Iraq but U.S. vital interests will be endangered.

Copyright © 2002, The Washington Post

The View From Abroad: Transcript: Mideast Expert Fawaz Gerges
ABCNews.com, September 11, 2002

Sept. 11 — One year after the Sept. 11 attacks on America, with the Bush administration considering a preemptive U.S. strike against Iraq, many foreign journalists say anti-U.S. sentiment is on the rise. 

"I think a lot of people see a greedy bully, someone who is prepared to run roughshod over other people's interests," one South African journalist recently told ABCNEWS. 
It was a theme repeated over and over again when ABCNEWS consulted journalists around the world about the way the United States is currently perceived. 
State Department officials, concerned about growing anti-U.S. sentiment in Europe and Russia, as well as the Middle East, recently invited a group of scholars to address the topic at a private conference. 

Why is regard for the United States slipping overseas? 
Fawaz Gerges, an ABCNEWS consultant and professor of Middle Eastern Studies and International Affairs at Sarah Lawrence College, joined an online discussion with our viewers on Wednesday, Sept. 11. The transcript follows. 

Produced and moderated by ABCNEWS.com's Saira Stewart 

Moderator 
Fawaz, welcome. Thanks for joining us.
How do you think the Bush administration is currently perceived abroad, especially in the Arab and Muslim world? 
Fawaz Gerges 
I often travel to the Middle East. I have never seen anti-Americanism as intense and hardened as it is today. Anti-Americanism is across the board. You cannot find a single social political group that has positive views about American foreign policy, particularly that of the Bush administration. 
The dominant narrative in the Arab world is that the Bush administration is insensitive to Muslims' concerns and is determined to dominate the region. A very polarized view of American foreign policy. 
Moderator 
Are people in the Muslim world angry at America and Americans, or just American foreign policy? 
Fawaz Gerges
Most people go out of their way to say that they have nothing against the American people. Their anger is directed against the "unjust" and one-sided policies of the Bush administration. 
But there are some important radical forces who exploit this anti-U.S. foreign policy sentiment to attack both American foreign policy and what America stands for. 
Moderator
What, if anything, can be done to stem the rising tide of anti-U.S. sentiment? 
Fawaz Gerges
We have arrived here not overnight, but over almost 40 years. There is a reservoir of accumulated grievances against the United States. I have come to believe that civil society has a great role to play in building bridges between the two cultures. Americans' relations with the Muslim world are too important to be left to the whims of politicians. 
How do we show the human face of America? How do we build bridges to the other? How do we invest in education, health, and the future of the Muslim youth? It is through engagement by civil society that we might be able to reduce Anti-American sentiment. 
Moderator
Let's talk about Iraq. What do you think about the Bush administration's claim that Saddam Hussein is getting "closer every day" to acquiring nuclear weapons. 
Fawaz Gerges
The weight of evidence does not point in this direction. According to the CIA, Iraq has a few years to [go before] it acquires the needed materials to be able to build up a nuclear bomb. 
Why not apply more rigorous military sanctions? Why not strengthen the current surveillance of Iraq's weapons acquisition? First and foremost, Iraq represents a threat to its own people, not to the outside world. 
Fred asks: 
How would you respond to comparisons of Saddam Hussein and his regime to Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany and the results of not attacking pre-emptively as suggested by Winston Churchill? 
Fawaz Gerges
Iraq is small, little, Third World country that does [not have] the resources to be Hitler's Germany. Surely Saddam Hussein is a bloody dictator, but Iraq is neither Germany nor a state to be counted as world power! 
Moderator
Do you think President Bush has a clear policy on Iraq? 
Fawaz Gerges 
Now he does. Obviously, the administration seems to have made up its mind to attack Iraq. But what do you do after you topple Saddam Hussein? 
Do we have a vision for the post-Hussein regime? Do we have the will to rebuild Iraq, one of the fragmented societies in the Arab world? Do we have the stomach for nation-building in Iraq? In this context, Afghanistan is not a reassuring case. 
Scott Sparks asks:
If most Middle Eastern countries fear or dislike Saddam, why do we not have their support for ousting him instead of anger? Is it fear of pro-U.S. government afterwards? Or is Saddam the one who keeps the Middle East in check? 
Fawaz Gerges
Most Middle East governments are terrified of the aftershocks of an Iraqi earthquake. Most of them are skeptical about U.S. staying power and its willingness to stay engaged. 
Most of them dislike Saddam Hussein but they doubt that the United States will have the stomach or the will to glue Iraqi civil society together after Hussein's fall. 
Moderator
What do people in the Middle East think about the prospect of a preemptive U.S. strike on Iraq? Do they relate it to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? to the Sept. 11 attacks? to President Bush's father and the 1991 Gulf War? 
Fawaz Gerges
The dominant narrative is that Israel controls U.S. foreign policy. It is unfortunate that intelligent men of letters believe that the [reason] the U.S. is planning to attack Iraq is because Israel and its friends want it to do so. 
Mike asks: 
How much do you think America has changed? Are we better prepared, or are we still very much vulnerable to terrorism? 
Fawaz Gerges
It seems that despite the depletion of al Qaeda's human and financial resources, it still has the capacity to visit death and terror on America. 
In the last few days, all the concrete evidence that we have seen points to the fact that al Qaeda is still kicking. Yet it sees the administration is [shifting] the focus from its war on terrorism to a possible attack on Iraq. 
Does such a shift carry risks by playing into bin Laden's hands? I fear it does. 
Moderator
How do you feel about America's response to terrorism? Share your thoughts with others on our message board. 
Many thanks to Fawaz Gerges for joining us — and our thanks to all those who submitted questions.

Copyright © 2003 ABCNEWS Internet Ventures 
 
 

Al Qaeda's Coils Grip the Media; Airwaves and the Internet fall prey to terrorist tactics
The Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2002

Aware of the symbolic power of Sept. 11, Al Qaeda's lieutenants have used media outlets to celebrate and capitalize on this historic moment. Gone is their pretense of denial. Now they have publicly taken full credit for the Sept. 11 attacks and have promised to visit more death and mayhem on the U.S.

Al Qaeda appears to have learned no new lessons about its past suicidal conduct. No second thoughts about killing thousands of innocent American civilians or precipitating a devastating war that has claimed more Muslim
lives. No apologies about tarnishing the name of Islam in the world and jeopardizing the well-being of the Muslim communities in the West. No explanations about initially feeding Arabs and Muslims lies about their
innocence and blindly luring their sons into a deathtrap in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In the last two weeks, Al Jazeera, the leading Arab television network, has broadcast interviews with two of the group's field lieutenants, who admit to helping plan and carry out the Sept. 11 attacks. Blindfolded and driven to a secret location apparently in Pakistan, Al Jazeera's correspondent said he was surprised to find himself seated next to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed--a close associate of the presumed mastermind of the September attacks, Mohamed Atta--and Ramzi Omar, also known as Ramzi Binalshibh, one of the highest-ranking Al Qaeda field lieutenants and one of the most-wanted fugitives in the world. Mohammed and Omar discussed Al Qaeda's organizational skills and its ability to strike at the heart of the U.S. without being detected and promised more attacks to come.

Although it is not the first time Al Qaeda has confessed to the crime--Al Jazeera says it has 19 videotapes by all the hijackers airing their grievances against the U.S.--Mohammed and Omar's acknowledgment timed to coincide with the attacks' first anniversary sheds light on the group's mind-set and desperate quest for recognition.

Hunted down and on the run a year later, Al Qaeda is trying to convince the world that it is still alive and kicking, capable of unleashing terror and death on its enemies. Since its war with the U.S. has not gone as well as it had hoped, Al Qaeda's strategy is designed to motivate hardened foot soldiers and inspire sympathizers to target Americans and continue the fight.

According to Arab and Pakistani sources who are close to Al Qaeda, at the end of 2001, after the Taliban's fall, Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants decided to withdraw their forces to Pakistan and Iran, with a preference for the former because of its proximity and the presence of militant supporters and to organize them in sleeper cells in preparation for future attacks.

Although Pakistani and Iranian authorities arrested dozens of Al Qaeda's fighters, hundreds of others, along with their families, escaped. Some settled in Iran, but most sought refuge in the rugged area along the Pakistani-Afghan border under the protection of tribal elders. Other members of Al Qaeda reportedly used Karachi's access to the Arabian Sea to travel to Oman, Yemen and Somalia.

Al Qaeda appears to be using the September anniversary to reassure these important hidden assets in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Europe and elsewhere and to signal them to be ready and vigilant.

For example, two weeks ago, Bin Laden reportedly released a handwritten letter, posted on the Jihadonline Web site, in which he belittled U.S. power and claimed that it will ultimately be defeated and meet the same fate as that of former empires. Ironically, he called on Afghans, not Arabs (obviously, he has been disappointed with Arab inaction), to rise up against the U.S., which only understands "the language of force and jihad."

On Thursday, Bin Laden's confidant and spokesman, Sulaiman abu Ghaith, on a Web site frequented by militants, published an emotional letter addressed to Al Qaeda's "captives" in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. He claimed that "the moujahedeen will not rest until they liberate their brethren in faith." He did not say how Al Qaeda, which possesses no naval armada, would be capable of sailing the oceans and infiltrating a well-guarded U.S. military base. Perhaps he was insinuating that Al Qaeda might take Americans hostage and then use them as a bargaining chip to gain the
release of its prisoners?

Abu Ghaith's letter might not have provided a concrete plan or map of how to free the prisoners, but, imitating the example of his boss, he included fiery verses of poetry to lift the morale of the troops. This goal--keeping the jihad flames alight and preventing further erosion--lies at the heart of Al Qaeda's celebration.

Abu Ghaith's letter was subsequently posted on Jihadonline, whose manager congratulated himself and Bin Laden, "on this great jihadi anniversary" in which America's nose was bloodied. He urged all brethren to "actively and positively" participate in this special occasion by revisiting terror on the U.S. and thus scoring a major propaganda coup. Jihadonline stressed the important, parallel role of the media in this war. Al Qaeda seems to be fully conscious of the propaganda value of this anniversary and wishes to celebrate it with a big bang.

At the same time the Bush administration is rattling its sword against Iraq, the evidence of Al Qaeda's continuing danger exposes the ineffectiveness of the administration's war on terrorism. Military means are not adequate to deal with the complex phenomenon.

One year after the horrifying events of Sept. 11, our understanding of Al Qaeda's world remains perilously slim.

Until we succeed in developing among our leaders a broader knowledge of the causes and roots of anti-Americanism and begin to grapple with ways to defuse it, we will live with a constant threat to our peace and security.

Copyright © 2002, The Los Angeles Times

Time for an Islamic Enlightenment?
The Star-Ledger, September 08, 2002

The Muslim world has been profoundly shaken by the Sept. 11 attacks and America's war against terrorism. Governments have exploited the moment to repress political opponents of all stripes. Militant Islamists, under pressure, are rethinking their violent tactics. And the policies of the United States -- especially our support for tyrants across the Middle East and beyond -- are facing withering criticism.

Fawaz Gerges, a professor at Sarah Lawrence College, discussed the changes with Deputy Editorial Page Editor Tom Moran. 

How has the Muslim world changed since Sept. 11?

The first impact was an awareness that what Osama bin Laden did was extremely harmful to Arab and Muslim interests. All the polls taken in the Muslim world show that while most respondents agree with bin Laden's criticism of American foreign policy, and dislike America's support for authoritarian Arab regimes, they decisively disagree with his terrorist tactics. 

Many people recognize that Osama bin Laden has done more damage to the Arab and Muslim world than all their enemies together. While some deluded souls were delighted that the United States tasted defeat and humiliation, most realized that by antagonizing the United States, bin Laden and his ilk awakened a sleeping giant, with devastating consequences. 

The Islamic movements -- those who want to establish an Islamic state based on Shari'ah, the Islamic law -- now find themselves in crisis. Both the peaceful mainstream Islamists and the militant groups were casualties of Sept. 11. The movement as a whole has been labeled violent, militant and terroristic. Most Arab and Muslim governments have cracked down not just on militants, but also on mainstream movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other countries. The Islamists have become open targets. 

Is the Islamist movement in retreat?

By the end of the 1990s, most of the (militant) groups in Egypt, Algeria and other countries were strategically defeated. They lost not only on the battlefield, but also in the court of Arab and Muslim public opinion. 

Do the militants see the Sept. 11 attacks as a victory? 

The dominant factions within the militant Islamic groups see Sept. 11 as a disaster. Several books have come out in the last year, particularly in Egypt and Lebanon, arguing that the attacks harmed Arab and Muslim causes. Now they must fight a two-front war, against their own governments and against the power and resources of the United States. 

What's fascinating is that there is a great deal of critical reflection and soul-searching. The militants are reassessing not only their discourse, but their tactics and strategy with regard to terrorism as a means to power. 

A recent United Nations re port concluded that the Arab world is crippled by a lack of freedom, especially among women. Why hasn't democracy taken root in any of the 22 Arab countries?

Some observers explain it by pinning the blame on the Arab and Muslim culture and religion. That's unfortunate. We shouldn't fall into the trap of cultural determinism. The absence of democracy in the Arab world has more to do with politics and economics than with culture and religion, though the latter matter greatly. 

For example, can we understand the lack of democracy now without understanding the dominance of the authoritarian states that have bled their societies dry in the last 50 years? They have restricted open society and stifled civic debate. Arab citizens feel monitored and frightened, thanks to an atmosphere of terror and political oppression. 

As such, the Arab genius has not been released. These authoritarian structures have done considerable damage to the Arab ability to liberalize, engage in healthy, open debate, and to fully embrace modernity. 

The major thesis of the U.N. report is that these problems have more to do with the authoritarian political structure than with Islam, or with Arab or Muslim culture. That is the dominant view, among both Arab and Muslim as well as Western scholars. 

That suggests that democracy could take root in these societies, given the right political and economic reforms. 
That is the point. If you invest in rebuilding civil society, if you gradually open the political system, then you are giving people hope and a stake in the future. There is nothing in the Arab genes that prevent them from creating modern democracies. 

Is the Muslim world in need of its own Enlightenment period, something like the West went through in the 18th century? Is there a need for an intellectual revolution, and a separation between mosque and state?

Yes. But it took the West 300 years to create functioning democratic institutions. The Arab states came into being in the late 1920s. In comparative historical terms, I would argue they have come a long way in 80 years. But the Arab states are still children, finding their way at home and in the world. 

Of course, there's a great deal of upheaval and violence and reaction -- and unfortunately reactionary interpretations of religion are dominant. 

Unlike Europe, though, which saw a major struggle between the liberal construct and the religious/reactionary construct, I don't think we have seen a similar process in the Arab world. Both the dominant opposition and the existing governments are two sides of the same coin when it comes to democracy. They are both anti-democratic and anti- liberal. 

This is the tragedy and predicament of Arab politics. There is no third major liberal force that might offer a way out of this political impasse. There are few democrats in the Arab and Muslim world. The question is: How can you have democracy without democrats? 

Is the United States doing what it can to encourage the gradual political opening you be lieve could lead to democratic government?

The dominant perception throughout Arab and Muslim lands is that security, not democracy, has become the principle concern of American policy after Sept. 11. 

These commentators and civil society leaders point to the actions taken by Arab governments after Sept. 11 -- the crackdown on legitimate opposition, and legislation that restricts political and personal freedom in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt -- and they argue that the United States has given its allies carte blanche to crack down, not just on militants but on mainstream Islamists and other anti-American forces in the region. 

That is how some of them perceive the impact of Sept. 11 as highly detrimental to the prospect of liberalization and open society in the Middle East. 

President Bush last month said the United States would deny any Egyptian requests for more aid in response to the sentencing of democracy activist Said Ibrahim to seven years of hard labor. Is that move encouraging?

I remain skeptical. Does this represent a fundamental shift in how the administration perceives the question of human rights and democracy in the Arab world? Does it signal a new awareness among American policy makers of the need to advance the rule of law? It seems to me that so far the United States has used the question of democracy as a stick against enemies like Saddam Hussein and Yasser Arafat. 

Let's be blunt: Most of America's allies in the region have little respect for human rights and the rule of law. The question is what has the United States done about this since Sept. 11. It seems to me very little, with the exception of a few statements and a few half measures. 

If these countries had elections tomorrow, wouldn't they elect governments that are more hostile toward the United States?

You've put your finger on the critical problem. If you have elections now, in most Arab countries the mainstream Islamist movement will win -- in Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan. Not terrorist groups, but mainstream Islamists. 

They would come to power with the agenda of creating an Islamic state. They'll realize Islam is an easy slogan, but that there is a huge gap between the slogan and political and social reality. A slogan doesn't bring their people butter and bread. What do you do about the dismal state of Arab economies? About foreign policy? They will learn by trial and error. 

So should we be calling for elections in these countries?

No one is suggesting that the United States should give up on its allies overnight, that the change should be dramatic. The challenge for the United States and its allies is how to gradually open the political systems, while maintaining checks and balances in place to protect civil society. 

The first component you must have is the rule of law. Independent courts are critical. When the opposition realizes there are legitimate avenues they can appeal to, then there will be no need to go underground and use violence and terrorism. That is where the United States should be investing, in helping to build independent legal structures. 
The second investment is what I call open civil society. You can't have democracy overnight. You have to educate people on how it functions. You have to reform the education system, and create civil society organizations. 
You also have to separate the military from the civilian political structures. Here the United States can play a decisive role. And finally, you have to develop a solid middle class, who have vested economic interests who will stand up and defend democracy if it is endangered. 

Copyright © 2002, The Star-Ledger

Pressure on Arafat Now Comes From Within
The New York Times, May 17, 2002

Under increased internal and international pressure to reform the Palestinian Authority and put an end to suicide bombings, Yasir Arafat conceded this week that he has made mistakes and promised to institute change. "We are in a great need to review our policies in order to rectify and correct our march toward national independence," he said. He also repeated his opposition to attacks on Israeli civilians, saying, "These operations do not serve our interests." The words sound constructive, but advocates of reform will remain skeptical of Mr. Arafat's genuine commitment to transparency, accountability and power sharing.

A leader of the opposition in the Palestinian legislature, Abdul Jawad Saleh, said of Arafat's speech: "He's not serious. He's serious when there is pressure against him." Although Mr. Arafat is well known for loathing change, it will be hard for him to resist demands from a concerted Palestinian campaign and from the international community to fight corruption, unify the unruly security services, appoint a real cabinet with a prime minister, and establish separation of powers.

Never before has his authority been challenged as it is today. Dissent is now real and widespread among the Palestinians, and outspoken criticism of the authoritarian and corrupt ways of Mr. Arafat's leadership is resonating in the public. Most important, opposition to Mr. Arafat is intensifying among the Palestinian elite, some of whom now accuse him of "militarizing" the intifada, a move that made possible the election of Ariel Sharon as Israel's prime minister.

Particularly promising is a new awareness among many Palestinians that suicide bombings have morally undermined their legitimate cause for an independent state and have been politically and militarily devastating.

Some of Mr. Arafat's loyal aides are calling on him to lead the way out of the political stalemate and bloodshed. Last week, Muhammad Dahlan, security chief in Gaza and a possible successor to Mr. Arafat, confided to a leading Arab journalist in Al Hayat that if Mr. Arafat had accepted his recommendation to sign a cease-fire and end the armed intifada two months ago, Palestinians would have achieved major political gains. He implied that suicide bombings represented a strategic error because they brought the full brunt of the Israeli military on Palestinians' heads. Another powerful figure, Mahmoud Abbas, second in command to Mr. Arafat and a possible successor, ruefully said in Al Hayat, "Arafat should not be the only one in charge of finance."

Dissent is also brewing among the broader Palestinian public. There is considerable anger at the failures of the Palestinian Authority and the existence of personalized centers of power, each with its own agenda. National interests and nation building have been sacrificed to factional and tribal concerns. Thus Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades were able to co-opt the Palestinian Authority, gain popularity at its expense, and gradually impose their fatalistic and violent vision on a besieged Palestinian society. Voices criticizing Mr. Arafat for his indecisiveness - his either turning a blind eye to the armed intifada or actually trying to lead it - are growing louder. The information minister, Yasir Abed Rabbo, recently deplored what he described as Mr. Arafat's lack of a coherent political strategy.

Internal pressures for reforms will only intensify as the people get over their initial shock and rage in the aftermath of the Israeli military incursion. These pressures could force Mr. Arafat's hand as they converge with demands by the world community, especially the United States, for immediate reforms in the Palestinian government. Meanwhile, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are exerting considerable pressure on Mr. Arafat to act against suicide bombings.
Mr. Arafat, by temperament, usually refuses to lead when faced with difficult choices. But this time he will find it extremely hard to postpone taking action against internal corruption and against suicide bombings that have made him a pariah in the eyes of the Bush administration. In fact, if he does act against Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other suicide groups, many Palestinians are likely to support him. Palestinians have paid dearly for the militants' suicidal tactics, which have only empowered the hard-liners in Israel.

Hamas is already feeling the heat of Palestinian civil society. In town hall meetings and in newspaper editorials, Palestinians are debating whether to continue the intifada, end it or channel it in a nonviolent direction. Professional groups, commentators and civic leaders are becoming more vocal and critical in their questioning of the utility of suicide missions, an important change that will ostracize the militants. The Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades, a group closely connected to Mr. Arafat's Fatah movement, has said it will not send more bombers into Israel to kill civilians.

Mr. Arafat enjoyed immense Palestinian support and sympathy when he was held captive under Israeli siege. But the devastated civilian population is not likely to favor him with unquestioning loyalty as people face the wreck of their cities and lives.

The big question is this: Will he offer the Palestinian people peaceful alternatives means to independence? The international community, particularly the United States, must empower Palestinian reformist voices by giving them hope. This means helping Palestinians rebuild their shattered society and their future. It is becoming clear that a just settlement with Israel and internal reform of the Palestinian Authority must go hand in hand.

Copyright © 2002, The New York Times

America must difuse mounting Arab anger
The Baltimore Sun, May 7, 2002

BEIRUT - President Bush's recent success in finding a compromise to end the siege of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and create political momentum, especially his decision to convene a Middle East peace conference this summer, comes none too soon. 

It was not only an important step toward defusing the escalating hostilities between Palestinians and Israelis but was a means of salvaging what is left of declining U.S. influence and preserving America's vital interests in the Arab world. Although previous anti-American sentiments in Muslim lands focused mainly on foreign policy, America itself appears to be under siege in the Middle East today. 

Assaults on the symbols of American prestige and power have become daily occurrences. Throughout the region, U.S. establishments - embassies and cultural and recreational centers - are being picketed and attacked by angry young men and women who accuse the United States of collusion with Israel in its offensive against the Palestinians and providing it with a diplomatic cover. 

Last week in Beirut, I visited McDonald's, Burger King and TGI Fridays, usually crowded with adults and teen-agers. The once-festive atmosphere in these American cultural icons is gone, and managers bemoan their serious business losses. For the first time, young men and women seem to be boycotting these previously popular places as a gesture of solidarity with the Palestinians. 

The dissipation of Muslim empathy for Americans after the hideous attacks of Sept. 11 is one of the main casualties of the Israeli incursion into the West Bank. If winning the war on terrorism, according to Douglas Feith, undersecretary of defense for policy, "requires us to help change the way people think," then this war is already lost. 

The Arab street is boiling with anger at the United States for failing to restrain Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and allegedly giving him "a green light" to destroy the Palestinian Authority. Particularly alarming is the politicization of Arab youth, a constituency that had been apolitical and fascinated with the American idea. 

Placards at a big demonstration near a formerly popular KFC, situated on the Beirut sea front, called for "boycotting American goods." A young woman distributing anti-U.S. flyers said, "America is neither a neutral bystander nor an honest broker. Its fingerprints are all over the blood bath in Palestinian cities." 

Discussions with students, activists and opinion makers indicate a deepening, hardening anti-Americanism. Many Arabs, regardless of their background, no longer distinguish between Israel and the United States. They blame Americans for the misfortunes that have befallen their world. 

The U.S.-educated Arab elite has been harshly critical of the United States. For example, a young philosophy scholar, educated at Columbia University and the University of Chicago, said after my lecture at the American University in Beirut last week, "The U.S. position on the peace process is much worse than that of Israel." 

This blanket assertion reflects the angry Arab mood and Arabs' frustration with Washington's perceived insensitivity and hostility toward Muslims. Opinion makers and commentators keep the public's fire raging. 

It is unclear if the U.S. foreign policy establishment appreciates the inherent risks to American citizens and national interests. Too little attention is being paid in Washington to the reverberations of the Middle East crisis on U.S. national security. Administration officials ignore the rising anti-American tide at their own peril. 

President Bush laid down the broad contours of a fair peace settlement: terminating Israeli military occupation and establishing a viable Palestine state politically and economically in return for Israel's security and its integration into the regional landscape. 

U.S. vital interests require a sustained diplomatic effort to defuse Israeli-Palestinian hostilities that fuel anti-Americanism. Mr. Bush's recent initiatives to calm the deteriorating situation, which include the proposed summer Middle East peace conference, represent a step in the right direction. Containing the violence and restarting a substantive political dialogue must be given immediate priority.

More than ever, now is the time for political clarity and decisiveness, not for diplomatic ambiguity. Nothing less than America's moral authority, credibility and world peace is at stake. 

Copyright © 2002, The Baltimore Sun

You Can't Set the Peace Table Without Arafat
The Los Angeles Times, April 12, 2002 

While President Bush finally has laid out clear markers for all parties in the Middle East crisis, his pronounced disregard for Yasser Arafat could cripple the efforts of Secretary of State Colin Powell to reach a cease-fire and start a substantive political dialogue.

The combination of the president's ambiguous signals about Arafat's eligibility to represent the Palestinians, his open distrust of Arafat and his hope that other Palestinian leaders will step up and negotiate with the U.S. is a recipe for failure.

Pro-U.S. Arab leaders have impressed on Powell the need not to discredit Arafat before his people and have urged Powell to not seek other political figures with whom to build ties. The pulse of the Palestinian street and the internal balance of power indicate that no credible Palestinian would dare to step forward and offer an alternative vision to that of Arafat's, let alone deal directly with the Israelis and Americans.

Time is running out for constructive engagement and decisive action.

The most urgent task is to stop the bloodshed and break the current deadlock.

Despite his shortcomings, Arafat remains the most equipped Palestinian leader to enforce a cease-fire, negotiate a viable settlement with Israel and sell that agreement to skeptics and critics. Far from rendering him irrelevant, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's attack on him and his people has resurrected Arafat's sagging leadership at home and in the Arab world and made him the indisputable symbol of Palestinian national resistance.

Notwithstanding the poor quality of his leadership at home, Arafat is seen by most Palestinians as their legitimate representative and the symbol of their national aspirations.

By design and default, Arafat embodies the Palestinians' ceaseless quest for nationhood, a homeland and freedom.

While many Israelis view Arafat as the enemy and want him expelled or killed, such a move would deepen the Palestinians' sense of victimization and humiliation, thus undermining the prospects for reconciliation and coexistence between the two peoples.

Even if Sharon ultimately succeeds in getting rid of Arafat, it is doubtful that new Palestinian leadership would be more tractable or inclined to stop the armed intifada or make further concessions for peace.

Moreover, there is no potential leader waiting in the wings. Under Arafat's rule, the security apparatus--particularly the intelligence-gathering unit--is deeply entrenched; any future succession will revolve around three or four senior security chiefs and a few civilian members of Arafat's inner circle. None has an independent power base with which to challenge Arafat.

Discrediting or ousting Arafat likely would unleash political upheaval among the Palestinians and lead to an intensification of suicide bombings on an even wider scale.

Given the absence of entrenched and effective institutions, Arafat's dismissal, coupled with the destruction of his governing Palestinian Authority, would further weaken the only centralized power that possesses the means to maintain law and order.

Neutralizing Arafat would intensify, not arrest, the armed struggle. Far from advancing the cause of peace, the Bush administration's effort to sideline and bypass Arafat will backfire and undermine Powell's current mission and the administration's promising new initiative.

Throughout the Muslim lands, die-hard, sworn enemies of Arafat have heaped praise on him for refusing to buckle under pressure.

More than ever, he is indispensable to reaching a peace agreement with the Jewish state and making it stick.

No one else has the political weight to do so.

Unlike previous junctures, it is in Arafat's and the Palestinians' interests to respond positively to the new U.S. political initiative. Palestinian militants would think twice before challenging a comprehensive, legitimate settlement signed by Arafat, lest they antagonize public opinion.

Now is the time for the United States to actively engage the Palestinian leadership.

Copyright © 2002, The Los Angeles Times

No Stopping the Intifada
The Los Angeles Times, March 29, 2002

The suicide bombing that killed at least 20 Israelis celebrating Passover reflects the dramatic changes that have occurred in Palestinian society since the outbreak of the intifada 18 months ago.

Even though Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat said Thursday that he was ready to implement an unconditional cease-fire, his ability and willingness to enforce one is almost nonexistent.

The armed intifada has brought about an internal political realignment undermining Arafat and strengthening those who favor continuing attacks against Israel. Never before has Palestinian society been as militarized and radicalized, thanks to a deepening sense of powerlessness and loss. A new and strong consensus has emerged among Palestinians that the attacks are making the occupation too costly for Israel to endure indefinitely. They believe that they have created a balance of terror with their powerful enemy, using suicide bombings to counter Israel's military strength. In the eyes of the Palestinians, this balance is the key to forcing Israel to agree to the creation of a viable Palestinian state.

Old rivals, such as Hamas and Arafat's own Fatah faction, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which mistrusted one another and vied for influence, now agree that Washington's cease-fire efforts only undermine Palestinian national aspirations and consolidate Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's hard-line position.

They insist that armed struggle and terrorism are the most effective means to force Israel to withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territories and remove the settlements.

This new realignment of political forces, ushering in tactical coordination between the Islamists and secularists, has put Arafat and his security lieutenants on the defensive and has made it virtually impossible to enforce any cease-fire.

Palestinian officials reportedly are angry and disappointed with U.S. special envoy Anthony C. Zinni's emphasis on security issues and his neglect of politics. As one official involved with the negotiations said, all Zinni's proposal does "is to stop the violence. It doesn't do anything about our interest in addressing the root causes."

Given the lack of a clear political horizon, Arafat is unlikely to take concrete steps to implement the plan drawn up by CIA Director George J. Tenet to enforce a cease-fire. It is not in his interest to do so. In the face of overwhelming military and diplomatic pressure, Arafat may promise, with little prospect of success, to crack down on violence.

In particular, Arafat recognizes the inherent dangers in trying to disarm young, hardened fighters with no tangible political concessions. He is averse to risking popular rage and even civil war at home and being further sidelined by Sharon. The latter's actions--branding Arafat irrelevant, confining him to Ramallah and invading Palestinian territories--have backfired and have compounded Israel's security dilemma.

Far from being beaten into political acquiescence, the Palestinians have improved their combat techniques and become more experienced and daring. No degree of American and Israeli diplomatic pressure will persuade Palestinian activists to stop their attacks. A cease-fire unaccompanied by substantive peace negotiations either will not hold or will be short-lived.

The problem is how to address Israeli security concerns while bringing political questions into the negotiations giving the Palestinians a stake in the future. In this context, Washington's narrowing of the Zinni mandate to deal solely with security issues does not augur well for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

The Arab League's unanimous adoption this week of the Saudi peace initiative might provide a way out, but only if the U.S. gets more actively engaged in pushing the protagonists toward a real settlement. The critical question is: How can the U.S. translate this sweeping initiative into hard currency?

One would hope that the administration sustains its involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli track by focusing not just on security but also on political questions regarding the broad contours of a settlement. This broader focus holds the key to reassuring the desperate Palestinians and providing security for the Israelis, thus putting an end to the bloodshed.

Copyright © 2002, The Los Angeles Times

Intensify efforts to reach Muslims
The Baltimore Sun, originally published March 21, 2002

BRONXVILLE, N.Y. -- It appears that neither the Sept. 11 attacks nor the Bush administration's public diplomacy have dented anti-American sentiments in Muslim countries. 

A majority of Muslims still harbor deep resentment toward the United States and its foreign policies, according to a recent Gallup Poll conducted in December and January in nine Muslim countries -- Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan and Kuwait. 

Despite Washington's effort to make the case for its war in Afghanistan, 77 percent of all respondents believe that its military action is not morally justified; 53 percent view the United States "very" unfavorably. More alarming is that only 18 percent of all respondents think that Arabs were behind the Sept. 11 attacks and some believe that elements within the United States or Israel likely were behind them. 

Based on nearly 10,000 face-to-face interviews with adults in these countries, the findings support, not alter, existing evidence that anti-Americanism has become a staple of Muslim politics. 

They also indicate that the United States has garnered little, if any, popular support for its war on terrorism throughout the Muslim world and that its message has fallen on deaf ears. This is worrisome, particularly since the U.S. war on terrorism has just begun, and it questions the efficacy of U.S. public diplomacy grounded in a short-term, superficial campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of Muslim populations. 

U.S. officials do not seem to appreciate how hardened and widespread anti-Americanism is in Muslim societies and how difficult it is to change people's perceptions simply by relying on propaganda and spin. 

For example, President Bush, asked about the Gallup Poll, said that if the United States shows leadership in the war on terrorism, "the world will follow." Not really. While the United States might be able to twist the arms of its Muslim allies to join the campaign on terror, it will not be able to influence Muslim public opinion without direct and full engagement with local societies. 

The Bush administration must adopt a farsighted, longer-term strategy to aggressively compete in the war of ideas and persuade the large "floating middle" of Muslim public opinion that it is committed to promoting human rights, peace and development in Muslim societies. The United States must also directly explain to Muslims the rationale for its foreign policies and make these policies more palatable to them. 

A critical analysis of the recent poll's findings, coupled with field studies, points to important lessons that U.S. officials might use to build bridges to Muslim communities and reverse the dominant hostile trend there: 

Lesson 1: The more open Muslim societies are, the less anti-American they tend to be. Lebanon and Turkey, two of the freest countries in the Muslim world, had the highest number of respondents who viewed the United States favorably, with 41 percent saying they view America in a positive light. In contrast, the most negative views of the United States were registered by respondents ruled by autocratic regimes in which there are few outlets for political dissent. U.S. vital interests are served not by cozying up to Muslim dictators but rather by nudging them to gradually reform their authoritarian structures. 

Lesson 2: Many respondents pointed to U.S. policies, not cultural or civilizational barriers, as the source of friction. They even praised American accomplishments and freedoms. This is good news because it is much more difficult to deal with culture than with politics. The Palestinian question emerges as the dominant issue in how Muslims perceive the United States. A sustained and concerted U.S. effort to reduce escalating Palestinian-Israeli hostilities and broker a peace settlement would reduce anti-American feelings considerably. 

Lesson 3: The gloomy findings of the survey should not obscure a generational divide that separates the views of Arab youths from their elders and ultimately holds optimism for the future. This father-son split manifests itself in differing attitudes toward the United States and broader social and political issues. Over the last three years and in six Arab countries, I interviewed hundreds of college students, many of whom held overwhelmingly positive attitudes toward American culture. Although foreign policy figured prominently in the students' discussions, their idea of America revolved around its "soft" power and the endless possibilities that capitalism and open society could hold for them. 

The importance of this generational divide lies in the demographic shifts in most Muslim countries, where 65 percent of the population is under 25. It has the potential not only to change the nature of U.S.-Muslim relations but also to shape the sociopolitical landscape in the Islamic world. 

The United States can expedite this process by directly investing in the future of these promising young people -- women and men -- and giving them hope. The irony is that we can either drive them to the Osama bin Laden camp or give them the wherewithal to take charge of their own destinies. 

There are limits to what the United States can do to influence perceptions in the Muslim world. Some elements that are irrevocably hostile to the United States will not be reached or reasoned with. The challenge facing the United States lies in reaching the large "floating middle" of young Muslim society. 
 

Fawaz A. Gerges holds the Christian A. Johnson Chair in Middle Eastern Studies and International Affairs at Sarah Lawrence College in New York and is author of the forthcoming The Islamists and the West. 

Copyright © 2002, The Baltimore Sun 

What's Behind the New Arab Momentum
The New York Times, March 15, 2002

BRONXVILLE, N.Y. - As expected, Vice President Dick Cheney's mission to the Middle East has been drawn into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Bush administration appears to have seen this coming and has reacted with speed and skill. President Bush rebuked Israel on Wednesday for its invasion of Palestinian territory. The administration also authored a Security Council resolution, which passed, calling for a cease-fire and "affirming a vision of a region where two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side." The State Department called for a "complete withdrawal" of Israeli forces from Palestinian areas, and the president's envoy, Gen. Anthony Zinni, arrived last night to help broker a cease-fire.

These developments do not mean the Iraq focus is lost, only that any major American policy initiative in the region must pass through Israel and Palestine if it is to get anywhere else. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other pro-American powers fear that the Palestinian predicament, televised every day, will rally the Islamist opposition and other alienated people within their societies - and will exacerbate their crises of authority, exposing their many flaws as well as their subservience to the United States.

Time and again, Palestine has been used and abused by Arab rulers and their opponents as a political tool to garner public support. It is one of the most important identity issues in Arab politics, which is why competing social forces in Egypt or Saudi Arabia, for example, often distinguish themselves from each other by how they talk about Israel. Genuine local concerns in these countries - problems of modernization, relations with the West, the appropriate social roles of religion, the balance between national and Arab identities - are often defined in relation to Palestine and Israel, as if the problems were really there and not in Cairo or Riyadh. This is without question a dysfunctional way of practicing politics. But it is real enough and cannot be ignored, certainly not if the American goal is to change an Arab regime in Baghdad.

The actual conflict between Israel and Palestine may or may not be at a turning point. But the ability of Arab states to deal domestically with the intensification of that conflict may indeed be at such a point. Arab League members are now speaking very seriously of normalizing relations with Israel. For the first time in this hundred-year struggle between Arabs and the Jewish state, a consensus exists in the Arab world regarding peace with Israel, based not on the previous land-for-peace formula but on full normalization of cultural, economic and political relations between the protagonists. 

Today the Arab establishment, even former hard-liners like Syria and Libya, accepts a settlement that recognizes the existence of Israel and its integration into the regional landscape. The Saudi Arabian peace initiative, anchored within this new vision, has been embraced by pivotal Arab states, including Syria. Although the Syrian regime kept silent at first, President Bashar Assad has since fully endorsed the proposal. Neither the pariah Iraqi regime nor Iran, both of which oppose the current peace process, has criticized the Saudi plan. It is more than likely that the Arab League will ratify this consensus at its meeting later this month.

Arab leaders recognize the need to offer full peace for full withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders. Arab officials are also reported to entertain accepting the Jewish state's sovereignty over the Wailing Wall and Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. The right of return for Palestinian refugees and the precise frontiers of the state of Palestine would be worked out directly by Palestinian and Israeli negotiators.

While success is not assured, this shift in the Arab position lays the foundation for a breakthrough. Previously, the Arab consensus was that peace with Israel did not require full normalization. It was claimed that Arabs would be unable to bear seeing the Israeli flag above embassies in Damascus, Riyadh, Beirut and Algiers. This belief no longer holds.

The new Arab approach provides Palestinian leaders with crucial political and cultural support to help them accept and sell compromises on the painful question of refugees and on adjustment of borders, and to help them parry opposition from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other Islamists. The new stance should also reassure Israelis of the pacific intentions of their neighbors and prepare them to make concessions like the recognition of East Jerusalem as capital of Palestine and the removal of most West Bank settlements.

Even if the present Israeli and Palestinian leadership is unable to seize the new momentum, the Saudi initiative, if developed further, would dramatically shift political dynamics in both societies. Neither Ariel Sharon nor Yasir Arafat could survive politically if he were to oppose a sweeping settlement firmly backed by the United States and the Arab nations. Despite the terrible recent bloodshed, a great many people in both societies still support the peace process.

Capitalizing on this momentum will serve American vital interests. Helping to resolve this prolonged conflict will remove one of Muslims' major grievances against the United States - and, over time, ease the security obsessions of many Arab nations and Israel as well. It might even gain Arab support for a change of regime in Iraq, should that seem necessary. By taking risks on Mideast peace, this administration's war on terrorism could be made more effective and less costly.

Copyright © 2002, The New York Times Company

Palestinians Must Take Charge of Their Own Destiny
The Los Angeles Times, February 20, 2002 

The escalation in Palestinian-Israeli hostilities overshadows an equally daunting political challenge facing Palestinians: their lack of visionary leadership and the absence of a public debate on this critical issue. With the exception of a few courageous voices, Palestinians and the Arab world have refrained from publicly discussing Yasser Arafat's dismal failings with regard to peace negotiations and the urgent task of nation-building. 

Arab and Muslim colleagues confide to me that they fear that criticizing Arafat's autocratic conduct would play into Israeli hands, particularly the ruling Likud government, which is trying to destroy Arafat and his Palestinian Authority. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's besiegement and humiliation of Arafat compel Palestinians to side with their nationalist leader. Sharon's destructive methods are producing the opposite of their intended results. 

Tragically, Palestinians appear to be repeating the costly mistakes committed by their Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi brethren, who sacrificed economic and political development at the altar of security and the fight against the "Zionist entity," losing both battles in the process. Palestinians are at a crossroads and no longer can afford to blindly trust a bankrupt leadership. Arafat has squandered humble but important achievements that were hard-won by Palestinians over the last two decades. Closedminded and authoritarian, Arafat has not digested three of the most critical lessons in the prolonged Arab-Israeli conflict. 

* Lesson one: Violence and terrorism against Israeli civilians undermine, not strengthen, the legitimate Palestinian cause by empowering the hard-liners in Israel who oppose a sweeping peace settlement. 

Instead of building bridges directly to the Israeli public and informing his people of the requirements of peace, Arafat spent more time abroad, conducting shuttle diplomacy. He also spent more time abroad than in communicating with Palestinians. 

The academic debate about who is accountable for igniting the armed Al Aqsa intifada overlooks the fact that violence and terrorism threaten not only to destroy Arafat and his Palestinian Authority but also Palestinian nationalist aspirations. 

* Lesson two: Despite signing the 1993 Oslo accords, Arafat continues to pursue the illusion of an Arab option.

Although Arab rulers pay lip service to the plight of the Palestinians, they have not translated their rhetoric into real currency. Since the outbreak of the intifada 17 months ago and after two Arab summits, Arab rulers pledged billions in U.S. dollars to aid the collapsing Palestinian economy but delivered little of this promised aid. 

Palestinians should not expect much concrete assistance from the Arab summit in March because the Arab world is deeply divided over the Palestine question. While Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf countries call for an end to the intifada and a return to the negotiating table, Syria and Lebanon oppose giving up armed resistance. 

Mainstream Israelis--some of whom have become skeptical--must be convinced of the limited nature of the Palestinians' nationalist aspirations. 

* Lesson three: Socialized into the chaotic street politics of Jordan in the 1960s and 1970s and of Lebanon in the 1970s and early 1980s, Arafat took what he learned and applied it to the Palestinian situation: He behaved much more like a militia boss than a statesman confronting the challenge of constructing a democratic state. 

By failing to understand the real sources of Israeli power, Arafat, using corruption as a tool to consolidate his political control and marginalize opposition, built a bloated bureaucracy and several security agencies beholden to his will. 

Shattered were the high hopes pinned on Palestinians to avoid imitating the deadly models of Arab militarism and authoritarianism and to chart, instead, a more liberal path.

The result is that his Palestinian Authority lacks moral legitimacy in the eyes of the world and many Palestinian citizens as well. 

Unfortunately, the Palestinian cause has become synonymous with Arafat to the detriment of the former. Yet Palestinians remain ambivalent about taking their leader to task and holding him accountable for his wrongful deeds, thanks mainly to Sharon's shortsighted policies and his brutal crackdown. The Palestinian public is terrified of what the future holds after Arafat's departure.

In the final analysis, Arafat's dismal failure to nourish an open society and develop transparent institutions likely will have as much lasting negative effects on Palestinians as the current setback in peace talks and the devastating Israeli onslaught. 

Sooner rather than later, Palestinians and Israelis will recognize their common interests and make the needed painful compromises to settle their differences. 

But the autocratic and security-oriented apparatus installed by Arafat will take years if not decades to dismantle. This culture of authoritarianism and cult of personality have already wreaked havoc in Arab politics, deepened public cynicism and fueled intolerance and extremism. 

In the absence of legitimate authority, competing parallel authorities tend to fill the vacuum. 

It is no wonder that militant groups, such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and others, have gained popularity at the expense of Arafat's Palestinian Authority. 

Regardless of who is in power in Israel, the longer Palestinians postpone the inevitable--which is to say, initiating a frank, open discussion about the nature and form of their future leadership and government--the more the Palestinians risk being oppressed further and perpetuating their prolonged tragedy. 

Copyright © 2002, The Los Angeles Times

The Arab Tide Turns Against Bin Laden
The Los Angeles Times, January 4, 2002 

Abstract:
Bin Laden had hoped that by killing thousands of innocent Americans he could make the U.S. lash out angrily and murderously against Muslims, thus precipitating a clash of civilizations. But the Bush administration did not play into his hands, and the Muslim community did not rise up. Although surveys showed that 40% of Arabs sympathized with Bin Laden's criticism of the U.S. and the pro- Western regimes it supports, they rejected his terrorist methods.

Bin Laden's loss of the propaganda war does not imply that the United States has won. Poll results show that anti-American sentiment is a staple of Arab politics. Today, to be politically conscious in the Arab world is to be highly suspicious of the United States, its foreign policies, values and institutions. In the eyes of many Arabs and Muslims, Bin Laden or no Bin Laden, the United States has become a scapegoat for the ills and misfortunes that befell their world in the second half of the last century.

Full Text:
While the world awaits a determination of Osama bin Laden's fate, many Arabs and Muslims are coming to terms with his destructive legacy. Whether he is found dead or alive, he is unlikely to be viewed as a hero or a martyr.

The decisive military defeat handed to Bin Laden in Afghanistan has discredited him in the eyes of most Arabs and has shattered his well-constructed image as a holy warrior. He has lost the battle for the hearts and minds of the "floating middle" of Muslim public opinion.

Even those Arab multitudes who initially flirted with Bin Ladenism out of anger with the United States have now discovered that his inflated rhetoric was more thin air than real. Not only did he not put up a credible fight against the anti-Taliban forces and their U.S. allies, but he lured thousands of deluded foot soldiers into a deathtrap in Afghanistan.

People in that part of the world are fed up with losers, who often abuse their political naivete and who promise them the world only to bring defeat and death in the end. Bin Laden's raw tribalism rings true in Arab ears: "When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like the strong horse."

Bin Laden proved to be less a strong horse than a paper tiger.

As the dust settles on the field of battle in Afghanistan, Arabs are recognizing the incalculable damage wrought by Bin Laden. With the exception of a few naive souls intoxicated by the culture of martyrdom, support for Bin Laden and his ilk appears to have evaporated quicker than expected. Instead of seeing him as living up to his claims of advancing the cause of Islam, Arab commentators accuse him of hijacking a peaceful religion and making it, in the eyes of many Westerners, synonymous with terrorism. They also blame him for undermining the Palestinian cause.

Equally important, Bin Laden's defiance and subsequent defeat will also deepen the sense of Arab victimization and encourage Middle Eastern regimes to suspend political reforms and crack down harder on opponents.

Bin Laden had hoped that by killing thousands of innocent Americans he could make the U.S. lash out angrily and murderously against Muslims, thus precipitating a clash of civilizations. But the Bush administration did not play into his hands, and the Muslim community did not rise up. Although surveys showed that 40% of Arabs sympathized with Bin Laden's criticism of the U.S. and the pro- Western regimes it supports, they rejected his terrorist methods.

Do not be misled by the noisy cheerleading for Bin Laden in some Islamist quarters. Most Arabs and Muslims do not subscribe to Bin Laden's apocalyptic nightmare and see through his inflammatory rhetoric. It was only the majority's apathy that enabled the activist pro-Bin Laden camp to misinform, propagandize and distort political sensibilities in the Muslim arena.

However, Bin Laden's loss of the propaganda war does not imply that the United States has won. Poll results show that anti-American sentiment is a staple of Arab politics. Today, to be politically conscious in the Arab world is to be highly suspicious of the United States, its foreign policies, values and institutions. In the eyes of many Arabs and Muslims, Bin Laden or no Bin Laden, the United States has become a scapegoat for the ills and misfortunes that befell their world in the second half of the last century.

Bin Ladenism taps into the Arab sense of victimization and the deep reservoir of accumulated grievances against the United States. With the Taliban vanquished and the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan destroyed, the challenge facing the U.S. is to tackle the deepening anti-Americanism in the region by reassessing the efficacy and fairness of its foreign policies.

Yet there are limits to what U.S. policymakers can do to reduce social discontent in the world of Islam. Arabs and Muslims must take charge of their political destiny by seizing the initiative from Bin Ladenism and charting a new liberal, humanist path. Blaming the other- -the West--is an easy escape from addressing the real conditions that give rise to and sustain backwardness, underdevelopment, extremism and intolerance.

Will the defeat of Bin Ladenism serve as a catalyst for the Arabs to rise to the challenge and fully join modernity?

Copyright © 2002, The Times Mirror Company; Los Angeles Times. All rights reserved.

Islamists put Arafat's back against the wall
The Baltimore Sun, December 9, 2001

BRONXVILLE, N.Y. - Militant Islamists have seized the political initiative from Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and have undermined his negotiating position in the current peace efforts by antagonizing the Israeli public, whose support is critical for Palestinian statehood. 

The stakes are very high, not just for Mr. Arafat's political survival but, ore important, for the future of the Palestinians. Mr. Arafat confronts daunting tasks in responding to Hamas' bloody methods and in seizing the political initiative from the seasoned and effective Islamists. 

In this context, Mr. Arafat faces a three-pronged challenge: 

How to counter the influence and power of the militant Islamists, who, since the outbreak of the intifada more than a year ago, have gained public support at the expense of the Palestinian Authority and other political forces. 

How to stem the steady erosion of internal support for his authoritarian rule. 

How to obtain necessary external incentives, particularly from an ambivalent U.S. administration and a hostile Israeli government, to regain credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of a skeptical and bleeding Palestinian community. 

In the final analysis and regardless of the brutality of the Israeli military
occupation, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have done considerable damage to the legitimate Palestinian cause, internally and externally. Their strategy of establishing a "balance of terror" with the right-wing government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has been costly to Palestinians and Israelis alike and counterproductive as well. Mr. Sharon feels emboldened with a popular mandate to invade Palestinian-controlled territory and threatens to destroy the Palestinian Authority and the prospects for genuine peace. 

In the eyes of many Westerners, the plight of the besieged and occupied Palestinian people is now overshadowed by Hamas' systematic and deadly terrorist attacks targeting Israeli civilians. 

The suicidal tactics of Hamas and Islamic Jihad are ensuring that the Palestinians will lose the moral high ground. The world finds it difficult to empathize with the suffering Palestinians, who are themselves victims of violence, when many of them suspend their critical judgment and humanism and applaud Hamas' terrorist attacks against Israelis. 

But cracking down against the radical Islamists and arresting their leaders and rank and file will not on its own enable Mr. Arafat to defuse the crisis at home and earn him the world's respect for which he hungers. 

The challenge is to try to influence and shape Palestinian public opinion on the question of peace and empower, not marginalize, civil society to provide humanist alternatives to Hamas' extremist project. 

Mr. Arafat's autocratic and corrupt ways and equivocation on the use of violence, along with Israel's prolonged occupation, are partly responsible for the rise in the influence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. His failure to provide Palestinians with security and dignity and legitimate and transparent institutions has pushed many of them into the Islamists' arms. The danger is that more Palestinians might join the latter's ranks. 

Despite his waning popularity, Mr. Arafat is still viewed as a powerful symbol of Palestinian nationalism and retains a deep residue of support within Palestinian society. He can be most effective by using the symbols of Palestinian nationalism to redefine the political debate less as a zero sum game, as Hamas and Islamic Jihad would like the Palestinians to believe, and more as a give-and-take bargaining process. 

Mr. Arafat must stress the importance of nonviolent struggle as the most effective path to achieve Palestinian independence. 

He still possesses the military means to tame the militant Islamists, but it remains to be seen if he has the vision to transform the Palestinian political landscape. 

A thin line exists between peace and all-out conflict in the area, with critical implications for regional stability and Washington's ability to hold together a coalition against terrorism. 

The Bush administration must redouble its efforts to nudge the Palestinians and Israelis to return to the negotiating table. The United States can be most effective not only by exerting pressure on the Palestinian Authority to quell violence but by offering hope to the "floating middle" of Palestinian public opinion, which still supports the peace process, and providing a road map that shows a way out of the morass. 

Copyright © 2001, The Baltimore Sun

Saudi Arabia Must Stand Up to Bin Laden
The Los Angeles Times, November 21, 2001

Despite Saudi Arabia's efforts to cooperate with the U.S. in the war on terrorism, there is reason to believe that Osama bin Laden's existential threat to the House of Saud has not sunk in yet. His crusade is as much directed against the "infidel" Saudi rulers as it is against their American "masters."

We should not minimize the positive Saudi response, albeit slow, to requests by U.S. officials to confirm the Saudi identities of 15 of the 19 hijackers, to block bank accounts with links to terrorist groups and to arrest some of Bin Laden's associates and sympathizers. Further, in an unprecedented move for the royal family, some of its influential members have been vehemently critical not only of Bin Laden's destructive message but also of religious extremism and militancy in general.

Yet the Saudis have shied away from fully joining the U.S. campaign against terrorism and the Al Qaeda organization. A look at one of Bin Laden's videotapes gives us a clue as to why. A recent study at Columbia University of the two?hour Bin Laden recruiting videotape shows that, despite his rhetoric of pan?Islamism, Bin Laden is first and foremost concerned about his homeland, Saudi Arabia. His main goal is to deny the legitimacy of the royal family in order to topple it.

Standing in front of a wall?size map of the world??a symbol of the extent of purification that he sets out for his Muslim audience??Bin Laden cries: "The crusaders and the Jews have joined together to invade the heart of [the Abode of Islam]: our most sacred places in Saudi Arabia, Mecca and Medina, including the Prophet's Mosque."

To dramatize his assertion that the U.S. military presence in the Saudi kingdom profanes Islam, throughout the tape Bin Laden interweaves images of American troops with those of former U.S. presidents fraternizing with Saudi rulers. The purpose is to show that the latter have failed to protect Islam's sacred places and have forsaken their religious responsibilities. Worse, he asserts, "infidel" American soldiers, particularly women, roam freely in the land where the Prophet was born and the Koran was revealed.

Of all the Muslim countries, with the exception of Pakistan, Bin Laden's message resonates the most with alienated young Saudi men, who make up more than half of the population. In the last two years, Bin Laden succeeded in recruiting hundreds, if not thousands, of Saudi youngsters into his Al Qaeda organization, a critical shift in his recruitment strategy. The fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, and that some financing and planning for the attacks occurred on Saudi soil, reveals the susceptibility of Saudi men to Bin Laden's message. Although conditions in Saudi Arabia do not resemble those in Iran in the late 1970s, social and religious upheaval exists more deeply under the surface.

Bin Laden and his fanatical ilk cannot be appeased or bribed away but must be confronted head?on. The Saudi establishment's strategy of using religion as a legitimizing device and its channeling of hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars to various Islamic movements, including the Taliban, have proved to be potentially self?destructive. The Saudis have unwittingly empowered the Bin Laden phenomenon.

A clean break with past policies is needed. Instead of either trying to appease Islamic militancy by co?opting it or forcing legitimate opposition to go underground, the Saudis must gradually open up their closed system and integrate the rising social classes into the political field. An outlet of political expression is urgently needed to stem the steady degradation of support to Saudi rule. Throwing money at the problem or burying their heads in the sand will not enable the Saudis to overcome this formidable challenge.

Saudi Arabia must take the lead in putting the Islamic genie back in the bottle before it is too late.

Copyright © 2001, The Los Angeles Times
 
 

A Time of Reckoning
The New York Times, October 8, 2001

For Muslims of the Middle East and south and central Asia, the moment of reckoning arrived yesterday. The Bush administration has made what are, for an American government, extraordinary efforts to show that the war that began Sept. 11 will not be the war Osama bin Laden wants: a battle between Islam and the rest of the world, particularly the United States. Whether Muslims in the region accept, encourage and further this American effort will determine much of their fate in coming years. It will also determine how effective the war against terrorism will be. 

The outlook does not, for the moment, seem bright. A week ago I participated in a conference in Beirut on how Arabs and Muslims should respond to the campaign against terrorism. Present were leading political activists and politicians representing the broad spectrum of public opinion in the Muslim world. Despite the efforts of President George W. Bush to allay the fears of Arabs and Muslims by stressing that the United States will wage a relentless war on terrorism and its state sponsors, not on Islam and its adherents, the American message seemed to have fallen on deaf ears. Liberals, leftists and Arab nationalists sounded as suspicious of American war aims as the representative from Hezbollah. 

Most participants claimed that the United States aims at far more than destroying Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization and toppling the Taliban regime. These representatives of the Muslim world were almost unanimously suspicious of America's intentions, believing that the United States has an overarching strategy which includes control of the oil and gas resources in Central Asia, encroachment on Chinese and Russian spheres of influence, destruction of the Iraqi regime, and consolidation of America's grip on the oil-producing Persian Gulf regimes. 

Many Muslims suspected the Bush administration of hoping to exploit this tragedy to settle old scores and assert American hegemony in the world. This was despite the fact, unacknowledged by the conference participants, that the terror attack has forced the young president to shift focus from his domestic agenda to the world arena and that he has been dragged to war against his own will. 

Compounding the discrepancy between American and Middle Eastern perspectives is a genuine skepticism about the culpability of Muslims in the terror attacks. Engrained suspicions raised by Muslim opinion makers reflect deeply held sentiments among the general public.

Many Middle Easterners with whom I spoke advanced conspiracy theories to explain what had happened. A Christian director of a Western bank in Beirut claimed that only ''international Zionism possessed the means and the will to undertake this hideous act.'' These nonsensical views are held by both the man on the street and some in the intelligentsia. It remains to be seen whether the pitilessly aggressive statements by Mr. bin Laden and Al Qaeda spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith will erase such beliefs among the Muslim public. 

Those individuals who did accept the culpability of the Arab perpetrators usually drew a comparison between the terror attacks on America and shortsighted, unjust American policies that have alienated and antagonized most of the rising social classes in the region. In short, they believed America has reaped what it sowed. 

Most of the participants, who represent the pulse of mainstream Muslim public opinion, strongly cautioned their governments against joining the American coalition on terrorism and warned that people would oppose any sustained military assault on a Muslim country, including Afghanistan. 

To date, the United States' case for war against terrorist networks has not been effectively communicated to Arabs and Muslims. America's representatives abroad have yet to engage civil society leaders and opinion makers in the Muslim world and fully explain the nature and purpose of Washington's strategy. The earlier ambivalence of Arab and Muslim governments, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular, to participate aggressively in the American campaign against terrorism stems from a legitimate fear that an escalation of hostilities would incense their citizens and undermine their political stability. Now, after the start of military action, American emissaries will need to convince all Arabs and Muslims, not only their governments, that Muslim societies must not allow a few fanatics to commandeer their political future. 

As this war continues, the United States cannot afford to neglect the painful and frustrating, but critical, work of building bridges to Muslim peoples and societies. This task requires cultural sensitivity, understanding and full political and economic engagement with the Muslim world. 

American diplomats, even on the eve of war, have remained distracted and distant from the Muslim public. American embassies in the Middle East have long been impenetrable castles separated from the local communities. American ambassadors hardly venture out to participate and interact with the intellectual and cultural life in those countries. The United States would have benefited from investing in an Arabic-language media outlet similar to that of the BBC World Service. As matters stand, the video statement by Osama bin Laden -- that the events of Sept. 11 and afterward ''have divided the world into two parts, a part that espouses faith and is devoid of hypocrisy, and an infidel part, may God protect us from it'' -- comes as a culmination of years of anti-American broadcasts. 

It is not too late to show how important questions of justice have been and will be in American foreign policy. The United States needs to invest directly in Middle Eastern civil societies to improve governance, education, health and quality of life. The challenge in gaining greater understanding in those societies will no be easy, but American diplomats can help by overcoming their own bunker mentality. The use of force against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden was unavoidable given the terrorist threat. But the long-term aim of reducing anti-American fervor among Islamic extremists will still best be achieved by directly engaging with the Muslim people. The military response that began yesterday only makes the hard nonmilitary work, in the next weeks and years, more necessary than ever. 

Copyright © 2001, The New York Times Company 

The Tragedy of Arab-American Relations
The Christian Science Monitor, September 18, 2001 

BRONXVILLE, N.Y. - Sadly, I'm not surprised that the evidence for the most devastating terrorist attack in history points to a Middle East connection. I have just returned from the area after almost two years there as a MacArthur fellow. I was conducting field research on how Islamic movements perceive and interact with the West, particularly the United States. The writing was all over the wall.

For many Arabs, regardless of their politics, the US has replaced colonial Europe as the embodiment of evil. In their eyes, the US is the source of the ills and misfortunes that befell their world in the second part of the past century.

Today, to be politically conscious in the Arab world is to be highly suspicious of America, its policies, and its motives. Radical Islamists blame the US for their defeat at the hands of the pro-US Arab regimes. They claim that the West, particularly the US, tipped the balance of power in favor of secular regimes by providing them with decisive political and logistical support.

Reports about the identity of some of the hijackers point to a heavy presence of perpetrators with Persian Gulf nationalities. It is also likely that the fingerprints of the defeated remnants of Egyptian Jihad and al-jama`a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) will be found all over this horrendous terrorist attack on the United States. Most of the lieutenants and confidantes of Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden - the principal suspect - come from these organizations. 

In the past two years, the Afghan-based Mr. bin Laden has successfully recruited dozens of foot soldiers from the Gulf countries, mainly Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, signaling a shift in his tactics. This new development bodes ill for the long-term stability of the pro-US oil-producing monarchies.

Unfortunately, bin Laden's rhetoric has sunk deep roots in Arab soil. Hatred toward American foreign policy has become solidly entrenched in Arab popular culture as well as intellectual circles. Public discourse in the mosques and newspapers is full of references to America's legacy of aggression, manipulation, and subjugation of the Arabs.

There is legitimate Arab fury at America resulting from historical conditions and an arsenal of accumulated grievances, such as the questions of Israel, Iraq, and associations with the corrupt ruling elite. However, many Arabs refuse to take either moral or personal responsibility for their predicament. This perpetuates a sense of victimization. It also provides ammunition to terrorist groups, like bin Laden's, which are bent on waging a holy war against the "great Satan." 

Acts of hatred follow. On a visit to Hadramout, Yemen, last month with my wife and two children, a few Yemeni boys chatted with us and expressed a genuine desire to "kill" Americans for supporting Israel's oppression of the Palestinians.

It is no longer just bin Laden versus the United States. Arab children are being indoctrinated to hate Americans, thus providing a fertile breeding ground for bin Laden's foot soldiers.

My own generation - people in their 30s and 40s - has also been socialized into an anti-American mindset, which is difficult to critique or deconstruct. America, it is often claimed, conspired to humiliate and dominate the proud Arabs by corrupting their local elite and empowering their hostile neighbors. Intelligent Arab men of letters advance conspiratorial theories to explain Washington's conduct and animosity toward the Arab and Muslim people.

Many Arabs no longer distinguish between their legitimate criticism of US foreign policies and almost everything that America stands for. They dismiss American democracy as being hijacked by the privileged few. Blinded by anti-Americanism, Arabs see little good in American society - and overwhelming cultural and moral decay.

In their commentaries about the indecisive results in last year's US presidential election, Arabs evinced wishful thinking that the American empire was beginning to crumble from within.

Unfortunately, Arab politicians and commentators invest more time and energy in denouncing the US than in understanding American institutions and civil society. The Arab world does not win respect in the West by being morally outraged at United States foreign policy.

Arab countries are not taken seriously by the West, particularly the US, because they have failed to develop, democratize, and normalize relations between state and society. Economically and politically, the Arab Middle East is one of the regions left out in the world race to democratize and globalize. Authoritarianism and patriarchy are highly consolidated on every level of society, from the public sphere to the dinner table.

These shortcomings, not US foreign policies, are largely responsible for the lack of Arab development and progress.

Far from forcing Americans to rethink their stand on the Middle East, this terrorist attack will most likely produce opposite results. It is high time for the Arabs to take charge of their political destiny and fully embrace modernity. This process requires structural reform from within and total engagement with the world, including the eradication of terrorism. It is then - and then only - that just Arab causes will be considered legitimate.

Copyright © 2001, The Christian Science Monitor 

Islamic Seeds of Democracy
(One of two opposing commentaries released by UPI)

In the aftermath of the most devastating terrorist attack in U.S. history and the subsequent war against terrorism, a few voices in the Muslim and Western camps have depicted this recent struggle as no less than a clash of civilizations. 

Last month Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi fired the first shot in this war of words: "We should be conscious of the superiority of our civilization, which consists of a value system that has given people widespread prosperity in those countries that embrace it, and guarantees respect for human, political and religious rights," he said in Berlin. This respect certainly does not exist in the Islamic countries."

Berlusconi stated further that the West would "continue to conquer peoples" as it had "already done with the Communist world, and the moderate Arab states." It was necessary, added the Italian premier, to "extend to those [Muslims] who are 1,400 years behind the benefits that the West enjoys."

Berlusconi's assertion that the West is "superior" to Islam not only provides ammunition to dissidents, like Osama bin Laden - who twist this claim and manipulate it for their own deadly ends - but also begs the question of what civilization is. To what extent can Muslim civilization be viewed as a continuum, with an unbroken unity, from the time of the Prophet Muhammad to the present? At what historical point, and by what criteria, does one determine the "superiority" of the West and the inferiority of Islam?

If superiority is measured in terms of power, economic growth and technological innovation, then Western civilization has been remarkably successful during the past 200 years. However, the West's material dominance is not the result of any intrinsic or moral virtue but of the historical accident of European expansion. 

The irony is that many Muslims view the West's material accomplishment with contempt and assert, instead, Islam's moral and spiritual superiority. The claims of partisans on both sides tend to be ahistorical and are distorted by cultural and political blinders. 

Today the Islamic world is plagued by authoritarianism, political oppression, intolerance and intellectual apathy. The underlying causes of this decline are mainly internal. Islamic law and Islam's decentralized forms of authority and institutions - such as Sufi orders, gilds, madrasahs, and al-waqf (effective civil society organizations), which carried democratic seeds within their roots - failed to resist the tyrannical Islamic state.

In contrast to its Western counterpart, this tyrannical Islamic state co-opted and dominated Islam's local institutions as well the sharia (Islamic law) and ulama (the brotherhood of learned men) and monopolized and centralized authority at the expense of local autonomy. As a result, the level of violence increased considerably in the Muslim world. Political oppression by the state produced and reproduced a militant opposition, uninhibited about the use of terror and force.

The colonial powers' imposition of secular, central authority also intensified the level of violence and extremism in Muslim societies. Again, this reversal of fortunes in the world of Islam was a historical accident, not intrinsic to the religion itself. Most Westerners, far removed from the internal concord that had existed in the world of Islam, find it difficult to envision that blissful order.

Between the 16th and 19th centuries, while Europe was torn apart by bloody conflict and sociopolitical and religious upheaval, Muslims enjoyed relative peace and harmony. Although the world of Islam fought wars on its frontiers, those conflicts were not comparable to the scale of devastation that rocked Europe. In the Islamic world, autonomous local institutions produced messy, unstructured but nevertheless successful societies. They created a peaceful social order in which people of different religions and ethnicities felt secure and knew who they were and where they belonged. 

In contrast, although Western civilization was economically and technologically successful, it had many frightening traits and structural problems and was seen as a dismal failure. 

To illustrate the importance of taking the long view, consider the great Depression and the ethnic and religious persecution culminating in the Holocaust, which sowed doubts in the minds of many European citizens about the humanism and universalism of their culture. Would it not be misleading and reductionist to concentrate solely on this sad, bloody, and brutal chapter in the West's story and neglect other enlightening moments and epochs? 

The genius of the West lies in creating and sustaining an open society with legal and constitutional checks and balances, which guarantee, protect, and mediate individuals' rights, freedoms, and obligations. However, the Enlightenment was not a coincidence. It occurred as a result of trade and cross-fertilization of cultures, particularly with that of the world of Islam. For example, does not Aquinas get his reinterpretation and reintegration of the Aristotelian tradition for Christian Europe from his knowledge and contact with Muslim scholarship? 

Some critics of Islam might dismiss this intellectual exercise as futile, sentimental, and passé. But history matters greatly because it shows that Islam's decentralized institutions carry within them the seeds of democracy. The challenge facing the world of Islam is not to dwell on past injustices and to pin the blame on the colonial West for its decline. Rather, the challenge lies in rejuvenating Islam's previous forms of local autonomy and decentralized authority - to limit the powers and reach of the tyrannical state and empower the individual and free and release her creative spirit. This ambitious project requires cross-cultural fertilization and receptiveness to universal currents, not obsession with false and obsessive authenticity.